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Preface: understanding and promoting peace
clo Vol aAyA go, the mob assembles
Vol aAyA the mob assembles
clo boMb mAro go and throw the bomb
Sitting in Halol on a balcony, reecting on some interesting interview snippets, I heard a few
children playing downstairs. It took a few rounds of their game until I became aware of the verse
they used as their counting rhyme. Much later, I understood what it meant: what they were
singing in heavy dialect, and what disturbed my lavish academic endeavours, was post-conict
reality in its most traumatic and absurd way. The sun was shining. And kids were counting
mobs and bombs. Similar disturbance returned time and again during eld research and while
listening to my tapes at home. The children of Halol (almost cynically) held my analysis on track
and often put my feet back on the ground in very unexpected ways. When presenting a scientic
typology of "Being Muslim and working for peace", I of course do so in a way acceptable to
academia. But from the beginning, this project involved more than a graduation thesis: a rst
idea came up among development practitioners in summer 2007, followed by eld cooperation
with several NGOs in spring 2008 who might eventually benet in their work from my ndings.
While this preface is primarily written for them, it might also give academic readers an idea of
my personal involvement: the ction of neutral observance, though academically necessary, is
still a ction and you should be aware of what it covers.
Gujarat is the home state of Mohandas Kamarchand Gandhi; from here the Mahatma set
o on his historic salt march, promising not to return until India was liberated by non-violent
means (cp. Gandhi, 1939; Nanda, 2004). It is also the state with the deepest communal
rifts in India (cp. Yagnik & Sheth, 2005, p. 276.; Varshney, 2002, p. 7). Here, fascism
became mainstream political thought and led to state-supported riots against Muslims in spring
2002. Practitioners often wondered why I focussed on religion and peace in this context. Of
course, communal violence of such scale has to be explained, especially when concentrated on
the area where the Sabarmati Ashram gave inspiration to one of the world's most astonishing
struggles. Indeed, many models have been developed to analyze the process of fascist identity
shaping, the instrumentality of communal rioting or the role of intolerant religious teachings.
But this knowledge about fundamentalists, rioters or terrorists is not sucient to understand and
encourage peace activism. Without denying that physical security might be the core of peace,
sound research should explain its emergence or production as a process sui generis; similarly,
interventions should not just be designed by simply inverting those factors leading to violence.
In short, I thus focus on peace activists as a group of its own, because "until we study
ethnic peace, we will not be able to have a good theory of ethnic conict" (Varshney, 2002,
p. 6; for an even stronger bias towards violence in research on Gujarat cp. Burman, 2005, p.
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4 and Heitmeyer, 2009, p. 118). Furthermore, research on peace activists with Muslim back-
grounds could provide practitioners with arguments to challenge the core of Hindu nationalism
{ a problematic understanding of India's Muslim past { and help them ground their emerging
cooperations for peace. In his comprehensive work about Hindutva thought, Sharma (2006)
argues that dialogue is necessary and possible to counter fascist ideology. Unless the core of
this mindset is questioned, sustainable peace won't be achieved. "This suggestion of a con-
versation might sound politically naive and impractical. Yet, without undertaking a journey
to the antagonistic 'other', there is little hope" (p. 3; cp. similar arguments by Zaid, 2008,
p.344 or Schäfer, 2008a, p. 12). This "other" is primarily driven by a specic image of Islam
and Muslims, portrayed as alien, violent (nowadays: terroristic) and dangerous; their assumed
violence is often the prime justication for the whole project of martial Hinduism, undertaken
as an act of "self-defence" (Sharma, 2006, p. 10; cp. also Metcalf, 2005, p. 217). Unfortunately,
much of recent academic and journalistic writing supports this biased picture by focussing on
fundamentalism. I hope to be able to show that not all Muslims are violent terrorists and that
instead some inspiring personalities are quite active for peace. I also want to show that rioters
and peace activists can neither be distinguished by religious identity as such nor by one single of
its subdimensions: some peace activists are inuenced by their faith, some by their relation to
their community, some by both and some by neither; some become more religious during their
activism, some shed this aspect of their identity. All these congurations and dynamics can also
be found among terrorists (cp. Miller, 2006, p. 126 or Esposito & Mogahed, 2008, p. 161f. and
p. 182). With a comprehensive explorative research design, I thus try to move beyond formal
and overly abstract categories to give an initial understanding of how complex religious identi-
ties relate to the struggle for peace, presenting the diversity of this relation among Muslims in
Gujarat. If a clearer picture inspired fresh intervention designs and new coalitions for conict
transformation, it would make me happy and the interviewees' contributions worthier than they
would be for a shelved thesis.
The hope for practical relevance nally leads back to the children of Halol { and to Gandhi-Ji.
His central assumption was that lasting peace must be based on truth and justice (cp. Iyer, 2000,
p. 229). Overcoming communal hatred and religious fascism by building justice (or inventing
new counting rhymes and rules) is out of reach for a researcher. But as far as truth is concerned
(and I am fully aware how dangerous that word can be in the realm of social sciences) I hope
to give further insights { so that understanding peace helps promoting it.
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1 Research question and relevance
This study explores one particular aspect of religion in conict: the variety of connections be-
tween a person's religious identity and his or her peace activism. The biographies of 19 Muslims
provide the empirical basis; they were given and explained to me in qualitative interviews in
Gujarat/India in spring 2008. Among them, I found very dierent functions of religious identity
for political behaviour, including irrelevance. For example, some interviewees were inspired by
an Islamic ethic to build refugee camps or to initiate interfaith dialogue (like those in section
5.1), while others did not particularly care about religious beliefs, but developed a deep bond to
fellow Muslims from which they drew strength to assist in trauma healing (a prominent theme
in section 5.4). Further, there were those born as Muslim, but active for dierent reasons (in-
troduced in section 5.2) { and frequently, identities were inuenced in reverse and transformed
by the struggle for peace (most prominently discussed in section 5.3).
By looking in depth at this complexity, I try to counter three shortcomings in existing
research on religious identity and conict: a methodical gap, theoretical confusion and a biased
selection of cases. Methodically, a few specic assumptions are frequently generalized without
sucient exploration, skipping a crucial step in the research process. That way, rather marginal
theological ideas could be overrated and theories about ethnic conicts could improperly be
transfered to religious groups. An example of the latter is the opinion that elites maintain an
optimal ingroup size to gain advantages over outgroups by instrumentalizing markers of identity
(e.g. Schlee, 2006, p. 36). This ignores that the maintenance of religious group boundaries
might often be based on genuine dogmatic concerns and does not necessarily intend a change
in intergroup relations (for India cp. Mines, 1981, p. 85). An example of the former opinion
is the idea that Sus' spirituality is comparatively peaceful because its emphasis on a "greater
spiritual jihad" appears non-political (e.g. Rosemann, 2007, p. 86). Quite on the contrary,
Schlee (2006, p. 96) calls (reformed) Susm the rst manifestation of modern political Islam
and during the identity-sharpening Islamic revivalism in India in 19th century, Sus played a key
role (cp. Mayaram, 1997, p. 232). By systematically disclosing empirical variance, explorative
qualitative research can broaden such narrow perspectives and enables the development of sound
theories: prior to deductive research, one has to nd out what might be relevant therein.
An often vague empirical foundation leaves more space for theoretical unclarity, the second
shortcoming I try to address. In particular, two contradictory but equally narrow identity con-
cepts compete. On the one hand, mainstream socio-psychological tradition states that the mere
fact of identifying with a group could cause dichotomic perception and facilitate violence (e.g.
Hammack, 2008, p. 228 { ultimately referring to Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In their practical
conclusions, scholars in this tradition tend to assume that less identication would increase the
likeliness of peace activism. They also tend to treat religion purely as a variety of ethnicity
and thus emphasize group dynamics over religious beliefs (cp. Jackson & Smith, 1999 as an
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overview; Svensson, 2007, Seul, 1999 or Hanf, 1999 in relation to religion; and Ghosh & Kumar,
2007 or Ruback & Singh, 2007 on India). Meanwhile, other scholars present just the opposite
argument: religious actors should be strengthened, because only "mature" identity and "strong"
religiosity enables them to resist religion's instrumentalization and to nurture peace (cp. pri-
marily Appleby, 2000 and Johansen, 1996 for India). With identity, though, the latter mainly
mean personal basic beliefs and tend to ignore group dynamics.
Unfortunately, neither tradition on its own can reliably grasp the existential frame of polit-
ical behaviour, because religious "identity has a structure which sometimes involves a symbolic
order and at times a corporate or social order" (Mines, 1981, p. 65; my emphasis). More-
over, scholars in both traditions frequently argue essentialistic, ignoring how experience and
culture dynamically shape identities. Brubaker (2004) concludes that "whatever its suggestive-
ness, whatever its indispensability in certain practical contexts, ,identity' is too ambiguous, too
torn between ,hard' and ,soft' meanings, essentialist connotations and constructivist qualiers,
to serve well the demands of social analysis" (p. 29). As an alternative, he suggests three
comparatively clear-cut concepts, which cover both uses of "identity" discussed above in precise
terms: "categorization" (an abstract, marker-based process, p. 41), "self-understanding" (a
set of cognitive assumptions, p. 44) and "groupness" (as an emotional feeling of belonging, p.
46). His dimensions one and three can be combined when analyzing the biographic experience
of one's own identity, since an emotional attachment requires a categorically specied group to
attach to and on the other hand self-categorization without any emotion is unlikely (though it
happens; cp. section 5.2). I thus analyze dynamics of group identication (consisting of cat-
egorization and degrees of "groupness") and religious beliefsets (the cognitive aspect of being
Muslim, partly manifested in ritual practice) to understand religious identity more completely
and less confusing than usual { and, through identity, peace activism.
Research question: by exploring political behaviour, religious beliefsets and group
identication, I hope to develop a comprehensive understanding of how religious
identity (as an abstract categorization as well as a psychodynamic process linking
oneself to a Muslim community and a set of beliefs about God, religion and the world)
accounts for biographical anchorage of peace activism and how political behaviour
in turn inuences dimensions of religious identity. My aim is to hermeneutically
extract, separate and characterize dierent ways of "being Muslim and working for
peace", systematically disclosing empirical variance.
The title of this thesis has several connotations, most of them unintended. First of all, it
suggests that identity is static while activism is dynamic. Of course, whatever constitutes the
inner self might arguably be more static than the multitude of activities taking place while work-
ing for peace (identity, after all, signies something staying identical). But identities are never
absolutely unchanging background factors. To see how they are dynamically shaped through
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activism is an important counter balance to understand how activism is facilitated by identity.
More, religion is not necessarily the most important identity dimension for all those born as
Muslims, although scholars often assume so. While I put particular focus on religion, this must
not reect interviewees' priorities { and in fact, some were rather upset when addressed in reli-
gious categories (in particular those activists presented in section 5.2). Further, identity seldom
determines action. Kippenberg (2008, p. 25) argues that even persons with clear value-rational
motivation still act in changing contexts and that belief and behaviour therefore correlate at
best (for the unclear relation between religious belief and prosocial behaviour in particular cp.
Grom, 1992, p. 210). Even more: nobody acts without contingency. Although social scientists
naturally strive to identify motivations for deeds, they should weigh their explanations with
respect to serendipic factors, as Becker (1998, p. 32) demonstrates.
Still, peace activism does not happen at random: which options for action people perceive in
the rst place is pre-structured by identity (together with situational factors; social psychologists
speak about category salience; e.g. Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, & Martin, 2001, p. 14). While
group identication dynamics and religious beliefsets do not determine action, they shed light on
important subjective restraints and leeways for activism as a micro-level factor distinct from, but
linked to agency (cp. Schäfer, 2008a, p. 23f.). Reconstructing the dynamics of identity means
reconstructing the relation between religion and peace on the very level on which activism
emanates. Pure literature studies, which interpret a body of cultural or religious heritage (such
as the Quran), would be inappropriate for understanding identity, because "the relation between
the structural elements of experience and its performative expression always resembles a risky,
fallible transformation [...], a creative translation between a culturally shaped interpretation of
meaning and a qualitative conduct of life" (Jung, 2007, p. 65f.; my translation). Any study of
religious identity must necessarily proceed empirically to be able to catch the contingency and
liberty space between religious identity and political behaviour, "retain[ing] a clear commitment
to the individual as a meaningful unit of analysis" (Hammack, 2008, p. 240).
But not only "being Muslim", also the phrase "working for peace" invites contestation: which
work in particular is an adequate mean to this end? For sampling, I pragmatically bypassed
the problem and included everybody who would refer to him- or herself as a "peace activist"
(cp section 4.1 for sampling details; for the dierent Hindi terms section 5.3). A substantial
conceptualization of peace activism is not necessary due to the scope of my research question:
I try to reconstruct several ways of how religious identity and political behaviour interact, not
several ways of working for peace as such. Conceptually, I treat peace activism as a black box
to be lled empirically. Consequently, I found quite diverse approaches and people working for
negative and positive peace alike: some provide victims relief or legal counsel, others promote
dialogue, heal trauma or inuence friends and family. Not all approaches might be considered
proper peace activism if one uses a normative denition (e.g. as proposed by Brand-Jacobsen
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& Jacobsen, 2003, p. 107.). One can especially question if a mere private inuence on family
members is institutionalized enough to be considered activism, if this is, even in a broad sense,
political behaviour. One can also doubt whether rehabilitation of internally displaced people
could not be better described as disaster relief { and the fact that one interviewee (in section
5.1) presented missionary activities as peacebuilding is denitely problematic. Nevertheless,
most activities at least broadly t { and because a proper denition is contested among local
practitioners themselves (important implications are summarized in chapter 2), I leave the nal
judgement to them (and will take up the issue again in the conclusion).
Last not least, eld research was situated in India to tackle the third shortcoming in existing
research: a biased selection of cases. Many studies on India ignore Muslims and most on Islam
ignore India (for exceptions cp. section 3.3). This surprises, because looking at India could
highlight once more that a scriptural approach to Islam (as said to be prevalent in the Arab
countries) demands sociological explanation and should not just be mirrored in bluntly deductive
research designs: actual beliefs can not be derived from presumably standardizing scriptural
sources (cp. Brasted, 2005, p. 109 and Malik, 2003, p. 376). Unfortunately, the "normative
thrust of this approach has [...] prevented the appreciation of the bewildering diversity of beliefs,
rituals and religious practices that underlies the faith in dierent parts of the world. [...] While
Muslims in India no doubt subscribe to the fundamental Islamic precepts [...] each community
carries its own social construct of what is orthodox" (Ahmad, 1981, p. 11 and p. 18; cp. Mines,
1981, p. 69 and Burman, 2005, p. 9f.). India could be an instructive case for a sociological
appreciation of the diversity in Islamic doctrine { and again an explorative design seems most
appropriate for reconstructing the role of religious identity in Muslims' political behaviour.
There is a second reason to look at India: there, the prevalent form of religious violence
is communal rioting and not the fundamentalist terrorism dominating academic and political
discourse. Because these riots are neither clearly an issue of psychological group dynamics (iden-
tication) nor of religious content (beliefsets), they are promising to develop a comprehensive
understanding of identity. That way, they dier from the cases of terrorism or sectarian cults
(which do not necessarily draw from a wider ingroup basis) and of ethno-religious separatism
(which uses far more political and historical than purely religious references). An example of In-
dia could thus also enhance the understanding of identity by inspiring an integration of beliefsets
with socio-psychological dynamics (or at least a simultaneous consideration of both).
Reecting general demography, a bigger share of Indian activists has a Hindu background.
I nevertheless chose to focus on Muslims { and this is the last decision to be justied in this
introduction. A rst reason is purely pragmatic: I simply know far more (and still too little)
about Islam than about Hinduism, and would neither be able to work through Hindu religious
beliefsets nor deal with the question to what extent "Hinduism" could or should be described
as a religion the way Islam could. Further, practitioners are more interested in research on
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Muslims and Islam than on Hindu traditions. But there is also a reason beyond pragmatism:
"the project of sustaining communal coexistence, although nominally espoused by a majority
of [people], is one which inevitably falls much more heavily on the shoulders of [...] Muslims,
given the wider political context in which ultimately it is their livelihoods, lives and well-being
which remain most at stake" (Heitmeyer, 2009, p. 118). It is unfortunate that many studies
on communalism reconstruct in detail how "othering" Muslims facilitates formation of Hindu
identity, while treating Muslim identities in turn rather vague (cp. M. Hasan, 2008, p. 2). Still,
a similar study about Hindu peace activists would be interesting.
Following this introduction, the next chapter sketches the actual eld context { in the In-
dian state Gujarat { by commenting on institutional landscape and NGO debates over proper
interventions into communal conict. Chapter three will roughly summarize ve academic dis-
courses, presenting the background knowledge on which later analysis builds upon. Chapter
four contains a set of explorative tools and methods of classication: the scientic foundation
of abductive research. Throughout the paper, a diagram with central concepts, research instru-
ments, analytical tools and index categories is generated in four steps, with the rst version
printed below. In chapter ve, I shall present results and introduce four typical combinations of
group identication, religious beliefsets and political behaviour identied among Gujarati Mus-
lims working for peace: faith based actors, secular leaders, emancipating women and doubting
professionals. Although this typology targets some of the gaps in existing research, it can of
course not solve all problems. Finally, chapter six invites to think beyond my initial steps { to
further improve the understanding of religious identity and political behaviour during conict.
Self Under-
standing
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Figure 1: conceptual framework; Brubaker (2004)'s dimensions highlighted (continued with
research instruments on page 32, analytical tools on page 35 and index categories on page 42).
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2 Field context
Inside India, the central districts of the western state Gujarat was chosen for eld research
(cp. map in the appendix). After justifying the research question, I shall roughly introduce
the institutional and discoursive context. Since long, Gujarat has comparatively deep commu-
nal ruptures in many districts. Following a brutal pogrom against Muslims in 2002, parts of
civic society started explicit post-conict interventions (cp. Hardiman, 2007; Varshney, 2002,
p. 220f.). In spring the same year, 59 Hindu nationalist pilgrims were burned in a train in
Godhra; the re was set by a majority Muslim crowd after heated exchanges of words and sts
(cp. Engineer, 2003, p. 18f.). Soon, mainstream media and the state government encouraged
"revenge". What followed was not spontaneous, though, but largely resembled a pre-planned
assault on the state's Muslim communities, using Godhra as a pretext. The violence claimed
over 2.000 casualties in three weeks, aected over 150.000 Muslims and left several ten thousands
of them permanently internally displaced (cp. Yagnik & Sheth, 2005, p. 282 and Heitmeyer,
2009, p. 104). Finally, chief minister Narendra Modi and his BJP party won a landslide victory
in the december elections 2002: "communal intolerance had reached ash point" (Brasted, 2005,
p. 106). The direct involvement of the state, brutality, scale, and one-sidedness of violence are
reasons for many activists not to speak of "riots" but of "ethnic cleansing" (Setalvad, 2007, p.
108), "genocide" (Hashmi, 2007, cover) or "holocaust" (Engineer, 2003, p. 1). Although these
terms are debatable, they rightly point out two obvious characteristics of the 2002 violence:
direct state facilitation and massive support of the elite.
But the state played ambivalent roles in previous riots as well (cp. Basu & Kohli, 1998 and
Basu, 2007 who by and large argue that the complicaty of the state has reasons in caste-related
electioneering). Genuinely new were only the NGO interventions in the aftermath: many devel-
opment practitioners in Gujarat became involved in conict management for the rst time. Prior
to actual interviews, I spoke with 14 (both Hindu and Muslim) NGO representatives and promi-
nent individuals in Ahmedabad and Baroda/Vadodara (cp. appendix) to understand how they
approach peacebuilding in general and the relations between religion and conict in particular.
After 2002, nearly all organizations formed common action platforms to provide victims with
immediate relief. While some faith-based organizations did not change this focus, some other
of them and most secular organizations did (throughout the whole paper, I will use the term
secular/secularism as it is popularly used in India, i.e. not as an academic, but as a political
term, used in a society's self-reection; cp. Ruh, 2008, p. 36 and section 3.3). Today they are
working in various elds from justice to dialogue to education. Most organizations propagated a
contact hypothesis and tried to engage people from dierent communities in cross-cutting issues
(working in conict). The long established NGO Sanchetana, for example, describes a typical
strategy using such a contact hypothesis in a recent leaet:
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"Identify the common problems of the common poor people, work with them to
create awareness about the commonality of their problems. This could lead to a
possibility of forming organizations of people from various religions to address the
issues aicting them. The bondage thus created can be strengthened by jointly
planning action programs. This breaks the alienation and sense of separateness."
Many background informants, who chose this peacebuilding approach, argued that religion
has been instrumentalized by politicians in 2002; consequently, it would be more promising to
weave a strong social fabric which can resist such instrumentalization than to start interfaith
dialogues. For them, an attempt to reconstruct inter-communal everyday relations is key, not
a deep engagement in conict dynamics themselves. Fewer organizations ventured into explicit
peacebuilding (working on conict), an approach exemplied in a brochure of the NGO Samerth:
"In the year 2005, Samerth initiated the process of networking with schools to con-
duct sessions with the children on peace building using the peace education modules.
[...] One of the sta comments: 'if children ingrain these values, change in their at-
titudes will denitely ensure peace and harmony.'"
Here, communal conict is at the center of intervention { be it as peace education, religious
dialogue or through the reconstruction of shared spaces, holy sites visited by several communities
(cp. section 3.4). Irrespective of the strategic dierence between working in or working on
conict, though, very few background informants had experience with work in conict before
2002. After the riots, many NGOs considerably changed their approach or sta composition (if
they were not founded as a reaction to the riots anyway). The institutional landscape is still
changing as the quest for an adequate reaction continues. Most NGOs consider it a mistake that
they ignored Muslim communities before 2002 and started to include them as a new target group
in existing programs. Background informants justied this inclusion by attributing neediness,
passiveness and a lack of leadership to Muslim communities (cp. Noorani, 2004, p. 1), which
they explained by a lack of education, insucient political representation, surrender to fate or
plain fear. But although it is important to work against the socio-economic marginalization
of many Muslims (cp. Sachar et al., 2006), it often remained unclear why this should prevent
violence or strengthen peace.
Even more, the above mentioned assessment of Muslim communities was strongly contested
by other informants and I witnessed a lively discussion where the attribution of passiveness was
rejected as a subtile variety of victimization. This objection of a minority of NGO representatives
(as well secular as faith-based) hints at a deeper problem: the "peace community" in Gujarat
could be structurally blind for its Muslim members. Despite frequent tensions between small
rural and large urban organizations, many secular NGOs in particular had problems with faith-
based counterparts, which they consider highly communalized. At the same time, non-practicing
Muslims active for peace were not recognized as Muslims. It is not the point to judge these
decisions in any specic case, especially since my own sampling was based on self-categorization
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only (cp. section 4.1). But I want to highlight how boundaries are maintained: the leadership
from within Muslim communities is rejected as illegitimate because it is faith-based, and, if it
is not faith-based but secular, it is not recognized as coming from Muslims. Lack of leadership
might be then the logical consequence of these prior assumptions, but not necessarily an empirical
fact. This potentially wrong conclusion often stems from the awed assumption that all Muslims
always act religiously, while my research intends to unravel the complexity of the interaction
between religious identity dimensions and political behaviour. I can not statistically proof
whether Muslims are more or less active than other people, but the data at least suggest the
possibility that dierent groups just ignore each other.
Despite mapping the institutional landscape and prevalent intervention designs, I was also
interested in background informants' take on religion in communal conict. Most of them
intuitively focused on the relation of religion and violence and propagated an hypothesis of in-
strumentalization: religion "itself" was either innocent or terrible, but ultimately irrelevant (cp.
sections 3.1 and 3.5 for similar argumentative tendencies among social scientists). Many pointed
at the successful indoctrination of rural and lower-caste masses through martial Hindutva ide-
ology, but saw therein a political, not a religious strategy. For example, the RSS's sustainable
grassroot approach was recognized as a case of optimum NGO work. But this merely left an
uneasy feeling, and did not start a reection on possible causes for their success, especially not
for causes which could be related to religion. The ignorance towards genuine religious factors
was shared by faith-based and secular organizations alike, although some of the former tended to
essentialize religion { for them, the issue then was less one of essentials being instrumentalized,
but more one of true essentials vs. false essentials. Directly asked about the relation between
religious identity and peace, about a third of all background informants mentioned ambivalence,
another third saw a spiritual motivation as fruitful in peacebuilding and a last third held that
religious concepts might be inspiring, while groupness should best be shunned. When saying
"identity", most of them meant primordial group membership combined with a xed set of
religious beliefs: an essentialistic and stable conceptualization.
Similar collections of interviews conducted by Lobo and Das (2006), Engineer (2003) and
Ganguly, Jowher, and Dabhi (2006) by and large conrmed what my informants said: their
account seems to reect mainstream civil society discourse. In an ethnographic study of a
central Gujarati town neighbouring the locations of the interviewees of this study, Heitmeyer
(2009, p. 103) convincingly termed the "normative discourses presenting the 2002 violence as
an aberration [...] a collective strategy of containing the tension and mutual suspicion which
remain constant undercurrents in daily life". While containing tensions might pragmatically be
necessary, though, it does not help to clarify the role of religion in conict; this research tries to
move beyond them.
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3 Academic discourses
This study is based on explorative interviews, from which I extract an empirically grounded
typology (the method is further explained in chapter 4). In this process, existing literature on
Islam and Muslims or on politics and identity serves as a pool of inspiration, not as a rigid the-
oretical foundation. For heuristic purposes, careful deduction is not necessary. Besides, dealing
comprehensively with religion, conict, fundamentalism, and several hundred years of Muslim
history in India on a few pages would be beyond the scope of this study. Instead, ve discourses
relevant to my topic will roughly be sketched by commenting on a few instructive books in each.
Doing so, one can extract those "sensitizing concepts" (Blumer, 1954, as commented by Kelle
& Kluge, 1999, p. 25f.), which will later become instructive for the interpretation of empirical
data. The rst two sections present how global academia treats religion in conict, on the one
hand acknowledging the ambivalence of the sacred (3.1), on the other hand frequently limiting
the topic to the problem of fundamentalism (3.2). The other sections cover important political
traditions in Indian Islam and colonial inuence (3.3), criticize clear-cut group categorization
(3.4) and review recent academic work on Hindu-Muslim riots (3.5).
3.1 The ambivalence of the sacred
"Most religious societies, in fact, have interpreted their experience of the sacred in
such a way as to give religion a paradoxical role in human aairs { as the bearer
of peace and the sword. These [...] reect a continuing struggle within religions
{ and within the heart of each believer { over the meaning and character of the
power encountered in the sacred and its relationship to coercive force or violence.
[...] The ambivalence of religion toward violence, toward the sacred itself, is actually
good news for those who recognize, correctly, that religion will continue to be a
major force [...] indeed, religions, despite the shameful record of a minority of their
adherents, are strikingly accomplished in developing their own traditions of peace-
related practices and concepts." (Appleby, 2000, p. 27 and p. 306)
Religion has always been at times a more, at times a less fashionable topic in social sci-
ence (cp. Kippenberg, 2008, p. 28f.). The latest shift of emphasis occured with the Iranian
revolution in 1979 and drew particular attention to the link between religious revivalism and
violent conict. Latest since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, even those who were
otherwise ignoring the issue (cp. Frühbauer, 2004, p. 126) deal with it in one or two paragraphs
of their texts: "religion matters" (Philpott, 2007, p. 522). The historical triggers predestinate a
particular focus: while the modernistic paradigm of global secularization ceded, the rediscovery
of religion was and often still is understood as a "return" that brings back a violence thought to
be historically overcome (cp. Hildebrandt, 2007, p. 3 or Makrides & Rüpke, 2005, p. 7). This
is true of many recent books and articles, irrespective of whether examples of religious "holy
wars" are collected (e.g. Partner, 1997), fundamentalism is feared (sometimes well informed,
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e.g. Pargeter, 2008, sometimes hysterically, e.g. Ulfkotte, 2007), today's relevance of secularism
is discussed (e.g. Maier, 2004; Roy, 2007), religious human rights are claimed (e.g. Little, 1995),
religiously inspired terror is explained (e.g. Juergensmeyer, 2005; Miller, 2006), Huntington's
thesis of a clash of civilization is assessed (e.g. Fox, 2001, 2004) or the monotheistic idea is
reconstructed (e.g. Assmann, 2000, 2003 and, partly revising, 2006). In summary, Lewis (2002)
simply asks: "what went wrong?" (cp. critically Robinson, 2007, p. 6).
It is largely due to the intervention of Appleby (2000) that a growing part of academic
discourse begins to assess religion as an ambivalent factor in conict (cp. Wilhelmy, 2006;
Weingardt, 2008, 2009). If this had previously been noticed at all, it was usually explained
with a compromise between "ideological consideration" and "compulsion of living" (Madan,
1981, p. 58); religion was either a violence-provocing ideology restrained only by context or a
harmless traditional way of living, viciously exploited by politics of identity (cp. Oberdorfer,
2004, p. 142). Appleby (2000) instead argues that religion itself oscillates "between eden and
armageddon" (Gopin, 2000), that ambivalence roots in the core of the "mysterium tremendum
et fascinans" (Otto, 1917). But speculations about the essence of the sacred do not help to
understand the social specics of its experience: additional factors mediate the transformation
of ambivalence into political strategies (cp. Kippenberg, 2005, 2008, p. 206f.). According to
Hasenclever and de Juan (2007), at least four religious factors can escalate conict:
1. "Religious traditions can be used to develop a sense of community despite political, social,
or ethnic fragmentation" (p. 25) as they anchor identities in transcendental spheres.
2. Having achieved this, religion is (like any ideology) able to transform divisible into indi-
visible conicts, which are often more complicated to resolve (p. 26).
3. Religious teachings can justify sacrices (or even make them more likely) by promising
transcendental rewards in the afterlife (p. 26).
4. Religious organizations often have access to well developed logistic networks and transna-
tionally generate income; they might use both for escalation (p. 27).
On the other hand, religion can support de-escalation of conict, too. Again, Hasenclever
and de Juan (2007) list several factors that have been suggested in recent research:
1. Religious authorities can publicly demand an end to violence or a (re-)secularization of
conicts with moral arguments (p. 28; prominent in Gujarat: Bandukwala, 2006)
2. Religious communities can mobilize global civic society, as they often can continue to
report on conicts when international aid agencies had to withdraw (p. 29).
3. Religious authorities frequently have high credibility among conict parties which they
can use as mediators in peace negotiations (p. 29).
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4. In the long run, inclusivist religious teachings can change actors' perceptions through
initiatives of interfaith dialogue or powerful rites of interpersonal reconciliation (p. 30; cp.
on dialogue Grieser, 2005, p. 181, Abu-Nimer, 2001, p. 16 and Gopin, 2000, p. 42).
5. Last not least, religions can contribute to the reduction of structural causes of conict by
objecting social injustice (p. 32).
For most research, religious identity serves only as an empty signier, though: the term
hints at the other side of the respective analysis, but can not account for it (interesting excep-
tions are Seul, 1999, Hammack, 2008 and Schäfer, 2008b, who try to include identity in their
framework). This study in contrast focusses on identity in order to de-essentialize Appleby's
main insight: that religion's ambivalence in conict might well root in the experience of the
sacred itself. Many scholars object "transcendental experience" as conceptually too inexible
and inaccessible to context-sensitive analysis. But by emphasizing the sacred's subjective inter-
pretation on cognitive as well as on experiential, social-psychological levels (beliefsets and group
identication), objectivating essentialism can be avoided without reducing religion to a passive
factor whose ambivalence stems only from context. One can reconstruct religious identities as
semantic operators and psychodynamic processes and highlight the conditions and consequences
of their formation without denying that actors themselves experience them as an essential force.
In this sense, this study builds on Appleby's main insight: it explores the peaceful side of
ambivalence, but try to avoid essentialism with an abductive design (re-constructing, not just
mirroring narratives) and a theoretical focus on (subjective, thus contingent) identity. This will
hopefully help to concretize the "ambivalence of the sacred" on the micro-level to make it usable
for a better understanding of political behaviour.
3.2 Fundamentalism
"Fundamentalist movements are movements which (1) absolutize religious convic-
tions (i.e. any belief) and which (2) deduce from these convictions a strategy of
social dominance that tries to subdue private and public life. Context (3) for such a
strategy is the fundamental politicization of all spheres of life during modernization
processes" (Schäfer, 2008a, p. 18, my translation)
Most authors in the emerging discourse on religion and conict, whether they share the
consensus of ambivalence or not, focus on the problem of fundamentalism. Under this heading,
they discuss either orthodox beliefs (read: teachings in certain Sunni law schools), scriptural
understanding of religious texts (read: of the Quran), traditionalist moral demands (read: pa-
triarchy in the Arab peninsula) or global terrorism (for the problematical use of obscuring labels
{ often meaning Islam without saying so { cp. Heine, 2004, p. 9). In the Indian context, the
semantic is even less precise; for example, A. Khan (2005, p. 29.) lists that "Islamic radicals"
oppose secularism, modernism, ethnic nationalism, Susm, traditionalism, all kind of political
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or economical elites and several groups of non-Muslims at the same time. On the contrary,
Schäfer (2008a) suggests a narrow and formal denition to enable precise analyses: only those
actors should be termed fundamentalist who treat beliefs as unquestionable and try to impose
them on society. Although absolutizing anything necessarily includes a notion of superiority
and thus a potential nucleus of conict, Schäfer urges to distinguish privatist seclusion from a
political strategy of dominance (referring to Weber's denition of world-dominating rather than
world-escaping religion; cp. similar denitions by Rieger, 2005; Conermann, 2003a; Riesebrodt,
2000, p. 55 or Heine, 2004, p. 81 { and their comprehensive discussion by Kessler, 2008). Only
actors with a strategy of dominance enter the struggle of contesting modernities. Despite their
traditionalist image, they act as modern as their opponents in equally politicizing all spheres
of life. Compared to them, though, fundamentalists adopt a particularly radical approach and
construct politics as a friend-enemy distinction, which, when unchecked by pragmatic restraints,
easily leads to violent annihilation (cp. Bakr et al., 2003, p. 8 and Schmitt, 1927).
Schäfer's denition is intentionally formal to cover fundamentalists of several religious tradi-
tions and he analyzes fundamentalism as a specic mode of politics combinable with any belief.
Still, Islamic fundamentalists by and large share not only a formal dynamic, but also a com-
mon theological argumentation (cp. A. Alam, 2007, p. 32). It is particularly the thought of
one of the most inuential theologians of political Islam on the subcontinent, the founder of
the Jamaat-e-Islami Maulana Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi that exemplies this framework (cp.
Conermann, 2003b; Ende & Steinbach, 1996, p. 636). He writes:
"The most fundamental and the most important teaching [...] is faith in the oneness
of God. This is expressed in the primary Kalimah of Islam as 'There is no deity
but Allah' (La ilaha illallah). This beautiful phrase is the bedrock of Islam, its
foundation and its essence. [...] The acceptance or denial of this phrase produces
a world of dierence between man and man. The believers in it become one single
community and those who do not believe in it form an opposing group. [...] [The] real
dierence lies in the conscious acceptance of this doctrine and complete adherence to
it in practical life. [...] Man became guilty of shirk [...] only because he turned away
from the teachings of the Prophets and depended on his own faulty reasoning, false
perceptions or biased interpretations. Tawhid dispels all the clouds of ignorance and
illuminates the horizon with the light of reality." (Maududi, 2004, p. 83f. and p. 89)
To insist on the oneness of God (Tawhid) as the core of Islam is nothing spectacular and that
this belief, if absolutized, separates Muslims from an "opposing group" is a logical consequence.
Since the time of the Caliphs, mainstream Islamic scholarship assumes that Tawhid also includes
God's word, the Quran. Because this book is not only regarded as one of God's many creations
but as part of his being, adding or removing something from it by way of autonomous reasoning
becomes highly problematic (cp. Küng, 2006, p. 360.). But this mainstream tradition does
not denounce reason as such: there has always been "a strong and continuing tradition of
interpretation and reinterpretation of Islamic principles to address changing times" (Smock &
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Huda, 2009, p. 5). Tradition emphasizes a never-ending circle of interpretation: suspected
contradictions between reason and Quranic teachings should inspire the believer to take the
application of reason a step further, ultimately leading to the (re-)integration of both; until then,
the case is kept pending (cp. Özsoy, 2008, p. 279). Maududi, on the contrary, categorically
distinguishes "the teachings of the Prophet" and "faulty reasoning, false perceptions or biased
interpretations". He claims that the only objective interpretation of Quran is his (his own
journal was titled "Interpret of Quran"; cp. Conermann, 2003b), which he presents not as an
interpretation rather than as the direct, "unbiased" representation of Quranic reality, reducing
further thinking to a mere act of memorization and reason to a semantic guise. Because more
and more spheres of life become inaccessible to deliberation if the "light of reality" putatively
speaks for itself, this approach leads, when turned into a political strategy, indeed to a radical
"world of dierence" between those accepting "reality" and those who do not. Fundamentalists
"draw a line inside the Muslim world between what is Islamic and what is not. [...] The need
to [...] dene objectively what Islam is - in short to 'objectify' Islam - is a logical consequence"
(Roy, 2004, p. 22; similarly Buruma & Margalit, 2004, p. 121f. and Schieder, 2008, p. 59.).
In precisely this sense fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon; it attempts acculturation to a
non-reexive Western modernity, similarly hiding the contingency in the application of practical
and political reason behind rationalist ideology (cp. Rorty, 1992, p. 91 and the famous debate
between Al-Azm, 1981 and Said, 1978).
This reication of reason is the problematic core of Islamic as well as early-modern funda-
mentalist thought, because it leads to a dichotomic approach to politics. It is typically achieved
by interpreting certain theological concepts in a certain way. These are in particular "Sharia {
divine law, Jihad { to strive in right path, Jahilliya { pre-Islamic age of ignorace, Dawa { to
invite towards Islam, and Umma { religious unity of Muslims in the world" (A. Alam, 2007, p.
53). Their use can be exemplied by fundamentalists' obsession with gender relations and sex-
uality: women symbolize the unity and morality of the Umma, they have to be protected from
the contemporary Western Jahilliya by application of Sharia, spread through Dawa in a moral
and at times martial Jihad (cp. Robinson, 2007, p. 137 and in detail Bredi, 2008). Here, funda-
mentalists re-enact an essentialist contrast between culture on the one hand, which subjugates
the God-created world and is therefore considered immoral, and nature or a "natural" system of
familial honour, represented by the innocent female, on the other hand (cp. Buruma & Margalit,
2004, p. 128.). This idea can also be found in Western romantic responses to industrialization,
another hint that fundamentalists are indeed part of processes of modernization.
To conclude, two main aspects of fundamentalism should be kept in mind because later
analysis will refer to them: the usefulness of a narrow denition (including political intention)
as well as the identication of the radical restriction of reason as the core problem. Both will
be particularly important to undertand faith based actors' diversity (in section 5.1).
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3.3 Secular polity and colonial legacy
"Where are you going and why? Raise your eyes. The minarets of Jama Masjid want
to ask you a question. Where have you lost the glorious pages from your chronicles?
[...] I want to remind you that these bright etchings which you see all around you,
are relics of the Qalifas of your forefathers. Do not forget them. Do not forsage
them. Live like their worthy inheritors, and, rest assured that if you do not wish to
ee from this scene, nobody can make you ee. Come, today let us pledge that this
country is ours, we belong to it and any fundamental decision about its destiny will
remain incomplete without our consent" (Maulana Azad's Address to Delhi Muslims
at Jama Masjid, Delhi, October 23rd 1947; quoted in Noorani, 2004, p. 54)
After a general review of literature on religion and conict, I shall now move on to specics
of the subcontinent. Due to the enormeous complexity of history, though, this section will
not present meta-level academic discourse, but immediately reconstruct traditions of Islamic
political thought (by and large following Robinson, 1983, 1986, 2000, 2001, 2007; a competing
analysis is separately presented in section 3.4). Spoken in midst of refugee tracks by an eminent
Muslim leader, the words quoted above were a desperate plea to develop ownership of the new
political order and to escape what was perceived as the "identity trap" (Mehta, 2004, p. 72)
that led to the partition of British India. Above all, the processes culminating in the formation
of Pakistan, the scars of partition and the context of a young secular polity still frame Muslims'
contemporary political behaviour: in the young republic, in principle everybody can become a
political subject independent of religious identity { and is expected to be secular.
But beyond constitutional claims, caste and religious barriers remain strong and "for the
millions of Muslims who stayed in India, secularism did not prove inclusionary enough" (Brasted,
2005, p. 117). Meant as the polity's foundation, secularism soon became partisan policy.
While it is still instructive to explain why "India has not witnessed large-scale Islamic militancy,
despite the growth in Islamic fundamentalist organizations" (A. Alam, 2007, p. 30), secularism's
potential of regulating conict decreases and its credibility is fading as a common ground for
political competition (cp. further Nandy, 1992, p. 86., Bhargava, 1996, p. 58 or M. Hasan,
1996, p. 172). In consequence, pre-secular religio-political traditions regain importance (cp.
Reetz, 1995, p. 87). These traditions root back into the time of Moghul-Rajput rule, they
were challenged by colonialism and reformulated by revivalists at the end of the 19th century.
For several decades, they lost their inuence after the trauma of partition and under the strong
imperative of secularism. But in today's identity politics they could well experience a comeback.
Initially having been an elite project of theologians and families of inuential saints, these
traditions had various explicit Islamic foundations, with "law (that is sharia, but dened { as
we shall see { rather broadly); tasawwuf (that is su ideology and practice); and language"
competing for inuence (M. Alam, 2008, p. 5; the linguistic dimension is today far less relevant,
though). Each of these elds is in itself rather complex: in Sharia traditions, for example, it was
and still is contested which techniques of interpretation of juridical sources or even which sources
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themselves are legitimate and if and how which Sharia principles were to be politically enforced
(cp. M. Alam, 2008, p. 8 and 11). As another example, the Su proponents of Tasawwuf moved
Muslim politics beyond legalism by combining ostentatious (though not necessarily substantial)
orthodoxy with acculturation in various social and ritual domains (cp. M. Alam, 2008, p. 192).
In particular Su's attribution of legitimacy to miracles (Karamat), enacted by a saint's spirit
or his descendants, inspired a exible reaction to the diverse social realities of India (cp. Aquil,
2008, p. 40. and section 3.4).
Under colonial inuences and challenged by western science, this broad history of thought
transformed and inspired several "revivalist" movements (cp. Robinson, 2007, p. 88). Most
important probably were the alumni from Deoband (cp. Metcalf, 2004, 2006a, 2006b), those in-
spired by Ahmad Riza Khan Barelvi (cp. Sanyal, 1996), the Aligarh movement (cp. T. Hasan,
2006; Lelyveld, 2003) and the fundamentalism of Maududi (discussed in the former section).
Their revivalism built on earlier traditions in contradictory ways: the frequent labels orthodox-
reformist (Deoband), traditionalist-syncretist (Barelvi), modernist-liberal (Aligarh) and funda-
mentalist are highlighting the varying relative importance of religious doctrine in general (least
in Aligarh) and the attitudes towards folk tradition in particular: "if the Deobandis wanted to
conserve Islam as they found it in the Hana law books, Barelwis wished to conserve it as they
found it in nineteenth-century India" (Robinson, 2007, p. 66). Till today, this dierence fuels a
rivalry between the Tablighi Jamaat (a Deobandi missionary movement and possibly the world's
largest Islamic institution; cp. Metcalf, 2006b; Ibrahim, 2008) and actors inspired by Barelvi's
thoughts. Right now, traditional Su practice is the "clear looser" (Robinson, 2007, p. 52), while
the Tabligh and the more radical Ahl-e-Hadith often are "hardening inter-community dierences,
by crusading against composite, syncretic religious and cultural traditions that bind Muslims
with others among whom they live, and by stressing external markers of 'Muslim identity' that
sharply divide Muslims from others" (Sikand, 2002, p. 312).
Nevertheless, the Tabligh in many ways resembles "a true modern incarnation of Su aspi-
rations" (Reetz, 2006, p. 48), which exemplies the complexity of the transformation of Moghul
traditions. While Deobandis and Barelvis focus in doctrine on Sharia rather than on Tassawwuf,
those emphasizing such legalism were often descendants of respected Su families (cp. Mayaram,
1997, p. 231f.), reecting an openness towards (even orthodox) reform inherent in Susm (cp.
Schimmel, 1985, p. 514). Similarly, Shaikh argues that the "secular" leaders in Aligarh were
inuenced "by a specically Indo-Muslim Mughal tradition [and] by a faith which stressed a
community bound in service to some higher end" (p. 230): the distinctions are not easy.
That the usual labels are not quite appropriate has its reason in an underlying common-
ality: all four revivalist traditions perform a powerful shift from other-worldly to this-worldly
or political religion. This shift does not necessarily lead to fundamentalism: both Deobandis
and Barelvis, for example, "emphasize hermeneutic interpretation, taqlid or the application of
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reason to law, and the right to assess whether the hadis are authentic or fabricated" (Mayaram,
1997, p. 221), which enables them to work in the deliberative structures of a secular polity (cp.
Heinrich, 2006, p. 56. and extensively Sachedina, 2001). Instead, individualism in hermeneu-
tics as well as in political behaviour is the main result of this-worldliness: "at the heart of this
activism, and the energy which it created, was the placing of the responsibility of fashioning
Islamic society on each individual Muslim" (Robinson, 2007, p. 177; cp. also Roy, 2004, p.
148.). Individualism in turn led to an emphasis on education during the Islamic revival in
the 19th century: although quite diverse in pedagogy and curricular content, Deobandis and
Barelvis run madrassas to shape personal consciousness, and, as the most pointed example, an
inuential university was founded in Aligarh (cp. Robinson, 2007, p. 19 and in depth Sikand,
2005). Development of personality through education nally led to a growing importance of
identity (cp. Nassehi, 1995; Hahn, 1995):
"The period of British rule saw the emergence of new strands of identity among
Indian Muslims. For many their religious identity became their prime identity. Mus-
lim imagination expanded to embrace the lives and fate of Muslims elsewhere in the
world; for some this became an all-absorbing concern. Increasingly, Muslim identity
in public space acquired a feminine dimension. Moreover, individuals were begin-
ning to emerge who wished to be treated as individuals; they rejected the demands
made upon them by their 'community' and resisted all stereotyping from without. It
should be clear that not all Muslims were aected by all of these processes, and some
by none of them. In sum, the period of British rule saw a particular privileging of
the religious dimension of Muslim identities, but at the same time it also saw other
strands emerge which Muslims might choose to emphasize." (Robinson, 2007, p. 141)
This leads back to the precarious state of secularism: stronger personal religious identities
should not be confused with stronger beliefs of any certain kind, nor with stricter observance of
rituals or rising importance of group identication. Although religio-political traditions might
well experience a second revival in times of a contested secular polity, the individualistic spin
given them during their colonial transformation should prevent a precipitated "glorication of
religious seminaries" like Deoband (M. Hasan, 2008, p. 132). On the contrary, personalisa-
tion above all diversies identities, fostering multiple religious revivals while at the same time
nourishing "the liberal and secular trends among Muslims" (M. Hasan, 2008, p. 132).
To conclude, several insights from this extremely rough sketch will be relevant to interpret
my typology: to understand the complexity of faith based actors (cp. section 5.1), it is indis-
pensible to know about the argument between Tassawwuf's and Sharia's advocates over sources
of authority, which is layered by the competition between Deobandis and Barelvis that focuses
on the aspect of folk tradition. The underlying forces of individualization, which strenghten the
relevance of identity as a political factor and enable liberalism, are crucial in doubting profes-
sionals' dynamics (cp. section 5.4). Finally, the context of a contested secular polity can explain
several statements of secular leaders (cp. section 5.2).
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3.4 Liminality and shared spaces
"Much of the academic writing [...] tends to structure the subcontinental experience
into the categorial identities of 'Hindu' and 'Muslim'. Groups are either one or the
other. [...] Both the nationalist and nineteenth-century social reform movements
anchored themselves in [this] tradition, seeking to dene identities in terms of au-
thenticities. [...] This conceptualization of identity, however, tends to be grounded
in singularity and does not incorporate the layers, the plural character of existen-
tial liminality [...], a potentially anti-structural questioning of categorial identities,
in this case 'Hindu' and 'Musalman'. Folk traditions both derive from and contest
'great traditional' practice." (Mayaram, 1997, p. 4. and 38f.)
A reconstruction of explicit Islamic traditions, contrasted only with secularism, recently came
under heavy critique. The research by Mayaram (1997, 2007) is exemplary of a discourse that
questions the dualistic categorization of Hindu and Muslim as elitist and emphasizes liminality
and shifting religious identities on the subcontinent. Mayaram argues that a clear-cut distinction
mirrors more a colonial projection (which inspired revivalism in the upper castes) than any actual
folk religiosity { which on the contrary often oscillates between Islamic and Hindu traditions (an
argument also presented in variations by Nandy, 1992, p. 71, Nandy, Trivedy, Mayaram, &
Yagnik, 1997, p. 56. and many other "post-colonial" authors). Indeed, Mayaram's remark on
Meo communities ts quite some Indian Muslims: "censuses recorded them as Muslim, [while]
ethnographers [...] found it dicult to say whether they were Hindus or Muslims because their
beliefs and practices drew upon both religions" (Mayaram, 1997, p. 4).
In Gujarat, Burman (2005) and Engineer (1989) collected many examples of such liminality,
ranging from an abundance of shared spaces visited by followers of any faith to whole communi-
ties observing "unorthodox" Islamic traditions. As prominent shared spaces, Dargahs (shrines of
Muslim saints) over the times acquired "therapeutic, social, economic and political signicance;
and in contrast to mosques, they provide an alternative source of communication and identity
for women" (Malik, 2003, p. 377). Although they were initially linked to Islamic Su traditions,
their contemporary spiritual signicance is broader and often ambiguous, partly because they
are organized around non-religious categories (such as gender; Dargahs will play a crucial role in
understanding emancipating women in section 5.3). As examples of "syncretic" communities, on
the other hand, the Shia Nizari Ismailis and, to a lesser extent, the Bohra Ismailis, follow "'an
esoteric Islam clad in a regional culture' [and] live their beliefs, celebrate their rites and holidays,
and rule their daily lives according to customs which appear to be eminently Hindu" (Mallison,
2003, p. 360). Unlike mainstream Sunni Islam, both communities have priestly hierarchies and
unlike both Sunni and Shia tradition they revere additional scriptures besides the Quran, which
picture Islam as the completion of Hindu tradition (cp. Mallison, 2003, p. 365). To protect
their unorthodox doctrine, they adopted a tradition of "taqiyya (precautionary dissimulation of
one's faith) which [...] gradually led some groups to shift their allegiance, and their religious
identity had largely remained 'liminal'" (D.-S. Khan, 2003, p. 44).
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Today, liminal communities and shared spaces are under severe stress, as "the rise of political
Islam [and] Gandhi's introduction of political Hinduism" (Misra, 2004, p. 15) led to attempts
of "purication" from both sides (cp. Wessler, 2007, p. 228). In the 2002 pogrom, too, Dargahs
were more frequently targeted than, for example, mosques (cp. Heitmeyer, 2009, p. 109).
Confronted with such overt hostility, some communities rene their strategies of disguise, a
practice now common well beyond Nizari Ismaili circles, while others indeed "purify" their
practices: "one enduring consequence of this encounter was the production of a stereotype of
Islam, which [...] also began to shape the way in which Muslims themselves perceived their
religion" (M. Alam, 2008, p. 16, my emphasis; cp. also D.-S. Khan, 2002, p. 169 and for
Hinduizing inuences Mayaram, 1997, p. 34 or Shah, 1996, p. 228). Normatively one might
regret it, but because colonial and revivalist essentialism did successfully trickle down to lower
castes, eased by socio-structural modernization, orthodoxy "is steadily eating into local custom-
centered traditions" (Robinson, 1983, p. 187), reducing the practical relevance of the latter.
Still, lower-caste, rural and female liminality will receive particular attention in my analysis to
avoid an academic reinforcement of these processes { and because many NGOs try to reconstruct
and protect shared spaces as part of their peacebuilding (as already mentioned in chapter 2).
3.5 Communal riots
"In answering the [...] question why religion becomes salient in politics at some times
and not others, scholars have oered two broad explanations. First there are those
who see religious mobilization as stemming fairly naturally from the religious beliefs
of politicians and their communities. [...] The fact, however, that demands framed in
religious terms change over time despite a great deal of apparent stability in religious
beliefs and practices has convinced many scholars that it is political elites and their
changing instrumental political and material calculations [...] that determines the
salience of religious politics." (Wilkinson, 2007, p. 4)
While the last sections mainly provided sensitizing concepts, this nal part of the literature
review will position my study in the academic discourse on communal riots. In early (including
colonial) research, "a substantial part of the understanding of ethnic conict in the Indian
subcontinent has been grounded within an essentialist framework" (Mayaram, 1997, p. 36).
This tradition still lives on in some Indian contributions: Pandey (2007, p. 545) for example
fears a civil war between religious communities, a perception that reminds not only Brasted
(2005, p. 106) of the theses propagated by Huntington (1997). That mostly Muslims are
blamed for a "clash of civilizations" in such "research" reveals a widespread Islamophobia in the
Indian public (cp. Brasted, 2005, p. 118, Misra, 2004, p. 236. or M. Hasan, 2008, p. 33.).
In contrast, contemporary academic mainstream favours an hypothesis of instrumentaliza-
tion, which was made popular by Paul Brass and since then reiterated in many variations (cp.
Brass, 1974, 1985, 1991, 1996, 2003, 2006 and the discussion in Hansen, Momin, Petersen, &
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Brass, 2006). He argues that "riots [...] rst and foremost persist because they are a [...] well-
known and accepted [...] part of the general armory of weapons used by activists and interested
parties within both communities for personal, local, and political advantage" (Brass, 2003, p.
356 and p. 366f.). Riots are instrumentally useful to the extent of institutionalization; the
religious semantics around them is in Brass's opinion merely a guise for worldly goals. Many
NGOs in India repeat this argument, which provides them with a picture of unempowered,
passively exploited masses. These are ideal target groups to legitimize interventions and to pro-
long an organization's existence: instrumentalization is the civil society's leading interpretation
of communal riots (cp. chapter 2). Recently, instrumentalists' argumentation was rened in
comparative studies by introducing additional variables (e.g. by Varshney, 2002, 2007):
"Perhaps the leading town-level explanation for communal violence focuses on the
role of economic competition. [...] The diculty lies, however, in deciding whether
[this] represents the cause of the riot in the rst place. [...] More recently, scholars
and activists have [thus] begun to focus on the value of inter-ethnic engagement in
reducing communal prejudice and violence. [...] [But] are successful inter-ethnic as-
sociations really a cause of peace so much as its eect? [...] I would argue that none
of [these approaches] really provides the key to understanding why communal vio-
lence takes place. This is because a focus on the town-level [...] leaves out the critical
role of India's elected state governments in deciding whether to prevent violence or
quickly stop it when it does break out. [...] The most convincing explanation for why
some state governments prevent communal violence while others do not, it seems to
me, is one that focuses on state-level electoral incentives." (Wilkinson, 2007, p. 8.)
These studies' merit is the rebuttal of overly blunt primordialism. Nevertheless, Wilkinson's
summary reveals that the quest for an optimal set of explanatory variables external to religion
itself never ends: it can explain religious violence to a certain (and important) extent, but seems
to permanently miss something. Consequently, more and more scholars develop a constructivist
"line of argument [which] takes religion far more seriously" (Mayaram, 1997, p. 18; cp. Brasted,
2005, p. 121 and Copland, 2008, p. 28f.). They complement what instrumentalism lacks "not
so much [in] reasonably wellgrounded explanations of political change, but [in] a more sustained
regard for the normative prescriptions of a religious and political tradition" (Shaikh, 1992, p.
4). They argue in particular that a religious tradition must a priori provide an adequate pool
of symbols if instrumentalization is to succeed (cp. Hansen et al., 2006, p. 112) and that the
semantic of instrumentalist politicians, when rooted in identities, acquires a quasi-primordial
stability and thus eectively frames political behaviour in turn (cp. Kakar, 1996, p. 209).
Although I look at peace activism and not at communal violence, this study shares a con-
structivist impetus: I take religion more serious than most instrumentalists and analyze genuine
religious content as well as psychological processes of identity formation. But in contrast to
old-school primordialists, I look at the reproduction of identity, explaining structural persistence
and dynamic change in the same framework (cp. Kippenberg, 2008, p. 23).
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4 Design and methods
My research neither follows a hard deductive nor an intuitive inductive logic: it uses an abductive-
hermeneutic design as developed as a basic epistemological approach by Kelle and Kluge (1999,
p. 23f.). For them, abduction is informed explorative thinking: the researcher is surprised by
common characteristics as well as irregularities in data and develops preliminary hypotheses to
understand them. This requires awareness of what could constitute "common characteristics"
or "irregularities" in a specic eld and how they could tentatively be understood: abduction
acknowledges that insights do not miraculously emerge out of data. But more than mainstream
deductive designs, on the other hand, abductive methodology encourages creativity while gener-
ating hypotheses in close interaction with empirical data. In the following sections, I shall thus
rst demonstrate how the selection of instruments reects the research question and makes use
of sensitizing concepts developed in the literature review (in section 4.1). Then I shall show how
sampling brings up a multitude of potentially surprising cases (again in section 4.1) and how
analytical tools systematically inspire creativity and extract variance (for textual data in section
4.2, for psychological scales in section 4.3). A methodical explanation of the actual process of
extracting an empirically grounded typology conclude the chapter (in section 4.4).
4.1 Instruments, sampling and eld dynamics
I used three instruments to generate data: storytelling, structured interviews and psychological
tests (cp. appendix). They each reect one aspect of the overall research question, namely
political behaviour (focus of storytelling), beliefsets (focus of the structured interviews) and
group identication (focus of psychological scales; cp. also gure 2 on page 32). With the rst
pillar, I wanted to explore how interviewees became active for peace and which motives they
present for their activism. As Gollnick (2005) mentions: "a person's identity is not to be found
in his or her behavior, nor even in the reaction of other people, but in the capacity to keep a
particular narrative going" (p. 105; cp. also p. 107. and Hammack, 2008, p. 223. for the
suitability of narratives in identity research). Specically, 21 interviewees told the story of their
initial involvement in peace work and an exemplary success story.
The second pillar was a structured interview covering religious beliefs. Because the guideline
was initially based on studies undertaken in dierent cultural contexts (especially on a study
by Schlösser, 2003), a pre-test with three Indian Muslims led to major adjustments. One idea
throughout the guideline's construction was to assess the extent of dichotomy in religious belief
and the rigidity of ritual practice, both often seen as potential obstacles for peace activism
(cp. Hörter, 2007, p. 30 and section 3.2). Nevertheless, I did not "test" for certain beliefsets,
but tried to explore what interviewees think and experience in several areas related to identity
formation; which combinations of beliefs join into a set was empirically determined.
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Figure 2: Research instruments and their relation to the conceptual framework (a continuation
of gure 1, further extended with analytical tools on page 35 and index categories on page 42).
The third pillar, nally, was a self-administered questionnaire with four socio-psychological
instruments; some demographic details were enquired at the very end to control potential sam-
pling biases. To be able to use these instruments outside large-N settings, clinical tests designed
for individual assessment were selected. The Giessen Test (GT; Beckmann, Brähler, & Richter,
1991), the rst part of the questionnaire, assesses a person's unconscious attitude towards groups
in general. It has already been applied successfully and with good results in India for interviews
with communalist rioters by an eminent Indian psychoanalyst (Kakar, 1996); intercultural trans-
fer seems therefore less problematic. Due to constraint of time, only those three (out of six)
scales important in Kakar's study were used: "social resonance" (reecting whether one experi-
ences positive or negative feedback from others; p. 90), "social permeability" (assessing openness
to one's surrounding and sense of basic trust; p. 105) and "dominance" (showing intrusive and
aggressive desires; p. 125f.). "Depressivity", which was also important, had to be dropped due
to research-ethical restrictions. While GT scales were available in English by the publisher,
other translations to English and Hindi were done by myself and revised by a native speaker.
A second part of the questionnaire provides a categorization ranking, reecting that religion
is in a secular context only one among several aspects of being Muslim (cp. section 3.3); the
ranking asked for the relative importance of gender, language, nationality, caste and religion.
Further, nine items helped to assess the intensity of identication with the religious ingroup it-
self; they were assembled from Zee, Atsma, and Brodbeck (2004, p. 290), Ganguly et al. (2006,
p. 65.), Varshney (2002, p. 303.), Schlösser (2003, p. 105.) and Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds,
and Turner (1999, p. 813). Following the distinction by Jackson and Smith (1999, p. 121.),
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four items concern attraction to the ingroup, two items the perception of the intergroup context
and three items depersonalization and beliefs of interdependency (due to the small item count,
sub-results had to be treated with caution, though). The last part was a psychological inventory
measuring tolerance towards ambiguity (IMA; Reis, 1996). Again only three scales were used,
namely those dealing with "social conicts" (for obvious reasons), irritations of traditional "role
models" (mainly gendered ones) and "new experiences" (with which peace activism frequently
confronts). This inventory was in particular helpful to concretize the general ambivalence of the
sacred on the micro-level of personal agency, even though religion was not explicitly covered (cp.
section 3.1). Neither IMA nor the scale of identication intensity have yet been applied in India
and were thus carefully translated by two Indian colleagues.
In the eld, I closely cooperated with the youth movement Yuv Shakti and its umbrella
organization Jan Vikas, which partly work among internally displaced Muslims. They provided
me with practical eld support, contacts, and credibility towards a reserved target group; in turn,
I provide them with a systematic study about a topic they are interested in. Inevitably depending
on them for most of the sampling (and on those NGOs which I visited for background talks; cp.
chapter 2), I at least asked everyone for potential interviewees as dierent from themselves as
they can imagine (a strategy proposed by Mercer, 2006, p. 101 and others).
Beyond the resulting restrictions in eld access, the sample was purposefully selected to
include a broad variance (following Blee & Taylor, 2002): the goal was to nd many dierent
combinations of religious beliefsets, group identication and political behaviour { irrespective
of how these might be distributed among a larger population. During April and May 2008, I
conducted 21 interviews of average 45 minutes duration in the state capital Ahmedabad and
the semi-rural district Panchmahal, both centres of violence in 2002 and therefore target area
for many NGOs (cp. map in the appendix). Two interviews could not be transcribed because
of very bad tape quality; two other interviews with poor quality were partly summarized; the
remaining interviews were literally transcribed in their original language. In the nal sample,
eleven interviewees were male and eight female, their average age in 2008 was 38 years (stan-
dard deviation 12). One woman (a former Brahmin Hindu) converted by marriage, all other
interviewees were Muslims by birth. The average household size was between six and seven
members, the average number of siblings lay between three and four; in the case of both indica-
tors for socio-economic status, broad standard deviations suggest a wide range. The educational
background also broadly varied from illiterate to multiple post-graduate. Seven interviews were
conducted in rural, twelve in urban contexts. Only ten interviewees worked formally with NGOs,
while nine were grassroot or volunteer activists. Overall, sampling was successful in including
a broad variety of people, both in terms of demographics and of peacebuilding approaches. It
necessarily remains unknown if this is the broadest variety possible { the demographic summary
only excludes the possibility of gross sampling biases and was solely included for this purpose.
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The majority of interviewees only spoke Hindi and I faced the usual problems, necessities and
advantages of research in foreign languages: above all the possibility to misunderstand culturally
important overtones { but also the chance to learn from these misunderstandings and the chance
to have an uninvolved outsiders' viewpoint (cp. Winchatz, 2006; Bujra, 2006). To balance the
problems, a female, Indian, but non-Gujarati research assistant (not aliated with Jan Vikas)
helped with interviewing and transcriptions. Cooperating with her was also an imperative of
research ethics in post-conict settings: if re-traumatization had occured (which gladly was
not the case), only a native speaker could have intervened (Kumar, 2007 gave valuable advice
on this). In some interviews it was an issue that she had a Hindu background (Kakar, 1996
faced similar problems, p. 261), but that she came from outside Gujarat dissolved potential
anxieties and her gender was especially helpful to access the eight female interviewees. Except
ve interviews, which were conducted in English by myself, the assistant usually led the con-
versation in Hindi, establishing a comfortable ambience while I was able to listen closely and
to intervene when crucial themes arose. To further improve the relationship between researcher
and researched, instruments were also arranged from exible to structured and the guidelines in
pillar two were administered as what they are: guidelines (cp. Kelle & Kluge, 1999, p. 63).
Due to the increased political and psychological sensitivity of the topic, the research clearance
was subject to certain research-ethical restrictions, including strict anonymization, encrypted
and locked storage of all interview tapes, transcripts and questionnaires, provisions regarding
condentiality in assistants' contracts and careful interaction with cooperating NGOs (most
strategies advised by Harrison, 2006). I also obtained informed consent from all interviewees (cp.
appendix as well as American Sociological Association, 2007, chapter 11 and 12 and Deutsche
Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft, 2002, section B), although it turned out that the actual
consent was almost always given after oral explanations and discussions { the written form itself
remained a formality barely looked at (similar experiences are reported and critically discussed
by many scholars, cp. for example Bhattacharya, 2007; Sin, 2005).
As often in explorative settings, some elements of this design changed during the eld process.
In particular, the exact phrasing was continuously adjusted to outcomes of earlier interviews and
situational necessities. Further, interview guidelines were soon shortened to counter time con-
straint, mostly by removing redundancies initially planned to increase reliability. Finally, a
new question was introduced halfway through the process, inquiring how the in- and outgroup
perceptions changed under the impact of 2002 violence to simplify the interpretation of psycho-
logical scales on this issue. All interviews were accompanied by eld notes; transcription and
analysis was done in the respective original language. With a rst summary directly after the
eld phase, I began to discuss my preliminary ndings with background informants and primary
interviewees. After returning to Germany, this exchange continued via email { and although it
can not validate my results (cp. Silverman, 2005, p. 267), dialogue continued.
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4.2 Analysis of textual data
Having recorded over 15 hours of interviews, analysis was started by looking at each single
transcript in depth before the variance across interviewees was explored. To prevent analytical
artefacts, details were systematically read in light of other information per interviewee before
a common aggregative framework was applied to all transcripts (cp. Schwandt, 1999, p. 454).
Both steps will be discussed in this section; additionally, gure 3 visualizes how the dierent
analytical tools relate to research instruments and conceptual framework.
In the narratives in pillar one, activists presented their political autobiography as a chain of
causally linked events, "telling a story of their being and development, and providing explana-
tions as to how and why they have reached their present situation or identity" (Lieblich, Zilber,
& Tuval-Mashiach, 2008, p. 613). By extracting their causality with the software ethno (Heise,
2007), I tried to understand the motivations, restraints and contingencies of being a Muslim
and working for peace. To clarify how this "event structure analysis" worked, gure 4 on the
next page presents an example of one interview (for the method cp. also Heise, 1997; Labov,
2001). Several events are chronologically arranged from top to bottom and linked whereever the
interviewee himself established causal inference. His story starts from three separate events: the
fact that he "came to [place one]", that he earlier "lived in [place two]", and "1992" (a code for
the demolishing of the Babri Masjid by Hindu nationalists; cp. Meisig, 2005). It ends with the
event "professionalized", his term for peace activism.
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Figure 3: Analytical tools and their relation to instruments of research and conceptual frame-
work (a continuation of gures 1 and 2, further extended with index categories on page 42).
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Figure 4: Graphical output from an exemplary event structure analysis of one narrative
By running along the causal links from top to bottom until each event occured at least
once, the software ethno generates salience statistics. Relative frequency { the rst indicator {
counts how often an event occurs in this rundown, divided by the total number of events (thus
scaled like a percentage). Priority { the second indicator { calculates how likely an event will be
evoked when evokable (instead of entering an alternative branch); in other words, it measures
how indispensable an event is for the story's logical consistency (higher numbers indicate higher
priority). Centrality { the third indicator { measures how many other events are linked to a
particular event as precondition or consequence (again scaled from 0 to 100). The following
table lists these indicators for a few events in the exemplary narrative structure in gure 4:
relative frequency priority centrality
2002 30 21 58
bringing up advanced 45 90 37
came to [place one] 45 10 63
developed understanding 15 75 90
frustration and fear 20 36 47
professionalized 15 75 90
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The event "came to [place one]", for example, is evoked rather frequently (because the web
branches out beneath it, necessitating several software rundowns), but has less priority than, say,
the event "bringing up advanced", whose occurence is as frequent, but far more important in a
particular stage of the story. Since the rst event is more central, though (linked to larger junks
of the narrative), this importance is easily missed. Statistical indicators can thus highlight what
is not obvious. To interpret them meaningfully, though, the respective narrative context must be
taken into account. This is especially necessary for events after which causality stops: although
interviewees tried to present a coherent story, explaining "occasions of exceptional trauma and
holocaust" led to "a rupture of language" (Mayaram, 1997, p. 193) in many narratives. This
rupture, which limited and at times broke causality, was not articially bridged but preserved
as a "rhizomatic element" (Serm¼n, Devlieger, & Loots, 2008) in the chain of events, hindering
overly smooth interpretation. While the event "frustration and fear" in the exemplary interview,
which has no further consequences, is slightly rhizomatic in this sense, ruptures can also be so
deep that they rip narratives into several nearly independent parts.
After analyzing event structures, interviewees' literal answers to the questions posed in pil-
lar two were systematically collected and categorized. Beyond obvious and important factual
information, one should also look at structural content: grammatical devices like repetitions or
passive constructions help to identify interesting passages; word choice, dichotomic expressions,
metaphors and other semantic specics give insights in how people look at their world; nally,
interviewees navigate the discoursive context: they were naming and framing, convincing and
denying, including and excluding. In all three dimensions { grammatic, semantic and pragmatic
{ answers transcended literality (cp. Ryan & Bernard, 2003, p. 19).
Factual information and structural content each imply a distinct way of establishing infer-
ence. The rst option is to reconstruct interviewees' own causality as narrated: "notwithstanding
what ,real' forces propel one's life, the question of one's identity is treated through one's manner
of constructing one's life in one's present life story" (Lieblich et al., 2008, p. 618). I largely
relied on this kind of inference. But to restrict analysis to interviewees' own accounts would miss
out personally and culturally unconscious dynamics (cp. Zilber, Tuval-Mashiach, & Lieblich,
2008, p. 1054f.). While event structure analyses remained more strictly bound to them causal-
ity (though admittedly in a highly abstract reconstruction), the interpretation of grammatic,
semantic and pragmatic details more often necessitated "sociological imagination" (Mills, 2000).
Such imagination develops its arguments by applying sensitizing concepts (developed in chapter
3) and by conducting cross-case comparisons. Thus it was not only necessary to unify obser-
vations' level of detailness per interviewee, but also across interviewees (cp. Kelle & Kluge,
1999, p. 73). To enable sound comparisons, an heuristic framework developed by Lieblich et
al. (2008) provides several meta-concepts around which all detailed observations were arranged
(axial coding; cp. Corbin, 2008, p. 195). They ask:
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"What drives the story forward, from the perspective of the narrator? Does the
narrator present oneself as a free actor with agency and experience oneself as someone
whose deeds, choices, and preferences have determined one's situation? Is this person
attributing much inuence to others and to one's relationships within one's social
network { what we term 'communion' { in the manner one's life turned out to be?
Is he or she relating his or her life story mainly as an outcome of randomality, luck,
or chance, which we term 'serendipity'? Or does one narrate one's life as being
controlled by external circumstances such as one's social class, gender, or historical
period, namely, by social 'structure'?" (p. 613f.; their emphasis)
In their model, own agency is rst contrasted with structure and serendipity, a heuristic
dierentiation particularly useful to appreciate the precarious causal links reconstructed in pil-
lar one. External inuence from both directions should not be reduced to "an expression of
helplessness or lack of control", though, but seen "as manifesting openness to experience: the
ability to improvise and use so-called random events and choices made by others [. . . ] for the
benet of the narrator" (Lieblich et al., 2008, p. 617f.). Serendipity and structure are as much
a barrier to subjective freedom as its precondition. On a second level, agency itself can either
be used to enhance the own position (agency) or that of someone else (communion). To dis-
cern the recipient of agency, beliefsets are instructive { their literal presentation, but also their
underlying grammatic (who is subject?) and pragmatic (for what purpose?) dimensions.
Overall, this model proved to be quite fruitful, probably because it fullls the request by
Kelle (2008, p. 164) that a proper explanation of social action should take external inuences
(structure and serendipity), as well as internal motives (agency or communion) and culture-
specic implicit knowledge (visible through the sensitizing concepts of chapter 3) into account
(cp. similarly Hammack, 2008, p. 224). All literal answers, grammatic, semantic and prag-
matic observations as well as the event structures' statistical measures were aligned around the
four meta-concepts developed by Lieblich et al. (2008), using them as coding axes to enable a
systematic comparison and to integrate narrative with structured parts of the interviews (these
coding axes then became part of a categorical index; a process described in section 4.4).
4.3 Analysis of psychological scales
In contrast to the textual data of pillar one and two, pillar three produced numerical infor-
mation. Psychological scales enrich qualitative ndings and should be interpreted in light of
them. But numbers never speak for themselves: a series of statistical remarks and aggregat-
ing transformations are necessary to enable proper interpretation. These remarks will ll the
following pages. As basic computational unit, values for scale subdimensions were calculated
from GT and IMA items according to test manual instructions; the items measuring ingroup
aliation, intergroup context assessment and depersonalization were additively aggregated; the
categorization ranking nally was inverted so that higher numbers reect greater importance.
The resulting indicators were pragmatically treated as interval scales.
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Uniform or seemingly extreme answers posed a rst problem. Without a controlled sample or
test norms of India (which are not available), these cannot be meaningfully interpreted, because
they could simply indicate a shifted distribution in a dierent cultural context. For example,
most interviewees only used the lower part of the scale measuring tolerance towards ambiguous
conict (numerically speaking 1 to 3), while tolerance towards irritating role models seemed to be
higher (numerically 2 to 6). This could have been an interesting and plausible nding, but with
due caution, only variance inside each scale is interpretable. To reect this restriction in later
cluster computations, raw results were z-standardized (cp. Bortz, 1999, p. 45f.); normalizing
standard deviations that way at
+
  1 ensured that the empirical variance in each dimension is
equally weighed, independent of actual scale use (numerically, 1 to 3 and 2 to 6 were both treated
as -1 to 1). Further, each scale got centered at 0, so that positive values always indicate strong
expression and negative values weak expression compared to other interviewees.
After this preparatory step, the combination of correlated variables was attempted (cp. g-
ure 5 and appendix). This aggregation purely relied on conceptual considerations; measures to
assess the reliability of dierences beyond chance (such as statistical signicance) were neither
achievable in this design nor relevant: I do not intend to generalize (cp. Bortz, 1999, p. 115).
Unfortunately, most correlations were low, and where they were high, the remaining variance
was either conceptionally too important to allow its dismissal by aggregation { or aggregation
made theoretically little sense. An exception were the intensity scale subdimensions of deper-
sonalization and ingroup aliation (correlated at .90): most activists with strong bonds to their
ingroup experience group and self as one entity. This resembles what Brubaker (2004) terms
"groupness" (cp. section 1) { and as the remaining dierence was conceptionally unimpor-
tant, both subdimensions were combined under this catchword (as expected, the subdimension
"intergroup outlook" was statistically independent; cp. Jackson & Smith, 1999, p. 132.).
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Figure 5: Graphical overview of the relations between psychological variables. Longer arrows
pointing in similar (or opposite) directions are correlated; short arrows cannot be interpreted.
Axes are linear combinations apt for an optimal representation in two-dimensional graphs; per-
centages show how much variance these combinations are able to reect.
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After reducing the array of variables proved unsuccessful, hierarchical cluster analyses ac-
cording to Ward (1963) reduced variance comparatively boldly by revealing similarities and
dierences between cases (an overview of the nal cluster solutions is given as reference in the
appendix). Because a case-oriented approach retains a link to real persons, the creation of sta-
tistical artefacts was preventable through frequent cross-checks with relevant interview passages:
out of several statistically possible cluster solutions, those were chosen, which were most plausi-
ble in light of qualitative data. GT dimensions and intensity scales on the one and IMA scales
one the other hand were separately aggregated to maintain a reasonable ratio between cases and
variables ratio; the identication ranking was grouped by hand (mainly because interviewees
frequently added comments to their questionnaires, which a solely numerical analysis would
lose). Clustering changed the level of measurement, which in turn simplied later integration
with textual data: each interviewee's contiunous test results were aggregated under categorial
labels for each cluster, breaking variance into disjunct blocks. These blocks became part of a
categorial index during the extraction of my typology, as shall now be discussed in detail.
4.4 Typology extraction
The overall goal of the design so far was to extract as much variance from data as possible. This
focus started to shift with aggregation around coding axes and clustering of psychological scales.
These strategies reduced complex narratives to salience pattern, summarized literal answers and
clustered psychological results into disjunct blocks. The resulting catchwords and labels establish
a categorial index, which was a necessary intermediate tool for systematic comparisons, as it
keeps variance manageable during the extraction of the typology (cp. Kelle & Kluge, 1999, p.
57; the nal design is visualized in gure 6 on page 42). Since I will ultimately use interview
snippets and psychological raw results directly for a rich description of the extracted types in
chapter 5, though, I will only give a brief overview here. This should suce to clarify how the
heuristic index categories derive from last sections' analytical steps and from the conceptual
considerations in the chapters before. The rst four categories explore political behaviour, the
next three focus on religious beliefsets and the last three on group identication:
Success story: this category lists interviewees' exemplary success stories as told in pillar one,
revealing the respective subjective understanding of peace activism. As mentioned in
section 1, not all examples t a scientic denition, but as a part of the biographical
narrative they should anyway be treated analytically rather than normatively.
Salience pattern: this category reects the narrative role of own peace activism compared to
the inuence of the 2002 riots and to events evoking religious identity. This was formalized
in event salience statistics (cp. section 4.2) and conceptually relates to the existential level
of structural and serendipic inuence suggested by Lieblich et al. (2008).
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Structural inuence: this category combines observations in the event structure with those
questions in pillar two which dealt with government action, moral rigidity or familial back-
ground. While "salience pattern" described restraints and leeways globally, this category
looked in depth at the structural side of Lieblich et al.'s model.
Serendipic inuence: this category in turn deals with the serendipic side and tries to as-
sess the role of chance or fate, mainly by tracing grammatic hints (passive constructions,
non-designated subjects) and by looking at the causal consistency of a narrative's event
structure, again combining insights from both pillar one and two (cp. sections 1 and 4.2).
Internal motivation: this category reects interviewees' own accounts of how (un-)important
religious beliefs were for their activism, moving on to the motivational level in Lieblich
et al.'s model. It summarizes ndings in pillar two, using the sensitizing concepts for
interpretation as developed in the review of literature (in particular sections 3.2 and 3.3).
Ritual life: this category combines answers to a series of questions dealing with ritual practice,
which were again interpreted in light of insights from the review of literature (in particular
from sections 3.2 and 3.4). As these answers were rarely explicitly related to peace activism,
inference here heavily relied on "sociological imagination" (cp. section 4.2).
IMA cluster: this category consists of the cluster solution calculated in section 4.3 and reects
how interviewees deal with ambiguous experience (cp. cluster solution in the appendix).
Although methodically located in pillar three, it conceptually takes up the cross-cutting
issue of ambivalence (not only of the sacred; anyway cp. section 3.1).
Intensity and GT cluster: this category also consists of the respective cluster solution from
section 4.3. It tried to catch the way interviewees identify with their ingroup; because
the clustering was { unlike the one of IMA scales { rather weak (cp. appendix), it was
interpreted along with the qualitative ndings in the following category.
Community motivation: this category combines interviewee's own account of how important
their community was for their activism with the semantic they used when speaking about
in- and outgroup and the changes of perception that did or did not follow the 2002 riots.
Conceptually, it ts the motivational level of Lieblich et al.'s framework (cp. section 4.2).
Identication ranking: this category nally reects the relative importance of religion as
compared to other modes of identication (cp. section 1). As already mentioned in the
last section, the categorization ranking was not statistically clustered but arranged by
hand, because statistics could only take into account the absolute position of an option
but not the characteristical order of a sequence nor additional comments of interviewees.
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To accomplish the nal generation of the typology, categories became crucial whose dimen-
sions were able to clearly separate the heterogenity of all cases, while categories in which most
cases were more or less similar (or totally diverse) became less relevant. For the classication
itself, the cases which were internally homogenous and externally heterogenous in a maximum
of categories were grouped by applying a fuzzy clustering algorithm to an improved Gower dis-
similarity matrix of the categorial index (cp. Gower, 1971 and Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 1990,
p. 164. and p. 235f. as well as Kuckartz, 2007, p. 237.). Heuristic exploration revealed
four or ve statistically possible clusters of interviewees with distinct combinations of index
categories. This preliminary grouping was moulded into four nal types after reading the actual
interviews a second time: only by looking beyond abstract combinations of categories did the
typology acquire the necessary density and reliability (cp. Kelle & Kluge, 1999, p. 77.). While
a typology could not have been created without the abstract index, without highly aggregated
narrative salience statistics or without psychological clusters, the next chapter will nevertheless
return to less aggregated data and attempt to convincingly prove that the four types found in
the complex analytical process described in this chapter are more than just statistical artefacts:
they are distinct ways of "being Muslim and working for peace".
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Figure 6: Final index categories; coding axes from Lieblich et al. (2008) and dimensions of
identity from Brubaker (2004) highlighted (based on the preliminary gures 1, 2 and 3).
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5 Being Muslim and working for peace: a typology
Using last chapter's comprehensive set of analytical tools and classication methods, I was able to
separate four ways of how political behaviour, group identication and religious beliefsets interact
among the interviewees. Each represents a distinct empirical dynamic, further condensed into
ideal types (cp. Weber, 1988, p. 191). While the respective combinations of index categories
of those interviewees who constitute a particular type were largely distinct from each other,
statistical methods can only ensure external heterogenity and internal homogenity to the extent
empirically possible; thus the characteristics of the four types partly overlap.
Ex-post and rather roughly arranged according to the role of dimensions of religious identity
and the extent of dynamic in this role, the typology looks as follows:
religious identity important religious identity unimportant
no inuence of 2002 faith based actors (5.1) secular leaders (5.2)
change after 2002 doubting professionals (5.4) emancipating women (5.3)
The presentation of each group of "Muslims working for peace" in the coming sections always
starts with a summary of the respective core dynamic, followed by success stories and typical
features of political behaviour (drawing on the index categories salience pattern, structural and
serendipic inuence), religious beliefsets (drawing on internal motivation, ritual life and IMA
cluster) and group identication (drawing on community motivation, intensity and GT cluster
and the ranking of identication options). While I try to keep the presentation concise, this
chapter naturally tends towards a thick description, whose details might not always be explicitly
related to my research question; it's analytical implications will be discussed in chapter 6.
5.1 How faith based actors react to riots
A rst possibility to combine religious identity and political behaviour was expressed by those
(male) interviewees which I term "faith based actors". Their activism strongly roots as well in
specic religious beliefsets as in a strong group identication; reverse inuence { in which agency
inuences identities { was rather seldom. One interviewee summarized:
Snippet 1 | islAm m\ do trh k hk
h{\. ek h  k  k uSlAh yAEn aSlAh k
hk. ... d  sr , logo\ k , kOmo\ k aAp
pr ?yA hk bnt h{\.
There are two sources of strength in Is-
lam. One is [to be a tool for Allah's
will]. The other is the strength created
by the people, by the community.
In "being a tool for Allah" and serving their community, faith based actors are guided by
a dogmatic interpretation of reality { a view which did not substantially change after 2002. In
this stable framework, riots merely appear as contingent interruptions of otherwise well-ordered
lives, as a serendipic "disturbance", which "happened" and had to be dealt with:
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Snippet 2 | Actually 2002 k bAd ,
[...] jo p rA episode TA , 2002 kA , jo
log disturbed T unko shelter EdyA TA.
Actually, after 2002, when this whole
episode of 2002 happened, we gave shel-
ter to those people who got disturbed.
The common formal stability of inuences of religious identity dimensions covers consider-
able variance in content. All faith based actors are strongly inuenced by a comprehensive moral
framework, common rituals give them strength and all tend to avoid narratives in favour of a
reied dogma { but the dogma itself varies according to dierent religio-political orientation.
Similarly, faith based actors experience themselves as part of a collective subject { but their
understanding of "community" is far from uniform. The following sub-sections on political be-
haviour, religious beliefsets and group identication each explore a dialectic of imagined stability
and the dynamics and variations hidden behind it. This dialectic is the core feature of how faith
based actors combine religious identity and political behaviour.
Success stories
I shall start by discussing the character of most faith based actors' success stories, which consisted
of classic relief, rehabilitation and welfare work. Even though the a-priori goal was to separate
dierent ways of combining dimensions of religious identity with political behaviour, and not
dierent ways of working for peace (cp. chapter 1), and although the typology does not really
coincide with specic peacebuilding approaches, a dierence in emphasis can be observed. One
in this sense typical account is given in the following interview snippet:
Snippet 3 | us v
t )!rt TF eld
kF. [...] jo log apn gA v jAnA cht T
unk Ele &yv-TA krnF pwF. [...] jo
commitees h{\ , jo fund dn vAlF , un
logo\ k sAT contact EkyA. [...] usn
bh  t mdd kF [...] ek sO pErvAr ko
to hmn vhA p [...] bsAyA aOr vhA p
mkAn BF bnA Ede.
That time, the demand lay in the eld.
[...] Arrangements were necessary for
those people who wanted to return to
their villages. [...] Existing commitees
and charitable people were contacted.
[...] They helped a lot. [...] We rehabi-
lated one hundred families here and also
arranged for the construction of houses.
Later in his story, this interviewee explained how the construction of these houses was ar-
ranged exactly, explained the outline of the new neighbourhood and was almost lost in details.
Like him, many faith based actors were absorbed in rehabilitation charity { but not totally, and
some not even predominantly. In many cases, relief projects were accompanied by educationary
eorts, intra- and interfaith dialogue initiatives. One town-level and one personal example:
Snippet 4 | [location] m\ 2002 k bAd
m{\ phlA m  sElm fHs h , Ejsn hr Id
pr , Id day Emln ko arrange EkyA ho ,
Ejsm\ sBF community k logo\ ko call
EkyA ho , unk Dmg  zao\ ko b  lAyA ho ,
unkF speeches aOr aQCF KAsF.
In [location], I am the rst Muslim after
2002, who arranged meetings during ev-
ery Id day [here: end of Ramadan], who
invited people from each single commu-
nity, who called in their religious lead-
ers, who gave good keynotes.
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Snippet 5 | mr am  k do-t nhF\
mAnt T Ek hm\ is kAm m\ jAnA cAEhe.
v BF DFr -DFr is kAm m\ aAe h{\ aOr
aAj unkF mAnEsktA bdlF h{. v aAj
is kAm s j  w h{\. kI do-t. aOr hmArF
yhF koEff h{ Ek do-to\ ko hm [NGO]
k programme m\ l kr jAe .
Many of my friends did not think that
we should want to go into this [peace]
work. [But] slowly, they began with
this work and today their mindset has
changed. They now joined this work,
many of them. And this is very much
my intention: to bring friends into
[NGO] and initiate a programme.
While many faith based actors did either charitable work or tried to mobilize their friends
and family for peace and for a peaceful religiosity as presented so far, one faith based actor
steps out of line: he presented his missionary work in the Tablighi Jamiat (cp. section 3.3) as
the core element of his activism. To him, peacebuilding is a genuinely religious project, through
which he wants to counter the moral laxity among Muslims, which he identied as the cause for
a fateful punishment in 2002. In the following snippet, he describes his agenda:
Snippet 6 | Islam is a religion of moral values. Moral values never change. [...]
Actually [...] I hear lot of people saying that Islam should be modernized. But
how? What should be modernization [cross speech]. No [need to have] human rights
anything. To, actually, actually the free sex. What do you think? Is it a moral view?
Its a moral view to have free sex? Moral values?! Actually, its a chaos civilization.
It's an animal instinct. It's a carnal desire over there. It's a carnal lust desire over
there, to have free sex. [pause] So, what shall we do? [...] Actually we are over here
as mentioned in the Quran: you are the best of the people, rescuer of the mankind.
You are the best of the people, rescuer for the mankind! That's our work.
The frequent use of the word "actually" resembles reication eorts, to "rescue mankind"
from "carnal desire" is clearly a strategy of social dominance, and the focus on sexuality appears
familiar: all three elements were introduced as notable features of fundamentalism in section
3.2. Still, it is important to note that only this one interviewee was fundamentalist in pursuing
a political strategy of dominance. Most faith based actors emphasize an unchangeable dogma,
but proceed quite dierently, as the following subsection will show.
Political behaviour
A rst commonality in faith based actors' interviews was the irritating fact that many of them
barely told a story. Although they could not avoid minor narrative episodes due to my insistence,
they felt notably uneasy and switched quickly to other rhetoric formats: they asked counter-
questions ("what do you think?"), presented long analyses of the general political climate ("the
media ..."), suggested improvements to my research approach ("be Edward Said!"), or lectured
on dogmatic compulsion ("any Muslim has to work for peace"). Even on a lingual level, mostly
third person constructions (unpersonal speech) were used to indicate the grammatic subject,
followed by rst person plural (representative speech) and rarely replaced by the rst person
singular (own personal agency): the own story is preferably clad in non-narrative rhetoric.
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Meanwhile, faith based actors did not object narrative style when quoting Hadith (sayings
about the Prophet's life) or relating the life story of a beloved Pir (Muslim holy man). This
specic avoidance of the own story surprises and distinguishes them from most other intervie-
wees. In her coursebook on narrative interviews, Küsters (2009, p. 67) suggests to treat such
a "failure" of narrative style as an interesting observation itself; in the following pages, I shall
develop two hypotheses as to why faith based actors might feel uneasy about subjectivity and
storytelling. On the one hand, and for some interviewees, a personal story might not appear
adequate because their activism is indeed not a personal choice but a hereditary occupation.
On the other hand, non-narrative rhetoric might be preferred over storytelling because it hides
dogmatically unpleasant contradictions in the actual biography.
In most cases, a simple argument overruled subjective narratives: Islam means peace, thus
the only prerequisite for peace activism is to be born as Muslim. Surprisingly, this short equation
could be an appropriate biographic summary for some activists { if they hold a hereditary
conict-mediating and welfare-providing position for the local community. One respected village
elder, for example, started his story by tracing his lineage back to prophet Muhammad himself
(discernable by his name, which is anonymized here; cp. in general Matin, 1996, p. 113.):
Snippet 7 | v{s jo s\-TA k sAT
j  wA , jo s\-TA m{\n bnAI , v to d\go\ k
bAd bnAI. lEkn isk phl kA jo mrA
jFvn TA , v BF isF rAh m\ j  wA h  aA
TA. lEkn v Es' minority, hm log
caste tk sFEmt T. hm log [caste /
family name] h{\. us caste k a\dr m{\
vice-president EpCl 24 sAl s h .
Actually, the NGO which started, which
I created, this was created after the ri-
ots. But in my life as it was before this,
I was already going on this path. But
they were only a minority, our caste was
our limit. We are [caste / family name].
I have been the vice-president in this
caste since the last 24 years.
His activism de facto derives from being born into a particular Muslim family. When he
told me about the massive inux of refugees after 2002, he left the "natural-born theory" of
a time-honoured family tradition and became pragmatic. Because Muslimness only did not
suce under these exceptional circumstances, he explained in detail how he used his good
education and mobilized a network of friends and colleagues to professionalize his activities
beyond traditional charity. Still, these pragmatic steps ultimately ensured the survival of his
hereditary responsibility: in his nal summary, he again equated Muslimness and peace activism.
But not all faith based actors held hereditary positions. If they did not, the equation often
served ideological purposes. One interviewee, for example, referred extensively to world politics
to justify why "being Muslim" would describe his work more clearly than "working for peace":
Snippet 8 | Actually nowadays [pause] this term is a wide scope term, peace
activism, peace activist. Actually everyone, whether you ask this question to Bush,
or Dick Cheney or Ariel Scharon, or whomsoever [...] they label themselves as peace
activist. [...] Why should I label myself as peace activist? We are by birth peace
activist, by birth. [...] "Islam" word derives from Salam, means peace. The root, the
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root mean is there. So every Muslim is a peace activist. [...] Peace is an inherent
quality in Muslims. Is inherent, is ingrained in them from the very rst moment.
[...] Actually, [pause] if I only label myself I label myself as a Muslim, not as a peace
activist. [. . . ] If there is a Muslim, actually, you don`t even have to ask them!
Another interviewee at least implied a "natural-born theory" when he argued that a lack of
peace stems from a lack of true Muslimness, a situation which he deeply regretted:
Snippet 9 | lEkn m  J y bAt BF
khn do Ek m  slmAn aAj m  slmAn
nhF\ rhA. m  J bh  t a'sos h{ is bAt
kA. ?yo\Ek us bcAr tk real tAlFm
ph  \cF hF nhF\. agr m  slmAn , sQcA
m  slmAn bn jAtA to d  EnyA m\ y lwAI
jgw aOr y Mr. Raphael ko peace
k bAr m\ thesis ElKn kF )zrt nhF\
pwtF. Why do you have to research on
peace? [emotional breakdown follows;
tape stopped for roughly two minutes]
But let me tell you also that today, Mus-
lims have not remained Muslims. I re-
gret this very much. Because these peo-
ple have not yet obtained real educa-
tion. If Muslims had become real Mus-
lims, then we would have no ghting of
wars in this world and it would not be
necessary that Mr. Raphael writes a
thesis on peace. Why do you have to
research on peace? [emotional break-
down follows; tape stopped for roughly
two minutes]
Unlike hereditary activists, for whom peace activism by birth is an accurate biographic
description, these two faith based actors use the "natural-born theory" to make a theological
statement. Event structure analyses show that frequent dogmatic digressions and the remaining
scattered biographical snippets form parallel but in themselves consistent causal chains: faith
based actors tell two stories in one (cp. the exemplary event structure in gure 7 on page
48). While the dogmatic story resembles a theological lecture, the pragmatic story describes
actual auto-biographic experience. Pragmatic webs connect to dogmatic causality at exactly two
junctures: in the fact that both lead to peace activism and in instances of "labelling", in which
the appropriate semantic for assessing reality is negotiated. I therefore assume that the dogma
does not simply replace subjective narratives, but interprets them in non-narrative terms: it
provides a specic semantic foil. This hypothesis is backed by salience statistics, which reveal
that dogmatic references occur far more frequent than pragmatic events, but are statistically less
important to the narratives' internal logic: the actual causality relies on a subdued pragmatic
event chain, while theological episodes appear as a dispensable rhetoric feature. But why do
faith based actors use such a rhetoric and what are the consequences thereof? A hint:
Snippet 10 | In the Indian context is, what we have to do is [that] we have to get
our organization registered. So, we have, we got the thing registered, according as to
the state laws. And accordingly we are running all our welfare activities. Including
peace activities, so these organizations| Interviewer: so you became involved
in all that in this way? | See, I just told you, [cross-speech] No, listen, this is
like a putting a question in other words: how are you a peace activist? So there is no
such story. [...] this is a fact that anybody who strives for peace and he is a Muslim
[pause] so there is a very clearcut denition, so you don't need any other story.
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Figure 7: Graphical output from the event structure analysis of one faith based actors' narrative
(cp. section 4.2). Visible are the few links between pragmatic (left) and ideological (right) parts.
Here, dogmatic rationality helps to reduce an unprecise, contingent and contextual story to
reliable "facts". This change in semantic leads to a reication of reason { which was already
identied as one aspect of fundamentalism in section 3.2. Indeed, the one clearly fundamentalist
faith based actor already mentioned in the last subsection (who also pursued a strategy of
dominance) was particularly strong in his preference of dogmatic arguments. But even in his
extreme case, an underlying pragmatic rationale revealed a quite dierent reality:
Snippet 11 | Interviewer: Do you speak a lot about religion in your
family? Are there dierent opinions about religion? | This is not a question
of dierent opinions. Why? Because every Muslim believes in Allah. No dierent
opinion over there. Everyone believes in Mohammad, no dierent opinion over there.
We have to obey Allah's commandments, no dierent opinion over there. We have
to follow the Ilm of prophet Mohammad, no dierent opinion over there. We have to
pray ve times a day, no dierent, we are paying Zakat, we go to the Hajj. Actually
there is no dierent opinion regarding these all things. As far as I am concerned, as
far as my family background is concerned, [...] and as far as my friends is concerned.
[...] Interviewer: How did you learn about Islam? Also from your family,
or from friends? | Actually, I learn Islam from the missionary work. Jamiat
Tabligh. [...] I learn Islam from them only [pause] Because, actually [pause] in India
[pause] Muslims are scattered. [...] So, from our upbringing I didn't come, at all I
did not get in touch with Islamic scholars, or Imams. Who can explain Islam, what
Islam means. Actually, after that, I came in touch with these people.
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As long as dogmatic causality prevails, a dierence of opinion and religiosity is denied. Asked
about the source of his knowledge, though, the pragmatic causality surfaces and the interviewee
tells a story where being a Muslim actually means becoming a Muslim. Again, the avoidance
of subjective narratives is a tool to subdue a dogmatically uncomfortable tension { but unlike
the reifying semantic suggests, pragmatic restraints introduce additional criteria to the concept
of "natural-born" peace activism. This conrms how important actual empirical exploration is,
even in the seemingly clear cases of faith based actors: to dierentiate between fundamentalist
and non-fundamentalist activists is as necessary as to look beyond overt claims of orthodoxy into
actual biographies to be able to understand faith based actors' political behaviour. The following
subsection will show that a similar dialectic of overt commonality and subdued variance can also
be found in those dogmatic assumptions inspiring their activism.
Religious beliefsets
When asked which Islamic idea is dearest to them, faith based actors focused on an ethical
imperative to serve other people and to live an honest life (which for most explicitly excluded
any compulsion in religion). This imperative was formulated rather general and leaves space for
diverse religio-political orientations. Indeed, most major schools of thought presented in section
3.3 can be found among faith based actors: while Barelvi activists and one fundamentalist
Tablighi were already mentioned, other interviewees lean towards classic Deobandi thought:
Snippet 12 | s  nF k a\dr do parti-
tion h{\. s  nF , jEmaAtF [pause] to m{\
jEmaAtF h \. usk a\dr , mr jo do-t
T , v alg þkAr k T , jo m{\ ab h \.
aOr d  sr h{\ v tAE)yA EnkAlt h{\ , v
alg h{\. mr father us tr' T. m{\
is tr'. [...] lEkn mE-jd m\ jb ek
jgwA h  aA to m{\ un logo\ k sAT nhF\ ,
k  drtF esA ho gyA Ek m{\ late aAyA.
ab late aAyA , to EjDr phl log h{\
vhF\ hm Kw rh\g. aAg to jA nhF\
skt apn , EpC hF rh\g n ? to m{\
EpC KwA TA.
Sunnis are divided in Sunnis and Jami-
atis. [pause] So I am Jamiati. I had
a friend with this dierent background,
and I adopted his view. Then there are
those, which take out [a replica of the
shrine of Husain]; they are dierent. My
father came from this tradition. I come
from that. [...] But I do not align during
controversies in the mosque. I arrange
that I come late. When you come late,
then you stand behind earlier people. If
you can not go to the front, then you
have to stay in the back, right? So I
remained in the background.
This interviewee was born into a rural Sunni caste, in which a syncretic variety of the Shia
festival Moharram is the religious key event of the year (cp. Saiyid, Mirkhan, & Talib, 1981, p.
121.). Later, he came in touch with Tablighi missionaries and adopted their interpretation of
Islam. Unlike the fundamentalist Tablighi quoted in the last subsections, he does not intend to
base his political strategy on dogmatic dierences ("I do not align") { again, exploration beyond
labelling is fruitful (for the Tabligh's diversity cp. further Mayaram, 1997, p. 221f.). If opinions
already dier inside one institution, they do so even more across schools:
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Snippet 13 | You must be knowing the Deobandi Tablighi Jamiatis and the Sunni
Barelvis. So I belong to the Barelvi community. And we have many dierences; so to
remove the doubts and certain exaggerations done by the Tablighis, we strive hard.
And we try to establish a good image. [...] We used to organize a Su festival and did
an amalgamation of the Hindu and Muslim [. . . ]. And because [name of saint] was
an embassador of Hindu-Muslim unity, it was a massive success. [...] Interviewer:
On which aspects may opinions dier on Islam? | No, a big No. [...] The
things are very clear. [...] We have a dierence of opinion. But not a conict.
In this snippet, the dogmatic demand for unity is a mere afterthought to "many dierences"
between Barelvis and Deobandis, whose religio-political competition was already mentioned in
section 3.3. The actual diversity in theological approach was particularly visible in the fact that
faith based actors disagreed widely on how a modern Islam should look like. Three examples:
Snippet 14 | aAD  Enk k sAT bdlnA
)!rF h{. yA to aAp nA bdlo to
usko apn Gr m\ rKo. bAhr jAao
to BArEty nAgErk j{s.
With modernity, change is necessary. If
you do not change then you should stick
to your own home. If you go outside,
then you are an Indian citizen.
Snippet 15 | We have no new version. We have not a revised version [...], there
is a set of laws which is just unnegotiable. So this is the Islamic society.
Snippet 16 | log i-lAm ko aQCF
trh s smJ l\ to aAj Ejs hm
aAD  Enk kh rh h{\ v 1400 sAl phl
BF TA. lEkn log smJt nhF\
If people would understand Islam cor-
rectly, then we would have had since the
last 1400 years what we now call mod-
ern. But people don't understand.
Should Islam change in present times, is it eternally xed or might it even be truly modern
from the beginning? Obviously, fundamentalists, Deobandis, Barelvis and followers of traditional
Su orders do not share a common interpretation. But whatever their respective point of view,
it strongly inuenced their activism { this is the underlying commonality:
Snippet 17 | I am sure Ek mrA Dm
m  J esA krn ko kh rhA h{. Because
I have read the biography of prophet
Muhammad| aOr unkF to p rF life
es h{. social work m\, social reform m\
aOr d  sro\ kF mdd m\. [...] aOr unk
jo r-tA h{ , us pr clnA m  J ps\d.
I am sure that my religion is telling me
to do it like this. Because I have read
the biography of prophet Muhammad.
His whole life was to help others through
social work and social reform. [...] And
it appeals to me to proceed on his path.
A second commonality were beliefs about the afterlife (cp. Heine, 2004, p. 30f.). Most
faith based actors imagined the end of times in precise terms and emphasized that the looming
accountability of judgement day should already transform their earthly lives. For them, morally
correct behaviour is not only a demand of social reciprocity, it also ensures future salvation:
Snippet 18 | Ha, we have an excellent understanding of the afterlife. [...] See,
there is only one creator. It is a nal thing. [...] One administration is over there. If
there are two administrations, what will happen?! [...] The same message is running
throughout all the books. The same message. That there is a creator, we are the
prophets, do what we say, if you want to succeed in this life and day after.
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This snippet metaphorically expresses that earthly life and afterlife could not be separated,
because the rules for both root in the same belief { in the oneness of God. The same "excellent
understanding" ensures success "in this life and day after" (my emphasis). On the contrary,
the vast majority of other types of interviewees said that they could only hope for salvation,
because the afterlife is essentially unknown. Schäfer (2008a) explains the dierence between
both beliefs by terming the latter "eschatology, and not apocalypticism. The focus lies on the
relevance of today's behaviour for the future. Apocalypticism imagines future and declares
its immediate relevance for the present" (p. 74; my translation). Eschatology formulates a
relatively open relation between ethical behaviour and future salvation, while apocalypticism
provides a more hermetic interpretation: because the rules of the afterlife are well-known {
they are "running throughout all the books" {, salvation is guaranteed if and only if one lives
accordingly. Faith based actors' moral acquires its preciseness from apocalyptic beliefs. The
eternal horizon could explain the stability in their conguration of dimensions of religious identity
and political behaviour, which was not inuenced by the 2002 riots (cp. Hasenclever & de Juan,
2007, p. 26). Beliefsets determine agency rather straightforward and with little reverse inuence.
Following the questions on religious belief, I also asked interviewees about their ritual life,
because it is frequently assumed that "in Islam, orthopraxis is more important than orthodoxy"
(Heine, 2004, p. 13; my translation). Indeed, all faith based actors told that they pray daily (like
most interviewees, they use the religious term "to read Namaz" for the ritual prayer) and that
this practice deeply grounds their lives (including their political behaviour). As one interviewee
expressed, the daily prayer bonds him to Allah and helps him to deal with emotions:
Snippet 19 | nmA) k Ely jb BF
KwA hotA h to ek to aSlAh k sAmn
KwA h aOr aSlAh m  J dK rhA h{.
[...] kBF kBF nmA) m\ ro BF dtA h .
BAb  k ho jAtA h . usk bAd bh  t aQCA
lgtA h{. bh  t s  k n. [...] m{\ iE(mnAn
aOr s  k n kF E)\dgF jF rhA h .
Whenever I am standing for Namaz, I
stand in front of Allah and Allah looks
upon me. [...] Sometimes I shed tears
in Namaz. I become emotional. After-
wards, I feel very good. Very at ease.
[...] I am living my life with leisure and
at ease.
Despite describing such personally stabilizing eects, faith based actors argue that the reli-
gious ritual has close and direct links to political behaviour as well, because both would share
the same objective and because the ritual would link beliefsets inevitably to group identication,
resulting in stronger ingroup coherence (cp. also Hardenberg, 2009, p. 83):
Snippet 20 | Religion covers all aspects of life. And for us, if we are praying ve
times a day, and if we are governing a state, actually both are the same [...] for us.
Here, ve times a day, we are trying to improve ourselves. While governing a state,
we are trying to improve [...] the whole society. [...] That has been sanctied by the
religion also, and [...] Muslims as a solidarity they express themselves on these days.
Because of the mass gatherings, they are better able to express themselves.
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Consequently, the ritual life of faith based actors was comparatively intense. It also remained
strictly inside orthopraxis and only minor inuences of acculturation were traceable in some
interviews. For example, the semantic which some faith based actors used to talk about Dargahs
(liminal shared spaces where Muslim saints' spirits enact miracles; cp. section 3.4) is notable; one
English speaking interviewee, who regularly goes to the mosque on "friday", went to Dargahs on
"guruvar" (thursday) { a Hindi word with Hindu background: it is the day for the reverence of
one's guru. Orthodox Muslim eschews intermediaries between the believer and Allah. Another
faith based actor recommended a book about "maulvi buddh", elevating Buddha to the position
of an Islamic scholar. But such examples were neither widespread nor more than minimal
semantic hints { and should denitely not be mistaken for liminality:
Snippet 21 | Because the Su shrines { actually they are good Muslims. People
follow them. And they have worked for the cause of Islam. [...] Why we are going
there? Because we respect them. Respect them. Try to imitate their lives, because
they are the best, and they have delivered the message of Mohammad, peace be
upon him. [...] What happened in Russia? Russia had a total ban on that religious
activities. But the Islam still existed, and it is more better existing than in India.
Because this tradition survived in a Sustic manner.
To sum up, faith based actors' beliefs on the one hand considerably dier and reect the
whole breadth of religio-political tradition in Indian Islam except liminality. On the other hand,
all faith based actors share a strong moral motivation, backed by apocalypticism and stabilized
in orthopraxis: again a dialectic of commonality and diversity. This supports the thesis that
the various forms of Islamic revivalism share a trend towards this-worldly religion (cp. section
3.3), in which beliefs (e.g. about the afterlife) are directly relevant for today's praxis as well
as the individualistic notion inherent. As far as the research question is concerned, it further
strikes that the direction of causality unilaterally runs from identity to agency with little reverse
inuence, while this relation is complex for many other interviewees.
Group identication
Psychologically, faith based actors experience themselves as capable of leadership and prefer
a traditional setup for their activism. This is visible in distinctly low measures for tolerance
towards irritations of role models (and, less clearly, towards new experiences) and high ones
for social dominance (cp. gure 8 on the next page). This is plausible, as the inuence of an
unchangeable reied dogma serves as a powerful motivation for leadership (high dominance)
while at the same time emphasizing eternal unchangability (low ambiguity tolerance). For
dominance, the distinctness rendered among the strongest eect sizes in the whole dataset.
Despite this strong dominance, though, faith based actors feel attracted to their community
to an extent which leads to higher levels of depersonalization than in many other interviewees'
cases: the boundaries between individual and community become blurred (cp. Shaikh, 1992, p.
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18). How can someone act strongly when he is not identifyable in the rst place? A look in the
interviews helps to clarify the relation of self, group and agency:
Snippet 22 | Interviewer: That's also your personal understanding? |
No, not my understanding - it's the understanding of every Muslim! [...] I am the
part and parcel of the community. [...] See, our community lies on the foundations
of the very religion. Without religion there is no community. [...] This division exist
in the Western society. But not in the Muslim society. So there is no question about
this or who will decide. The thing is if a community in consensus decides, this is one
and the same thing when an individual decides!
This account reveals that depersonalization implies not so much a loss of subjectivity { but
a loss of individuality. The shift to this-worldly religion does apparently not only lead to an
emphasis on each single person { in doing so, it also hides the same behind the experience of
collective subjectivity. Thus high groupness is not just an example of what Lieblich et al. (2008)
call "communion", agency for others (cp. section 4.2); faith based actors actually experience
themselves in their agency as collective subjects, as "part and parcel of the community". In
light of this nding, the dogmatic rhetoric found to layer personal narratives appears to be more
than just instrumental; groupness is not only semantic, but roots in psychological dynamics.
But again, dialectic is at work and individuality re-appears on a deeper level: although all
faith based actors tend to closely combine self and ingroup, they mean quite dierent people
with "community" or with the "we" in corresponding grammatic constructions. Often, the term
referred to the Umma, the entirety of all Muslims { but at times "community" also designated
the population of a particular geographic area (irrespective of religion), a specic Muslim caste,
or members of a religio-political movement. The ranking of identication options adds more
unclarity: surprisingly, only one faith based actor claimed that religion is highly important for
his self-categorization, while all others presented themselves as deliberate non-categorizers (i.e.
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Figure 8: Those dimensions of faith based actors' psychological test results with a variance con-
siderably and interpretably dierent from that of other interviewees. Scales are z-standardized
and two measures assess dierences numerically: Hedges' g is a coecient for the eect size or
degree of deviation (values above .2 indicate a medium eect; cp. Hedges, 1981, p. 112.), the
p-value stems from a non-parametric Wilcoxon test on variance equality, estimating the clarity
of this deviation (lower values indicate higher clarity; cp. Bortz, 1999, p. 149f.).
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assigned equal importance to all options of identication) or explicitly as patriots. The latter
must be seen in context: Indian Muslims encounter deep-rooted mistrust about their national
loyalty, in particular when they act in public (cp. section 3.3 and Misra, 2004, p. 230.). There-
fore, faith based actors might emphasize their Indianness simply because they are under close
observation. The way in which many of them creatively transformed the instrument conrms
this: faith based actors frequently wrote comments on the margins of their questionnaires or
changed the wording or layout of the ranking (cp. gure 9 below as an example). I therefore
tend to understand the surprising unimportance of religious categorization as a reaction to a
challenging research instrument and not so much as a reection of actual priorities.
A last psychological commonality was the typical assessment of the intergroup context by
faith based actors: they had a distinctly positive outlook compared to other interviewees (cp.
gure 8). This statistical nding is conrmed in many interview snippets, which also reveal the
roots of such optimism: an instrumentalization hypothesis. One interviewee, for example, told
that his view of Hindu communities positive because it is is independent of "politics":
Snippet 23 | Assistant: to 2002
s phl jo T aAp aOr usk bAd
aApkA n)EryA Eh\d  ao\ k þEt bdlA ,
nhF\ bdlA , to k{s ? | nhF\ bdlA n.
[...] y political log apn -vAT k Ele ,
Eks trh s bdSt h{\ [cross-speech] sAr
m  sSmAn yA sAr Eh\d KrAb nhF\ h{ [...]
Assistant: so did your view on
the Hindu community change af-
ter 2002, or not, and how? | No, it
did not change, no. [...] This [was done
by] political people for their own advan-
gage [cross-speech] neither all Muslims
nor all Hindus are bad [...]
Overall, the psychological results leave an ambivalent impression: high groupness is paired
with strong dominance, while various ingroups were hidden behind this experience of collective
subjectivity. Uniform was faith based actors' comparatively low tolerance towards role model
irritations and their positive outlook on (religious) intergroup relations.
Figure 9: Commentary in one faith based actor's questionnaire; the Hindi comment, written
in Gujarati script, reads: "such questions should never be kept" and seems to refer to caste,
gender and religious categorization. The national option is numbered with a "1".
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5.2 What secular leaders do
After faith based actors, this section introduces a group of interviewees who are in many ways
their opposite. For these "secular leaders", neither religious beliefsets nor group identication
dynamics play any role in their activism { but they categorize themselves as Muslims and are
thus part of the sample (cp. section 4.1 and chapter 6 for explanation). By terming them secular,
their preferred self-description is mirrored and not a substantial denition of secularism. In their
stories, religion, secularism and related issues are marginal to the extent that they do not even
feel an urge for coherence when talking about them.
In their political behaviour, secular leaders focussed on what they do, not on why or how they
do it, and emphasize their success stories. The structured interviews on religious beliefs were
quickly executed and the only overt commonality in the psychological scales was a comparatively
low groupness, conrmed in small stories like the following one:
Snippet 24 | m{\ [location] m\ itn sAl
rhtA TA lEkn muslim community ko
nhF\ jAnt T Ek m{\ m  slmAn h . Es'
j  Mm nmA) pxn k Ele yhA hotA TA
nmA) px k vAps gAe Gr p yA [busi-
ness] p. [...] to community m{\ grF esA
enter hotF h{\ to un log sAmnA hot
T : kOn h{\ aAp ?
I lived so many years in [location], but
the Muslim community did not knew
I am Muslim. If at all then I went
there for friday Namaz, and after pray-
ing, I returned to my home or [business].
[...] So when I entered the community
with my car, those people confronted
me: who are you?
Secular leaders do no necessarily reject religion { most are just "religiously unmusical" (cp.
Weber, 1994, p. 65). This implies that their interviews were on a rst look not too fruitful: if
there is no relation between religious identity and political behaviour, it can not be analyzed;
lest can be said about the spirituality of religiously unmusical people and a non-relation to the
ingroup can be stated and made plausible { but this won't ll many pages. The sparse comments
in the biographical interview parts do not even really clarify whether secular leaders' professional
stance on religion stems from personal areligiosity { or if causality runs the other way round and
professional secularism shapes religious identities. The family background of secular leaders, for
example, diers broadly { which would support both hypotheses.
While this section will therefore, by necessity, be a little less comprehensive, there is one
important nding regarding secular leaders: the fact that they exist at all. This is remarkable
because much research, and even more so public discourse, assumes the opposite: that Muslims
are always religious and, an even bigger mistake, always act out of religious motivation. "When
the culture of India was introduced to Europe, it was made to look predominantly religious. [...]
The mystical stereotype was conrmed and extended by romantic orientalists [...]" (Heehs, 2008,
p. 257) { and keeps on harming a clear view even inside the local NGO community, where it
leads to structural blindness to its secular Muslim members (cp. chapter 2). The trite possibility
of secular Muslims working secularly for peace should thus be boldly emphasized.
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Success stories and political behaviour
Quite like faith based actors, many secular leaders held the biographic aspects rather short in
their narratives. Unlike the former, though, they do not leave the narrative format, but use
it to present examples from their work; because success stories and political behaviour were so
closely integrated, bot are discussed in one subsection. Success stories last up to one and a half
times as long as biographical passages, a relation which is just opposite to most other interviews:
because their biography is, much like their religious identity, not a problem for secular leaders,
they prefer to narrate what they actually do. This is also conrmed in salience statistics: the
most important as well as most frequent events in secular leaders' accounts stem from the success
stories. Typical for these is a focus on the individual victim:
Snippet 25 | Assistant: koI ek
khAnF btA sktF h{\ j{s aAp success
story mAntF ho\. | bh  t sArF h{\. [lo-
cality] ngr m\ [name] h{. jo riots k
dOrAn hF widow h  I TF. [date] ko jb
VolA aAyA aOr b\d kA elAn TA to
us v
t hr m  sElm area m\ attack ho
rh T. [name] k husband BF s  bh , gol
kF lAWF lkr jA rh T. aOr un pr
attack h  aA , aOr v vhF\ mr ge r-t m\.
to is vjh s jo v [name] h{ v kA'F ,
ekdm , v uskA [pause] mAnEsk trh
s kA'F prfAn ho gI TF aOr k  C kr
nhF\ sktF TF. aOr v BF ek m  sElm
pErvAr kF h{\. khF\ uskA bAhr aAnA
jAnA , k  C knowledge nhF\ bAhr kF.
[...] hm unh\ bAr -bAr Eml , bAhr l
k ge. ab v itnA developed ho gI
Ek K  d kA sArA kAm v K  d krtF h{\.
[...] aAj v itnF aAg EnklF Ek unh\
apnA [pause] EslAI kAm BF krtF h{
K  d.
Assistant: can you tell any story
which you would consider a suc-
cess story. | there are really many.
In [locality] lived [name]. She became
a widow during the riots. When the
mob came on [date], when the curfew
was in place and all Muslim areas were
attacked. The husband of [name] also
took his stick in the morning and went.
And he was attacked and died right
there on the street. Then [name] was
much, totally, she was [pause] she devel-
oped many psychological problems and
was not able to do anything. She also
came from a Muslim family. She had no
idea how to go outside, she had no idea
about the public sphere. [...] We met
her again and again, took her out. Now
she is so developed that she does all her
work on her own. [...] Today she is so
developed that her own [pause] she has
her own sewing business.
It is such victims' concrete problems which secular leaders try to solve through empower-
ment and development of skills: most of them were working in conict and relied on classic
NGO methods (cp. chapter 2 for the prevalent peacebuilding approaches in Gujarat). In their
immediate relief and rehabilitation work, secular leaders' programs resemble faith based ac-
tors' activities, and indeed both cooperated initially. But while faith based actors remained
in a charity paradigm of aid or else ventured either into missionary activity or worked for the
reconstruction of shared spaces, secular leaders move beyond relief by adopting a rights-based
approach to development. They frequently provide legal training, mirror human rights violations
and politically lobby for internally displaced. One interviewee described the necessity thereof:
56
Snippet 26 | jb Ejn logo\ kF com-
plaints lnF TF Ek ?yA h  aA , [...] to
naturally oence h  a T. [...] us k
Ele hmn representation EkyA. to usk
phl to local vhA k BJP leader jo BF
politicians h{\ , BJP yA VHP vAl camp
ko aAkr aected logo\ ko dm krnA
f  z EkyA. Ek agr aApko Ej\dr [un-
comprehensible word] to koI complaint
nhF\ aAp dnF.
When people led complaints about
what happened [...] it was naturally
an oence. [...] Therefore we gave [ju-
ridical] representation. Before this, lo-
cal BJP leader, politicians, people from
the BJP or VHP came to the camp and
started to put pressure on people. That
'if you [uncomprehensible word] here,
then don't give any complaint'.
A frequent consequence of secular leaders' focus on human rights were complaints about the
state's complicity in the 2002 violence (cp. introduction), as in the following example:
Snippet 27 | aBF g  jrt k a\dr to
m  sSmAno\ k nAm p E)dA )lAyA jAtA
h{. [...] Es' 2002 hF nhF\. [...] y h{
?yA ? ?y ? [...] Chief minister bolt h{\
Ek 4 krow g  jrAtF h{\ , to hm BF aAt
h{\ usm\. lEkn v bolt k  C h{\ aOr
krn k  C aOr h{\. uskA unho\n pAln
nhF\ EkyA. minority community ko ek
trh hF Cow EdyA h{.
Right now the name of Muslims is
burned alive in Gujarat itself. [...] not
only in 2002. [...] What is this? Why?
[...] The chief minister said there are
40 million Gujaratis, so we are among
them as well. But talking and acting are
two dierent things. He did not observe
what he said. In a way, the minority
community is left out on purpose.
Equally common was critique towards the charity of faith based actors and against those
preferring explicit peacebuilding over rights-based or even classical development work. One
interviewee, for example, commented sarcastically about other NGO activists:
Snippet 28 | y sb peace activism
sb drama h{\ sb drama h{\. camp m\
KAnA nhF\ h{. aOr aA rh h{\ sb NGO
unk smJAn peace k Ele. ar [un-
comprehensible word] unko btAie Ek
agr peace krn CAEhe to inho\n )  Sm
EkyA , t  mh\ dm h{ , jao VHP lead-
ers k, BJP leaders k pAs aOr unk
sAT meeting kro peace k bAr m\. unk
peace k Ele training d do. E'r b\D
kro.
This whole peace activism is a huge
drama, a huge drama. In the camp is
no food. And the NGOs parade in to
impart an understanding of peace. Well
[uncomprehensible word] tell them that
if you like to make peace then have the
stamina to go to the oppressors, arrange
meetings about peace with VHP leaders
and BJP leaders. Give them a training
about peace. Otherwise shut up.
So far, the narratives' of secular leaders stick out because they focus on own success sto-
ries and emphasize rights-based approaches. Like faith based actors, they propagate a pure
hypothesis of instrumentalization (cp. section 3.5) and were interested in the political side of
religio-political conict. Like them, they also started their activism with classic relief operations.
But quite contrary to the latter, religion became no issue therein { and played no role in their
personal lives either, as the following subsections will show.
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Religious beliefsets
When directly asked whether religious beliefs have any relevance to their peace activism, no
secular leader needed more than a few sentences to negate. Lacking personal experience to
narrate, they often share their general impression of religion in conict to say at least something:
Snippet 29 | Assistant: aApkA Dm
yA aApkA Ev[vAs ?yA fA\tF k kAy m\
aAyA , yA nhF\? is bAt ko aAp k{s
dKt h{\? | koI jgh p i[vr k nAm
s fA\tF to EmlF nhF\ h{. Dm k nAm s ,
aOr m)hb k nAm s , fA\tF kA y jo
nAm h{ , chrA alg hF aAtA h{. mr
ko Es' mjFvo\ k a\dr jb m kF
bAt hotF h{ , vhA hF fA\tF EmltF h{.
Assistant: does your religion or
your faith play a role in your peace
work, or not? How do you look
at this issue? | nowhere is peace
in the name of God. Wherever peace
is clad in the name of religion, reality
looks quite dierent. In my opinion,
peace will only develop when the work-
force makes labour relations a topic.
Although this account sounds anti-religious, the overall account of this (born Muslim, turned
Marxist) interviewee was totally contradictory. Later on, for example, he lauded Islamic ethic:
Snippet 30 | Assistant: aApk
EhsAb s islAm kF ek esF idea jo
sbs important h{ , islAm kF ek
ahm bAt h{ k  C esA ? | hA , islAm
s ahm bAt to y h{\ Ek jo m  hMmd
p{g\br , v yhA k srdAr jo aAe to
unko ek lpV *  rAn m\ EdyA h  aA h{.
aSlh to aSlh h{\ , y Ejtn BF CF)\
bnAI h{\ , ek JAw h{. [...] i[vr -aSlAh
h{ , y m{\ nhF\ jAntA. ab h{ yA nhF\ h{ ,
EksF n dKA nhF\ h{. [...] [lEkn] v jF)\
hmko bh  t ps\d h{\.
Assistant: is there any idea in
Islam which is most important
for you, anything in Islam which
touches your heart? | yes, what
is close to me in Islam is that, when
the rich of his time came to Prophet
Muhammad, he gave them a blaze in
the Quran. "Allah is Allah", and what-
ever those create is only dust. [...] I do
not believe in God or Allah. He might
exist or not, nobody has seen him. [...]
[But] this pleases me very much.
The seeming contradiction between his earlier claim that peace in the name of religion is an
illusion and the later reverence to the egalitarian ethic brought by Muhammad is resolved in the
generality of both statements. Stripped from any theological reference, only the overall impulse
to strive for equality or to do the morally good remains. Similarily, who would not agree that
religion has the potential to be a conict-escalating factor (a bunch of problematic aspects was
already listed in section 3.1)? The following snippet helps to understand secular leaders' rather
general and at times even contradicting take on religion:
Snippet 31 | m{\ actually religious per-
son nhF\ h . Dm m\ ?yA h{ v m  J mAl  m
nhF\. frankly btA rhA h . m{\n *  rAn
pxA h{. K{r amn kA [uncomprehensi-
ble word] to hr Dm m\ h{ hF. koI BF
Dmg}\T l lo. [...] mdr-sh m\ BF ge
h{\ [...] lEkn vhA frArt itnF krF Ek
hmko BgA EdyA gyA.
Actually, I am not a religious person.
I have no idea what faith is all about.
I say that frankly. I read the Quran.
Well, the [uncomprehensible word] of
peace is in each and any religion. Take
any sacred book. [...] I also went to a
Madrassah [...] but made so much hub-
bub there that they threw me out.
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This interviewee has no real interest, lest much personal experience with religion. Many
secular leaders were not even decisively anti-religious { if a group in my sample rejected religion,
then the emancipating women presented in section 5.3. Secular leaders would rather agree with
the famous words of Weber (1994, p. 65): "I am religiously absolutely unmusical and can neither
create any religious edice in my soul nor do I need one { this is just impossible, and I refuse
it. But precisely? I am neither anti-religious nor unreligious" (my translation).
Secular leaders also said little about religious practice. Some highlight that the ritual prayer
keeps the body exible like gymnastic exercises, some other highlight that it helps to structure
one's day { but only one of them actually prays, and he does so only on fridays, as a family ritual.
Similarily, secular leaders express openness for religious ceremonies and some visit Dargahs, but
not out of any inner, spiritual motivation, as one interviewee explained:
Snippet 32 | Assistant: ?yA aAp
nmA) pxt h{\? | hA . m{\ nmA) pxtF
h , rm)An k mhFn m\ ro) BF rKtF
h , *  rAn -frF' BF pxtF h , sb pxtF
h . lEkn lgtA nhF\ h{. mr Gr kA
mhOl h{ Ek ro)A , rm)An sb krt h{\
to aAdt sF pw gI h{. [...] [m{\ BF] sb
jgh gI h . p jA nhF\ , Eks trh p jA
krt h{\ v to nhF\ ptA h{. jo sb friend
h{\ v ge to unk sAT m\ gI. unko
is trh nm-kAr EkyA bs is trh.
church m\ BF jA kr aAI aOr vhA BF
EkyA.
Assistant: Do you pray? | yes.
I pray, I also fast during the month of
Ramadan, I am learned in the Quran, I
read everything. But there is no emo-
tion. The atmosphere in my home em-
phasized fasting and all that in Ra-
madan, so it is an enforced habit. [...]
[I also] go to all the places. Not for of-
ferings, I have no idea how this ritual
works. All my friends go, so I go with
them. I pay them respect that way, that
is all. I also frequent the church to pay
my respect.
To sum up, religious beliefsets were not only unimportant in secular leaders' narratives {
they also play no signicant role in their personal life. In their statements, religion remains a
general category, an empty signier: secular leaders are religiously unmusical.
Group identication
Secular leaders' psychological scales, nally, were to a large extent nondescript. The only mea-
sures with considerable and reliable dierences to other interviewees were the groupness scale
(with a medium negative eect) and the tolerance against ambigous conict scale (with a small,
instable, negative eect; cp. gure 10 on page 60). Secular leaders have a considerably weaker
emotional bond to their ingroup and conicts tend to irritate them more. The latter could be a
correlate of the strong rights based orientation in their activism: conicts are nothing to be tol-
erated, but something to be fought out. And low groupness ts the overall picture plausibly: this
second dimension of religious identity was equally unimportant as the rst one. Consequently,
secular leaders strictly emphasized that group identication { in their case mostly plain self-
categorization { does not inuence their activism. One interviewee, for example, explained that
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he helps other Muslims because Muslims are structurally powerless and thus frequent targets of
communal violence { not because they constitute his ingroup:
Snippet 33 | Eh\d agr is trh
hot to m\ Eh\d  ao\ kA sAT dtF. unk
Ely lwtF. aOr )AEhr -sF bAt h{ Ek
m{\ m  sElm h aOr m  slmAno\ k sAT
y h  aA. aOr koI BF riots hot h{\ to
m  sSmAno\ ko yAdA BognA pwtA h{ aOr
unko hF yAdA n  ksAn hotA h{.
If something like this would happen to
Hindus, I would extend my hand to Hin-
dus. I would ght for them. Equally
true is that I am Muslim and that this
happened with Muslims. And what-
ever riots happened, Muslims had to feel
them the most and suered the most.
Often grammar (rst person plural) was the only reminiscence of secular leaders' personal
identication, when they assessed their ingroup through the lense of development professionals:
Snippet 34 | hm minority h{\ , hm
[uncomprehensible word] m\ km h{\.
isEle hmko dbAn m\ [...] hm log
EpCw h  e BF h{\. kA'F sArF education
nhF\ h{ , kOMvAd kF vjh s nOkrF nhF\
EmltF h{ to m  sElm pErvAr yhF khtA
h{ Ek hm log agr bQco\ ko pxAt BF
h{\ to hmAr bQco\ ko nOkrF aQCF nhF\
EmltF h{. y BF ek soc , y BF ek
mAnEsktA h{.
We are a minority, we have little [un-
comprehensible word]. That's why we
are oppressed [...] and why we people
are also quite backward. We have lit-
tle education, due to communalism we
nd no jobs, so Muslim families say that
"even if we educate our children, they
would anyway not nd a good job". This
is also a thought, this is also a psycho-
logical dynamic.
To sum up: secular leaders might have a professional opinion about their ingroup, but
considerably low groupness and related interview passages make clear that group identication
is as unimportant for their activism as are religious beliefsets.
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Figure 10: Those dimensions of secular leaders' psychological test results with a variance con-
siderably and interpretably dierent from that of other interviewees. Scales are z-standardized
and two measures assess dierences numerically: Hedges' g is a coecient for the eect size or
degree of deviation (values above .2 indicate a medium eect; cp. Hedges, 1981, p. 112.), the
p-value stems from a non-parametric Wilcoxon test on variance equality, estimating the clarity
of this deviation (lower values indicate higher clarity; cp. Bortz, 1999, p. 149f.).
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5.3 When emancipation transforms identities
Despite stark contrasts, both faith based actors and secular leaders would agree that communal
riots are not a religious problem and the conguration of religious identities and peace activism
changed for neither type after 2002. Riots are political, and identities stable { these two claims
also dominate NGO discourse in Gujarat (cp. chapter 2). But the next two types challenge
both central assumptions. On the one hand, a group of women, who shall be introduced in
this section, quickly had to deal with manifest religious patriarchy while becoming activists {
which led to a fundamental transformation of their religious identities. Doubting professionals
on the other hand (presented in section 5.4) propagate a strong and profoundly ambivalent role
of religion in conict and were inuenced by the 2002 riots either in their group identication,
their religious beliefsets, or in both dimensions of identity.
First to those female interviewees, whose religious identity transformed after the riots in
a complex dialectic interaction with political behaviour. They share extremely similar stories:
all women were victims in 2002, came in contact with secular NGOs in refugee camps, joined
their grassroot groups and later became sta members and multiplier in their communities.
In this process, they emancipated themselves from own victimization as well as from religious
patriarchial structures, conrming that "it is precisely in the power of activity that possibilities
for identity transformation [...] may occur" (Hammack, 2008, p. 235). To highlight the dynamic
character of this process, I shall refer to them using the clumsy term "emancipating women".
The analysis of their interviews and scales poses a dicult methodical problem: reconstruct-
ing a dynamic with data from only one particular point of time. Of course, narratives contain
retrospective episodes and an extensive hermeneutical analysis of these might suggest that the
process of transformation also changed religious identities. But because the psychological scales
and many answers in pillar two, which could conrm that this actually happened, are merely
snapshots, only a methodical trick can reveal dynamics in these dimensions. This trick assumes
that dierent women proceed with dierent pace on the path from victim to peace activist,
and were therefore in dierent stages of transformation at the time of our interviews. Some
women, for example, described a rather complex and far-reaching change, others narrated only
initial attempts. But because the rst steps of the former very closely resemble what the latter
described as their current situation, it is possible to assume a common dynamic by ordering all
interviews in a hypothetical chronology. This quasi-chronological concatenation of momentary
insights reveals ideal-typical developments in non-narrative dimensions.
As was already said, emancipating women develop agency and self-ecacy against the back-
drop of victimization and structural patriarchy and nally proclaim their own biography as
an exemplary success of peace activism. In a hypothetical chronology, event salience statistics
show typical shifts in the relative frequency, relative importance and centrality of key events
during this process, namely between the generalized events 2002 riots, own victimization, NGO
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intervention and own peace activism. Parallely, the role of religious beliefsets changed as well:
starting from a traditional and liminal religiosity, most women discovered the Islamic dogma of
equality and temporarily used it to stabilize their emancipation { but ultimately turned away
from religion. The dynamics of group identication nally reect how dicult this process was
on a psychological level, typically expressing fading groupness and rising tolerance towards new
role models on the one hand and fading dominance and low resonance on the other: an ambiva-
lent picture. Strictly speaking, these hypothetical transformation processes can be reduced to
a collection of synchronic dierences. But due to the strong commonalities in those stages of
emancipation which many women shared, and because retrospective episodes in the structured
interviews t the picture, an imposed diachronical order seems suciently reliable.
Success stories
Even though emancipating women work in similar NGO projects like other interviewees doing
the same kind of work (though more often at grassroot level), they report clearly distinct succes
stories, which were always related to their own personal transformation. The following woman,
for example, talks about the micro-credit program which she joined and now works in:
Snippet 35 | jb d\gA h  aA , tb esA
TA Ek aOrt\ b{W k ?yA kr\gF. uns Edÿ
mAg m\ aBF tk jo hmArA h  aA , usko
l k esA k  C yAd aA jAtA h{ to mn
m\ esA bh  t sA jo jAtA h{ Ek ek do
i\sAn g  )r gyA , aOr jo k  C TA v BF
clA gyA. [NGO] training EdlvAnA TF
hmko. tFn -tFn mhFn. us training m\
hmn lucknow-style handicrafts kA kAm
EkyA. [...] p{sA ltF h aAps. aOr hm
tFn bhn\ h{\ , supervisor hm K  d jAt
h{. ahmdbAd , b)Ar s kpwA lAt h{\
aOr K  d EslAn BF lAt h{\. [...] hm K  d
apn -aAp krtF h{\ aOr E'r exhibition
lgt h{\. Bombay m\ , [list of locations]
esA khF\ BF lgAnA hotA h{. [...] y jo
krt h{\ v log bh  t hF aQCA kAm krt
h{\. amn -f\tF k Ele.
After the riots, women sat around, not
knowing what to do. In their souls they
still remember what had happened to
us, so the fact that some lives were
lost still wanders through their mind,
[but] what happened is past. [NGO]
provided us a training. Every three
months. In this training we fabricated
lucknow-style handicrafts. [...] I bor-
rowed money from them. And we are
three women who supervise themselves.
We buy cloth from the Bazar in Ahmed-
abad and sew it independently. [...] I
myself sew and than an exhibition took
place. One should arrange this in Bom-
bay, in [list of locations] as well. [...]
Those who did this, did a very good
work for peace.
Distinct in this snippet is not so much the micro-credit program { secular leaders, for ex-
ample, did similar work { but that this woman herself participated. She explicitly reported her
own transformation into a businesswoman (and later peace activist) as her major success after
2002. Their own transformation is what emancipating women ultimately aspire to spread, as
the following two typical statements show:
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Snippet 36 | Assistant: ism\ s
koI ek khAnF jo t  MhArF Edl h{
kEhy , t  MhArA apnA yog TA| khAnF
to nhF\ h{ lEkn esF koI g  -sA nhF\
lEkn m{\ apnF success us trFkF s
mntF [NGO] s jown k bAd m  J esA
Ek m{\ acting kr sktF h . [...] usn
apn bAwA success mntF. ?yo\Ek is s
phl m  J ptA nhF\ TA Ek m{\ itnA [...]
nAyA kr sktF h .
Assistant: could you please tell a
story, which is close to your heart,
which was your own contribution?
| there is actually no story, but, it
should not be pretentious, but I see my
succes in this direction, that I, after
joining [NGO], that I can act in that
way. [...] I think this is my own big
success. Because before I did not know,
that I am able to [...] do something new.
Snippet 37 | mr ko es s'ltA
lgtF h{ Ek jo phl Xr rh T , Ejnho\n
dKA aA Ko\ s Ek is trh blAtkr h  aA ,
mAr XAl , v dKA TA aOr nhF\ Enklt
T , esF bhno\ ko hmn bAhr EnklA.
usk Ele hmko esA lgtA h{ Ek hmn
kr k EdKAyA. m{\ mr K  d kA khtF h 
Ek jb mr mAm E)\dA T to v hmko
[location] s [location] nhF\ aAn dt T.
akl. lEkn ab mr ko esA hotA h{
Ek mr ko bh  t yAdA EhMmt aA gI h{.
[...] mr ko mrF jAt p esA lgtA h{ Ek
ab m{\ m)b t ho gI h . m{\ EksF s Xrn
vAlF nhF\ h . [...] aOrt\ aBF tk boltF
h{\ Ek [name] aAp t  mn bh  t EhMmt kF ,
t  mn hmko aAg bYAyA. m{\n khA jo
mrA DrvAlA h{ , mrA hF phl dKo , m{\
BF es hF TF. aOrt hF TF , m{\ koI
yAdA nhF\ TF. amFr nhF\ TF , grFb
hF TF. es hF m{\ EnklF h bAhr. t  m
clo. es smJA k bhno\ ko EnkAlA.
I think it is a success that those who
were frightened before, who saw rapes
with their own eyes, feared death, who
saw this and did not leave their home,
that we took these women outside. We
think that this demonstrates [a success].
I myself already told that while my un-
cle was still alive, he did not allow us
to go from [location] to [location]. Not
alone. But today, I acquired quite some
courage. [...] In my community, people
think that I became strong. I do not
fear anyone. [...] Women say till today
that "[name], you are very brave, you
brought us progress". I say "look also
at my background, how I was before, I
was not like this. I was also a women,
I was nobody special. I was not rich, I
was poor as well. From this position I
came forward. [Now] you go." By giving
them this understanding, I bring women
forward.
While many emancipating women became part of trauma healing or dialogue projects, orga-
nize small-scale business training workshops for their organizations or have other grassroot-level
jobs, their own perceived contribution lies in the personal sphere: they try to let other women
participate in a thorough transformation { which shall be analyzed in the next subsection.
Political behaviour
As was already said, all emancipating women were direct victims in 2002 and many still live in
refugee camps. An often dramatic personal history is the rst commonality which distinguishes
not only their success stories from most other interviewees. Before the riots, none of these
women was an activist; thus they do neither report a story of "naturally born" peace activism
(like faith based actors) nor of longstanding professional development work (like secular leaders)
{ but a story of serendipically experienced victimization. Two women report:
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Snippet 38 | m{\ [village] kF rhn vAlF
h . [...] aOr vhA jb y riots h  aA , d\gA
h  aA , tb d\g m\ hm yhA Enkl k aA
ge. rAt m\ `yArh bj , 23 log T.
hmArA p rA prFvAr TA. yhA s aBF tk
hm bAhr ge nhF\. hmko rehabilitate
nhF\ kr gyA. hmArA mkAn kA pTr vTr
sb l k ge. [...] tFn Edn tk hmArA
p rA smAn l k ge. [few inaudible
words] hmArA kpwA [pause] sb k  C TA.
I am a resident of [village]. [...] And
when these riots happened, we came
here, to this place. At night, at 11
o'clock, there were 23 people. My whole
family. We have not left this place yet.
We have not been rehabilitated. Our
whole house was destroyed [...] In three
days, all that we owned was taken. [few
inaudible words] our clothes [pause] all
and everything.
Snippet 39 | jo 2002 kF d\g\ m\ h  aA ,
hmko to itnA ajFb sA lgA. Ek bh  t
KtrnAk h  aA. mr p to bh  t Ktrÿ
nAk g  )rF h{. mrA koI nhF\ bcpn s.
esA )brd-tF hm Kw h  e apn pO p.
[place] m\ aAe [...] hm es [place] m rh
Ek do dFn tk to hmn KAnA BF nhF\
KAyA. mrA bVA BF TA , mrF bVF BF TF.
koI n hmko ek kVorF sAlAn BF nhF\
EdyA. [...] bh  t bAI VAlt TF mrF.
When the 2002 riots took place, we felt
so terribly bad. That it was very dan-
gerous. In my case, extreme danger
passed by. I have noone since childhood.
We were forced to stand on our own feet.
We came to [place] [...] we lived there in
the rst two days without even having
any food. My son and daughter as well.
Nobody gave us cutlery or a room to
rent. [...] For me it was a big grievance.
From further hints in her interview, it becomes plausible that the latter woman was raped in
2002. Others, like the former woman, were displaced, robbed or saw family members die. In this
context, it is remarkable that both referred to 2002 in much clearer terms than other interviewees:
while many spoke of "disturbance" or referred to "whatever happened", emancipating women
had no problem with using the words "riots". This explicit semantic is one among several hints
that they actually overcame the passivity which is inherent in victimization.
A second hint is contained in typical pattern in the salience statistics. A quasi-chronological
ordering of interviews, as justied earlier in this section, enables the comparison of three hy-
pothetical stages in a presumably common process of emancipation. Although all narratives
contain reports on initial stages, salience statistics are dierent when these reports were the
core of a story from cases in which they were only a retrospective introduction to something
more current. To assess changes in the relative frequency and relative importance of certain key
events, I compared dierent interviews which are exemplary of dierent stages of transforma-
tion. The following table lists salience indicators of four common events in these interviews (rst
relative frequency, then priority, then centrality; cp. section 4.2 for the methodical background):
First stage Second stage Third stage
2002 riots 55 { 45 { 86 36 { 8 { 86 30 { 6 { 70
Own experience of violence 55 { 83 { 86 36 { 89 { 95 25 { 83 { 100
NGO intervention 33 { 38 { 100 23 { 45 { 100 30 { 86 { 90
Own peace activism 33 { 30 { 86 23 { 83 { 100 15 { 75 { 75
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These statistics have three implications. The rst two rows show that 2002 is crucial as a
personal event: the riots themselves, as an abstract historical event, never reach the importance
of own experience of violence (even less so in later stages of transformation). Many women
narrate them in a row with other tragic biographic events, like, for example, becoming a widow.
But unlike those other tragedies, internal displacement became the central precondition for
fundamental changes in political behaviour: many women pooled in this section would probably
not have become peace activists without the turmoil of riots. Some of them thus presented 2002
not only as a fatefully tragic, but indeed as a serendipically lucky event:
Snippet 40 | v{sA BF m{\n bolA Ek y
jo riots h  aA , murder Eky , mAr dAl ,
unk Edlo\ pr bh  t k  -h ho gyA. pr
ek "Z m{\ esA soctF h Ek y jo h  aA
bh  t hF bEYyA h  aA Ek jo hmAr mn m\
TA , hmAr pAs jo h  nr TA , v jo k
khF\ bAhr EnklA.
Like I said before, those, who murdered,
who beat up people in the riots, they
were pleased with their action. But for
an instance, even I thought that what
happened was [in fact] wonderful { be-
cause what was in our mind, what skills
we had, that came to the surface then.
This crucial inuence of 2002 as the source of activism as such distinguishes emancipat-
ing women from the two groups of interviewees described so far. As a precondition for NGO
interventions and own peace activism, the riots and in particular own experience of violence
also remain important events throughout all stages of transformation. But in later stages, they
were less frequently mentioned and increasingly put into context. In these stages, self-ecacy
develops, the serendipic starting point gets a positive meaning and step by step own peace ac-
tivism reaches the same level of importance as the experience of violence: the third hint in the
salience statistics. This transformation from victim to peace activist was a tough one. One
young professional street theater player, for example, told me:
Snippet 41 | f  z f  z k tFn mhFn
to m  J bh  tF awkward lggF. ?yo\kF
y sb m  J bh  t dierent h{. us trh
kF bAt\ ; nAVk m\ m{\n phl kBF nhF\
dKA TA kBF nhF\ EkyA TA. nAVk m\
Eh-sA lnA , d  sr logo\ s bAt krnA.
[...] yAdA dElt T , E'r lwk BF T.
is trh kBF h  aA nhF\ Ek hm lwk s
bAt kr\ TA lwko s is trh s Emlkr
b{Vkr bAto\ kr\ , kAm kr\. es Eblk  l
nyA TA. [...] to f  z k tFn mhFn m{\n
to bh  tF awkward.
In the initial three months, I would have
felt very awkward, because all this is
very dierent for me. This kind of talk;
I have never seen a play in theater nor
did I participate in it. To take part
in it, to talk with other people. [...]
There were many Dalits, and also boys.
I never talked with boys, met them,
sat with them and talked with them,
worked with them. Such things were to-
tally new. [...] So, during the rst three
months, I felt really awkward.
The personal struggle with own hesitation, as expressed in this snippet, could nally explain
the third interesting feature of the salience statistics: own peace activism was in an intermediary
stage far more important for the logic of emancipating womens' narratives than NGO interven-
tions, although both were equally frequent. In this stage, the development of self-ecacy is as
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crucial that it overpowers its organizational context { a dynamic which only changes in the third
stage, when own agency is already somewhat stabilized.
The typical process of (re-)acquiring own agency after victimization, as proposed by a hypo-
thetical chronology of event salience statistics, is the rst commonality of emancipating womens'
political behaviour. A second common feature was the confrontation with gender barriers. While
they started as peace activists (the just quoted street theater player, for example, performed
plays on communal harmony and social upliftment), they transformed soon into women rights'
activists, to counter the diculties which they experienced in patriarchial structures on their
way (later on, to stick to the example, the theater player also included gender issues in her plays).
During their transformation, emancipating women interestingly also used dierent Hindi words
for peace: if they earlier talked about "shanti", a kind of holistic calm with an undertone of a cos-
mic balance (often justifying structural violence like castism), they later talked about "aman",
meaning only absence of violence without any religious inference and in the last stage simply
about "nyay": justice. While a serendipic event { the 2002 riots { opens the leeway for agency,
structural inuence restricts it. One example:
Snippet 42 | mr Gr kA jo mhOl h{ ,
kA'F mr ppA mMmF , Dm ko lkr bh  t
v h{\ [pause] Ek kBF esA kAm n kr\ jo
Dm k EKlA' ho. [...] kyo.mki jaba
mai.m bhI shuru shuru me.m yahA/
[NGO] m\ j  wF to bh  t problems ho gI.
j{s Ek ism\ kAm krn s kBF aAW bj
gAe Gr ph  Cn ko , kBF sAt bj jAe.
to uss m  J Gr p bh  t bAt\ hotF\. [...]
to mr mMmF ppA to km bol\ , bAhr
jo log h{\ v is bAt\ bnAkr bol\.
In my home was this atmosphere, that
especially my parents take a lot from
religion. [pause] That 'you should not
do such a work, it would be against reli-
gion'. Because when I started and joined
[NGO], many problems came up. In this
work, you sometimes come back home
at eight o'clock, sometimes you leave at
seven. So this was a permanent discus-
sion at home. [...] Even if my parents
did talk less about it, other people did.
I could list a bunch of similar accounts: all emancipating women faced the same problems
when becoming self-ecate peace activists. For younger women and widows alike, it was mainly
the insistence of neighbours or family members on Purdah. Although this term does, in the
areas of my interviews, not mean the total separation of men and women as in other parts of
the subcontinent, it still denotes a strategy to restrict public exposure of womens' bodies. This
strategy obviously conicts with, say, street theater players who discover the expressive quality
of the same. Emancipation from victimization quickly transformed into an emancipation from
religio-patriarchial structures as well. Before I present this struggle with religion in detail, I
would like to summarize those features of emancipating womens' stories found so far: a trans-
formation from own victimhood to peace activism through NGO interventions, which followed
serendipic riots; in this transformation a development of agency and self-ecacy against own
victimization and structural patriarchy; and nally the proclamation of their own story as a
success exemplary to other women.
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Religious beliefsets
Emancipation was not only a process of overcoming victimization, but also a struggle with
patriarchial religious beliefsets. Emancipating women typically start from a traditional-cultural
family background, which they shed in a second stage for a selective acquisition of those beliefsets
which can support their personal emancipation process { often against their family. Finally, they
totally drop religion and become secular or even anti-religious.
Women in the initial stages of transformation did generally not care much for religion,
because they had to struggle with daily survival (which, by the way, contradicts the common
assumption that people turn to God in the absolute darkest times { according to the experiences
in my research, religiosity is rather a feature of relative dark outlooks). If religious beliefs or
ritual life were important in initial stages at all, then in a traditional and liminal conguration.
Although it often remained unclear if women talked about themselves or about their family's
preferences, Dargahs and other shared spaces (as introduced in section 3.4) were at the center
of their religiosity in this stage. One victim, for example, narrates:
Snippet 43 | Assistant: m-jFd to
nhF\? | aOrt\ ko mnA h{. drgAh m{\
jAtF h | Interviewer: kOn s ? |
hlol m\ aBF h{ y bAd-hAh bAbA. aOr
mhsAnA tk [jAtF h ]
Assistant: not to the mosque? |
this is not for women. I go to Dargahs.
| Interviewer: which ones? | in
Halol there is at the moment this Bad-
shah Baba. And I go up to Mehsana.
Badshah Baba is a non-descript local saint. Mehsana, though, is a surprise. Although no
famous Dargah is directly located in this northern Gujarati town, the village of Unana is really
close by. There, Mir Datar is buried, a saint who "has specialized in helping people who are
aicted with 'madness'. The dargaha dropped { or never developed { all other functions which
are usually associated with Muslim shrines. Its only function is [...] the religious healing of
those aicted with some kind of 'psychosis' or 'neurosis'. More precisely, it has a reputation for
healing those striken by a bhut. [...] Bhuts are believed to be the roaming souls of unpeacefully
deceased persons (suicide, violent death). The symptoms which result from this latent possession
are somatic ailments combined with mental disturbance. [...] The saint's spirit [is] one of the
most powerful exorcists in the country" (Peiderer, 1981, p. 218.; cp. in detail Peiderer,
2007). If this is indeed the shrine which this particular lady visits (which seems plausible, given
her history of victimization), she most likely does not do so for religious purposes but to overcome
what modern psychology calls a post-traumatic stress disorder (cp. Nemero et al., 2006), clad
in a "culture specic illness theory" (Peiderer, 1981, p. 232) as the possession by an evil spirit.
While it remains to a good extent speculation which experience traumatized her and whether
she really visits Mir Datar to overcome PTSD, the fact is important that emancipating womens'
visit to Dargahs is (in this and other cases) not a religious aair. During the rst stage of
transformation, a traditional or habitual religiosity is typical: emancipating women go to saint
festivals to maintain social networks or complain about the familial urge to celebrate holidays
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even in economical hardship { and some visit Dargahs for healthcare. This if at all implicitly
religious role of beliefs and ritual practices changes in the second stage of transformation. Here,
many women discovered Islamic dogma:
Snippet 44 | Assistant: agr jo
BF h{ , t  mhArA knowledge islAm kA
uns k  C hogF ek sb s mhvp  Z BAg
islAm kF , agr goI h{ ? [...] | isÿ
lAm m\ un dK m\ jao to ek trh , Ek
sm\tA h{. [cross-speech] agr hm Eh\d
Drm m\ dK\ to hm vr ,nA &yv-TA vh
koI kI nhF\ cEhe , koI dElt h{\. us
trh kA ek Bd -BOv h{. lEkn m  sElm
Drm m\ is trh kA nhF\ h{. [...] [lEkn]
an  dAt bh  t h{. | Interviewer: su-
perstitious | hA . ?yo\kF ?yA hotA h{ ,
n ? Ek hm us trh s socn k koEff
hF nhF\ krt h{\ Ek j{s , Ek p{gMbr Ek
islAm Ejho\n d  EnyA E'r lA aAegA.
[...] us trh kA nhF\ ps\d. aOr d  srA
yh h{ Ek islAm m\ jo mEhlA m\ jo
E-TtF h{ d  sr number dnA h{.
Assistant: in your knowledge of Is-
lam, is there one most important
part of Islam, is there something
like this? [...] | if you look inside
Islam, then, in a way, there is equality.
[cross-speech] If we look into Hindu reli-
gion, then there are chastity boundaries
through castism, there are Dalits. This
kind of divisions are there. But in Mus-
lim religion there is nothing like this.
[...] [But] there is a lot of superstition
| Interviewer: superstitious { yes.
Because it is like this, right? that we do
not try to think about that time, that
the world of the prophet's Islam is gone
now. [...] I do not like this approach.
And also that women are given the sec-
ond place in Islam.
Women in an intermediary step of transformation call for the contextualization of Quran.
An explicitly religious ethic of (gender) equality seems to become key to their own emancipation
(although it is dicult to assess whether this is an instrumental move or actual religiosity). In
contrast to their male opponents, whom they locate in the realm of faith based actors (though
a few of those were actually quite open to the empowerment of women), they do not back their
ethic with detailed and stable beliefs about the afterlife, though, but try to appropriate the
imperative of equality to their own process of emancipation by dynamically modernizing moral
commandments. One example:
Snippet 45 ||Assistant: ek esF
bAt btAie islAm m\ jo aApk Edl
ko c  Et h{ | [...] to v nmA) pxnA h{.
aOr aQC s p rA tn pr kpwA xA k k
phntA h{ , aox k phnnA h{ , v islAm
kA ek bh  t hF aQCA h{. esA nhF\ h{ Ek
aAp nkAb m\ rho. mgr aAp sr YAko
yA p rA aox k E'ro to v islAm kF
ek aQCF bAt h{ , m  J aQCF lgtA h{.
[...] apnA n  mAIf bAhr mt EdKAao.
| Assistant: Please tell me one
thing in Islam which is close to
your heart | [...] Reading Namaz.
And that you keep your whole body well
covered with clothes, wear a veil, this is
something in Islam that is really very
good. Not like: wear Nakab! But to
cover yourself, well this is a good thing
in Islam, that pleases me a lot. [...] Do
not exhibit yourself.
Such an reacquisition of ethical commandments (cover yourself, but do not force the wearing
of Nakab) was a typical feature for the second stage of transformation. In an intermediary step,
such religious beliefsets strongly inspire the activism of emancipating women:
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Snippet 46 | Assistant: jo BF aAp
kAm kr rhF h{\ iskF þrZA aA aApko
apn Dm s aOr kOm s EmlF yA nhF\?
| jF. hA , hmAr Dm s. mtlb y jo
h  aA usk bAd BF Dm hmn CowA nhF\.
Ek upr vAlA trA lAK -lAK f   h{\.
Assistant: do you get the inspira-
tion for your work from your reli-
gion or community, or not? | Yes,
from our religion. I mean, after what
has happened, we have not given up
our faith. That God commands high-
est gratitude.
This woman conrms that she roots her quest for equality in Islamic beliefs. Besides, the
snippet is interesting for its grammar as well: she asserts her religiosity by making a general
claim to Muslims ("we have not given up our faith"). Together with what will be reported
in the next subsection, this could explain why these women (selectively) turn to religion in
an intermediary stage of transformation: their community ("we") might if at all tolerate an
emancipation of women when justied in Islamic terms { but not if this goes hand in hand with
a perceived neglect of religion. Thus, emancipating women appropriate feminist theology.
But while a religious ethic is a necessary strategy to stabilize an intermediary transformatory
step, it ultimately does not last and is replaced by a secular justication of equality and womens'
emancipation in the last stage of transformation. In sum, emancipation leads at rst to a
transformation and discovery, but nally to a renounciation of religious beliefs:
Snippet 47 | aBF m{\ esA Ek lg h{
Ek m{\ alAh h{ yA BgvAn nhF\ mntF.
itnF m{\ nAE-tk ho gy . aOr percent to
k  C h{ , sAc s bA*F h{ E'r v BF km
m  J aAegA. ?yo\kF mrA pErvAr esA h{
Ek v p rA , v p rA Dm m\ mnt h{\ , p rA
K  dA m\ mnt h{\ , p rA 5 time ko nmA)
pxt h{\ , rmdAn m\ ro)A rK d\g. to
k  C percent h{ esA jo unkF tr' m  J
EmlA aAegA. v m  J ekdm 100 percent
nAE-tk hon m\ rok rhg.
Right now, I do not believe that there is
Allah or any god. That much I became
atheist. A few percent still hold that
there is truly something else, but they
will also go. Because my family com-
pletely religious, they believe totally in
Allah, make use of all ve prayer times
a day, fast during Ramadan. So a few
percent are still there from this direc-
tion. They will prevent me from becom-
ing 100 percent atheist.
In summary, it became clear that most women start with a traditional religious (or cultural)
life, then discover an explicit Islamic theology of equality which they use to stabilize their
emancipation, but ultimately turn away from religion. Very dierent religious beliefs play very
dierent roles, and in the hypothetically constructed dynamic, their inuence can increase as
well as decrease: this is in a sharp contrast to the stable relation betwen religious dimensions
of identity and political behaviour found among faith based actors and conrms corresponding
conceptual claims about identiy made in the introduction chapter.
Group identication
By now, it became obvious that the role of emancipating womens' religious identity is intricately
linked to their ingroup. Many of them changed to the rst person plural when answering
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questions on religion and spoke more about community tradition than about their own faith.
Group identication became particular salient after 2002, as one woman explained:
Snippet 48 | sb s main motAr TA
Ek 2002. us k bAd m  J m  sElm hogF
aOr mEhlA hogF yAdA. [...] to ek v
identity TF us v
t mrF Ek m{\ m  sElm
h isEly m{\ [NGO] m\ ek uskF )zrt
m  J hF gAI. lEkn bAd m\
The main impulse was 2002. Afterwards
I became very much a Muslima and a
woman. [...] So my only identity at that
time was that I am a Muslima, and that
is why [NGO] needed me.
Would they not have categorized themselves as Muslims, they would not have been of any
interest to those NGOs which discovered Muslim communities as new target groups after 2002
(cp. chapter 2). But at the same time, joining NGOs meant opposition to the family and com-
munity and thus started an emancipation not only from victimization and passivity, but also
from patriarchy, as described in the last subsection. As Muslimness was as much a precondition
as an obstacle in their story, the relation to their ingroup remained ambivalent: they can neither
easily dismiss group identication nor uphold an unbroken relation to their community. And
although they were externally seen primarily as Muslims, emancipating women consequently
identied themselves primarily as women in the ranking of categorization options. This ambiva-
lence has it's psychological correlate in distinctly low measures for dominance and resonance
(cp. gure 11): emancipating women were not able to considerably inuence their ingroup, nor
did they meet much conrmation.
In the last subsections, the internal dierences between emancipazing women were spread on
a timeline to construct a hypothetical dynamic. Statistical restrictions render this trick rather
adventurous when applied to the psychological scales. On the other hand, the dynamic that
becomes visible by dierentiating women in initial and later stages of transformation ts the
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Figure 11: Those dimensions of emancipating womens' psychological test results with a vari-
ance considerably and interpretably dierent from that of other interviewees (separately for
initial and later stages of transformation). Scales are z-standardized and two measures assess
dierences numerically: Hedges' g is a coecient for the eect size or degree of deviation (values
above .2 indicate a medium eect; cp. Hedges, 1981, p. 112.), the p-value stems from a non-
parametric Wilcoxon test on variance equality, estimating the clarity of this deviation (lower
values indicate higher clarity; cp. Bortz, 1999, p. 149f.).
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overall impression too well to be left aside. With a big methodical caveat, therefore, it seems
that groupness declines during the transformation process, while tolerance towards (on item
level gendered) irritations of role models increases. The shift from patriarchial structures to
personal emancipation ts that dominance completely fades. That resonance remains low could,
on the other hand, reect the continued grip of the community. One example:
Snippet 49 | jo Enkl to sb esA
btA rh h{\ Ek aApn to m  sSmAn h{\ ,
aOr m{\ EvDvA TF , aklF aOrt sb
esA bolt T Ek jo nOkrF krtF h{
v nhF\ krnA CAEhe. aOrt jAt nhF\
EnkltF bAhr. [...] hA m  sSmAn Dm
apnA apn Edl m\ rK. [...] yhA apn
esA tension aBF s l k ?yA kr\g.
Whoever became active was told "but
you are a Muslim", and I am also a
widow, a lone woman so everybody said
that it is not advisable that she works,
has a job. Women folk should not enter
the public. [...] Yes, the Muslim faith
is deep in my heart. [...] There develop
such tensions now, what shall I do?
"Such tensions" because of low resonance plausibly reduce dominance. The lack of support
from the community nally inspire some emancipating women to a radical change of identi-
cation: they want to fundamentally get rid of their Muslimness by becoming Hindu. But even
this option has pitfalls, which one emancipating woman described as follows:
Snippet 50 | Assistant: aAp 2002
m\ soCA Ek aAp Eh\d honA CAEhe ? |
hA . to mrA 2002 k soC TA Ek Eh\d
honA CAEhe. to mr lwAI nhF\ ho. [...]
mgr y 2002 k bAd esA hotA h{ Ek
y log k{s h{\ agr ink a\dr ImAn
hotA to v log esA nhF\ krt. death
k tFsr Edn esA h  aA.
Assistant: after 2002 you wanted
to be Hindu? | yes. After 2002, I
wanted to be Hindu. Then I would not
have to struggle. [...] But after 2002,
I [also] wondered how these people are
{ if they had humanity in them, then
they would not have done such things,
so much death in three days.
Overall, the discussion of emancipating womens' dynamics of group identication highlights
the diculties of a process of transformation. This is visible in the combination of fading group-
ness and rising tolerance towards new role models with low and fading dominance and rather low
social resonance. Further diculties lie as well in the need to categorize as a Muslima while at-
tempting to shed this option of identication as nally in the non-feasability of radical solutions.
Group identication remains an ambivalent factor in emancipating women, which conceptually
makes them an interesting case for reconstructing the ambivalence of the sacred on the micro-
level (cp. chapter 6). That both subdimensions of religious identity can transform in dierent
directions also conrms the importance to dierentiate them, as proclaimed in the introduction:
while the inuence of religious beliefsets initially increases but ultimately vanishes totally, the
inuence of dynamics of group identication steadily recedes without fading completely.
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5.4 Why some professionals develop doubts
A last type of interviewees were (previously secular) professionals who develop doubts about their
earlier stance that religion is irrelevant. For them, 2002 initiated a journey to "the own shadow,
the sum of those dimensions of the own being which were subdued and not realized" (Brück,
2008, p. 142; my translation). Like emancipating women, their identities were inuenced by their
activism as much as the other way round. One of these "doubting professionals" summarized:
Snippet 51 | I saw [...] communal conict and, you know, [...] this is how I
understood my own identity. Because again and again people used to started asking
me: who are you, who are you? And till then, that time I was [age] years old, I never
knew who I am. Because for me, I was born as a Muslim, my family was Muslim,
but it was very personal [...] and we never carried our identities.
After the usual relief and rehabilitation stories, doubting professionals narrate in particular
one kind of success: the initiation of cross-community religious learning projects. This mirrors
the importance of a development of (self-)understanding and the exploration of ambivalence in
their own biographies (the little "why" in the title hints at this):
Snippet 52 | [Only] as we went into deep and we tried to learn and we were
oriented in the social work and all this background, with the researches and the
studies [...] [we] then said that we should also take up this issue.
During their learning process, doubting professionals openly exposed their religious identities
to irritation and developed an holistic-aesthetical spirituality and a feeling of responsibility for
their ingroup. At the same time, they do neither need religious beliefsets for detailed moral
guidance nor does their psychological stability rely on high groupness. On the contrary: doubting
professionals are the only type of interviewees who have an external standpoint towards religion
and can thus fully embrace its ambivalence. Unlike faith based actors and secular leaders, their
identity is in ux { and unlike emancipating women, they do not turn away from religion, but
discover in it a "beautiful" language to express what underlies their activism. Because doubting
professionals themselves reect extensively on this dynamic in their narratives, temporalizing
dierences { the trick applied to the case of emancipating women { is not necessary for diachronic
analyses. They will explain their doubts themselves.
Success stories
In the diversity of successes that doubting professionals reported, one variety of peace work
sticks out: many of them venture into religious education. They organize workshops on Islam,
partly for Muslims, partly for both Muslims and Hindus. They invite both communities to
celebrate their festivals together. Some start explicit interfaith dialogues. A few examples:
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Snippet 53 | Interviewer: Could you tell me one short story where
you were successful in campaigning for peace? | see, while working with
the Muslims and all that we have been able to bring together the people as well
from Dalits as well as Muslim communities together. By explaining all these things
by giving analysis of whatever [uncomprehensible word] has happened, by taking
the example from their live and what have gone through, and of course what the
religion itself says about peace and all that. Because in Muslim religion, it is a
precondition that even you can't have, as simple as that, you can't fulll your
stomach as long as your neighbour is not fullled, he is not, he is hungry. So that
a religion can't talk about war and violence and this thing and that thing.
Snippet 54 | hm youth k sAT [...]
discussion m\ Eh-sA lt. [...] jb m{\
democratic rights kF bAt krtA h , jb
m{\ youth kA nation-building m\ ?yA role
ho sktA h{\ , m{\an jb youth k bAt
EkyA , jb syncretic culture kF bAt kF ,
harmonic atmosphere bnAn kF bAt kF
to bh  t s lwko\ n aA k sFDA sFDA
bol EdyA Ek aAp m  sElm nhF\ lgt.
mtlb , unho\n m  sElm k bAr m\ ek
esF soc bnAt rKF Ejsm\ m{\ t nhF\
hotA h . y hmfA rhA h{. lEkn DFr -
DFr E'r yhF bAt hon lgF Ek aAp
y mAnnA f  z kr\ Ek m  sElm BF is
trh kF bAt krt h{\. [...] E'r hmko
religious leaders, communal log aAk
d srF community k bAr m\ btAt h{\. [...]
DFr -DFr y bAt\ smJ m\ aAtF h{\.
We took part in discussions with the
youth [...] When I spoke about demo-
cratic rights, about what could be the
role of youth in nation-building, about
issues of the youth, about syncretic
culture and creating a harmonic at-
mosphere, then many boys came and
talked back to me: you seem not to be
a Muslima. That is to say, they were
holding a concept of Muslima into which
I did not t. This always happens. But
then slowly they began to realize that
actually a Muslima is talking this way.
[...] Then we gathered religious lead-
ers and communal people and told them
about the respective other community's
aairs. [...] Slowly they began to un-
derstand these things.
Snippet 55 | Initially of course, one wanted to reconcile. [...] So we started
working and I told you we [...] brought both the communities together. First
thing that was the month of Ramazan, so we were fasting, so we invited all our
Hindu friends, you know who have fought at the border side, so we invited both
the communities and broke the fast. [...] Lot of Hindus came. It was a huge
number, and they were all from the neighbours and they were so happy and then
they hugged each other and they apologized and said "we are very sorry, for what
people have done to you" (the Hindus) [...] and there are hundreds of such stories,
which we did and we tried to bring both the communities together.
The commonality of all three stories lies in their focus on education and understanding as well
as in their inter-communal scope. Like other interviewees, doubting professionals also provided
immediate relief and extensively worked in human rights advocacy. But closest to their heart
are those initiatives where they spread a productive understanding of religion { initially inside
their own NGO, later on in broader society. The next subsection will show that the development
of understanding is not only the core of their professional peace activism, but also the core of
their own story after 2002.
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Political behaviour
In the narratives of doubting professionals, own peace activism statistically appears at rst less
frequent and far less important than in most other interviews; the respective indicators lie as
much as one and a half standard deviation below average. At the same time, many doubting
professionals hold leading positions in their organizations and my eld notebook remembers
them as being quite self-condent. Indeed, on a second look the seeming unimportance of own
activism turns out to be a statistical aw which results from the complexity of most stories:
own activism takes, in absolute terms, as much space as in other interviews { it is just not the
only thing doubting professionals talk about, thus the relative importance appears low.
What is it that doubting professionals add to their narratives? Figure 12 shows an exemplary
dense event structure, in which two causal chains are intertwined: one links to peace activism
and one to the 2002 riots. Both do only partially overlap, but each in itself is more complex
than most other interviewees' stories. Such partial independence should not be confused with
the parallel causality found in faith based actors' narratives, though: doubting professionals
remain strictly narrative in their rhetoric. While faith based actors tell two parallel stories in
distinct semantic and create separate causal chains, doubting professionals narrate a single, but
complex story, in which peace activism has more preconditions than just 2002 and 2002 more
consequences than just peace activism. Salience statistics further reveal that the most frequent
as well as most important events were neither violence nor peace activism. Instead, a cluster
of events generalizable as "understanding" was crucial: processes of reection, a discovery of
religious sources, political analyses and similar knowledge- and learning-related events. The
development of understanding is paramount for doubting professionals and links the parts of
their story about the 2002 riots with their biography of activism. One example, in which an
interviewee tried to catch the ambivalence of religion, shall be quoted at length:
Figure 12: Graphical output from the event structure analysis of one doubting professionals'
extremely complex narrative (cp. section 4.2). While details don't matter for now, a consid-
erable logical independence of events connecting to 2002 (marked in the left graph) and events
connecting to peace activism (marked in the right graph) is obvious.
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Snippet 56 | m  sElm smAj m\ dKt
to EmlA Ek education bh  t hF km h{
logo\ m\ , pxAt nhF\ h{\ , hr bAt m)hb
ko lk hF krt h{\. m)hb s hF j  w
ho rht h{\. ?yo\Ek bcpn s bQco\ ko
mdý -so\ m\ jAtA h{. [...] bQco\ ko vhF
tAlFm hF jAtF h{ , *  rAn -frF' kF.
aOr *  rAn -frF' m\ BF jo aArbF m\ h{
to [...] hm g  jrAt m\ rh rh h{\ , hmArF
mAt  BAqA g  jrAtF h{ to aArEb BAqA ?yA
khnA chtF h{ ? [...] jo aAj s 1400
sAl islAm aAyA , jb bAt kF TF ,
to aAj kF date m\ to nhF\ Eml rhF h{.
[...] islAm k jo belief h{\ dyA , kzZA ,
smAntA , education v sb jo EkyA h{
aAj s 1400 sAl phl. [lEkn] log
yAdA m)hb kF pkw m\ rh ge h{\ aOr
log mOlAnA jo btAt h{\ usko hF lt
h{\. [...] is trFk s jo y logo\ k a\dr
n'rt DAlF gI aOr aAmn -sAmn d\g
kzvAe ge , uskF vjh s aAj hm\
EktnA n  ksAn dKn ko EmlA. [...]
to y sb analysis m\ krk ge to usk
bAd esA lgA Ek [...] E'r BF y yAy
EmlgA ? hmAr df m\ yAy kF þEyA
bh  t )ETl h{. bh  t lmbF cltF h{ ,
mgr hm m)b  t rh\g to hmko yAy
EmlgA. mgr logo\ k a\dr y smJ
bnAnA bh  t m  fEkl kA kAm h{. log
gIb hot h{\ , asr g}-t jb h  e h{\ to
yAy ln Enklt h{\ to unko dbAv
aAtA h{. lAlc hF jAtF h{ , DrAyA
hF jAtA h{. [...] BAI log kAm k nhF\
le g to bhn\ ?yA pkA k EKlAe gF ,
bQco\ k Ef?fZ kA ?yA hogA. [...] to
E'r v log Lh\D ho k jAt Ek BI
j{s aSlAh kF m)F v{s Ejyo aOr hm\
k  C nhF\ krnA. aOr kA'F log DEmk
BF ho ge , y [2002] hon k bAd. [...]
[lEkn] islAm k jo values h{\ v bh  t
aQC h{\. islAm kA jo Es\t h{ , Ek
jo EnrAkAr h{ usko hF t  m mAno , jo
smA\tA kF bAt h{ , jo aA)AEd kF bAt
hF h{. jo mEhlAao\ ko smA\tA hF h{ ,
v m  J bh  t aQCF lgF. usk jo core
values h{\. iskA m l [bAt] ?yA h{ [...] hm
meetings krt h{\ [...] hmArF koEff cl
h{. y logo\ ko smJ dnA.
If you look at the Muslim community,
then the education of the people is very
poor, the are illiterate and act by taking
everything from religion. They would
be very religious. Because from child-
hood on, kids go to madrassas. [...]
Children are very learned in the Quran.
But the Quran is in Arabic, and [...]
we live in Gujarat, our mother tongue
is Gujarati, so why would we want to
tell in Arabic? [...] [And] if you talk
about the Islam of 1400 years back,
then it does not t the present times.
[...] An Islamic ethic would consist of
mercy, compassion, equality, education
{ all this was already proclaimed 1400
years back. [But] people are very much
in the grasp of religion, and take for
true whatever thing the Maulana say.
[...] This way intolerance is planted in-
side people and by and large riots will
be created; in this way we have seen so
much sorrow today. [...]
After we made this whole analysis, we
felt that [...] anyway, will people achieve
justice? In our country, juridical pro-
cesses are very complex. They take very
long, although we will meet justice if we
remain strong. But it is very dicult to
develop this understanding inside peo-
ple. There is also envy, also fear which
was created. [...] Men nd no jobs, so
what can women cook, how will the ed-
ucation of children be? [...] So then
these people's energy cools down and
they claim that if it is Allah's will then
live this way and do not do anything.
And many people became very religious,
after this [2002] happened. [...] [But]
Islam has these great values. In Islam
there is the doctrine that you should re-
vere the numinous, there is the teaching
of equality, also the issue of freedom.
There is even the equality of women,
which I like very much. These are the
core values. About all these basic things
[...] we hold meetings, we put our eort
in this. To give these people an under-
standing.
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On the one hand, this snippet presents religion as part of the vicious circle of victimization,
marginalization and violence { on the other hand, it claims that Islamic ethic could provide a
source of strength and orientation. This interviewee tried to resolve the ambivalence by taking
into account socio-economic and educationary factors: learned people can make good use of
religion (because they can adopt ethic to modern times), while the poor reamin in the grasp of
1400 years of backwardness. Consequently, (religious) education is the goal of intervention. As
already mentioned in the last subsection, doubting professionals often ventured beyond cross-
cutting issues ("working in conict") into explicit peacebuilding ("working on conict"; cp.
chapter 2) and many indeed entered the realm of peace education, reecting the importance of
learning in their own biography. For example, one interviewee, who was not active before 2002,
reports how crucial reading and discussions with peers were during the initial steps of her work,
which at the time of our interview led to the formation of her own NGO:
Snippet 57 | 2002 m\ jo h  aA tb m{\
masters degree part two krtA TA. usk
sAT -sAT ek -k l m\ pxAtA BF TA.
aOr jb y carnage h  aA , to usk bAd
m\ g  jrAt m\ Ejs trh kF situation do
gI TF , to hm-hA y HyAl rht T Ek
?y ? [...] aOr ?yA y nhF\ bdl sktA ? .
[...] ?yo\Ek m  J pxn kA phl s -hOk
TA to E'r m{\n pxnA f  z EkyA aOr
smJ m\ aAyA Ek is trh h gAmA h  aA.
[...] lEkn [...] y to ptA hF nhF\ TA Ek
is trh kF organization ho aOr kAm
kr issues pr. [...] DFr - EDr lgA Ek m{\
is trh kA kAm. us smy v{s BF koI
hl smJ m\ nhF\ aAtA TA. g  -sA TA ,
frustration yA dd TA.
Before 2002 happened, I had nished
the second part of my masters degree;
I was also teaching in a school. And af-
ter this carnage happened, [I wondered]
in what kind of situation Gujarat was
thrown; there was always the thought:
why? [...] And could this not change?
[...] Because I always had a passion
for reading, I started to read and ac-
quired the understanding that the ri-
ots happened this way. [...] But [...]
we did not know that an organization
would develop and that we would work
on these issues. [...] Slowly I realized
that I would like to work in this way.
Initially, I did not have a complete pic-
ture. There was anger, frustration, fear.
Of course, other interviewees also tried to understand what happened in 2002. But in
contrast to faith based actors and secular leaders, doubting professionals typically emphasize
context factors and draw ambivalent conclusions, mirroring the academic state of the art in this
area (cp. section 3.1). The next two snippets show exemplary how doubting professionals argue:
Snippet 58 | Interviewer: First I would be interested if you can tell your
story. Basically. How did you involve yourself in that peace work? | It
was beyond 2002, it was even before that, because it was, in 1992, there was a Babri
Masjid. In the media, and it was a very important event, because [pause]. Firstly
that I would say I got involved in all that peacebuilding work or understanding
that whole world of conict, because I came to Gujarat. I came to Gujarat from
[location] [...] and { before that I had never experienced anything like this, like
communal riots. I have never been exposed to it. So Hindutva forces and all that.
[...] I used to ask my father that why are we staying in this big Ghetto, because at
that time we were staying at a place called [location]. Exclusively that colony was
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meant for Muslims. [...] So I said: "Father, before that we have never been to such
an area where everybody is Muslim, I don't like this". And my father said: "You
don't know, you are in Gujarat. You will understand later".
Snippet 59 | Behaviour also it is contextual. The community, the culture, the
culture of that particular geographical area { so it has a lot of bearing on that
behaviour. It's not always so much dened by the religion.
Three aspects are typical in these snippets: the contextualization in history (referring to the
demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodya; cp. Meisig, 2005), in location ("you are in Gujarat")
and nally the parallelization of "peacebuilding work" and "understanding that whole world of
conict". Contextualization typically led to a comprehensive assessment of the contemporary
situation: while doubting professionals put religion into context, they also argued that it should
not be left aside totally. This balanced view on religion inspired a change in their organizations'
interventions towards explicit peacebuilding. One interviewee reported:
Snippet 60 | As a team today there is very strong consensus and very strong
commitment to absolutely work on this issue [of religious conict]. And not only
make it a cross-cutting issue and say, there was a conict in Dahod and Panchmahal,
so we start working with that community. Because we started working with that
community and there was lot of risk and we were beaten up two, three months back,
we were attacked and all those are part of it. So earlier those things used to really
scare the team, in terms of not knowing how to handle it. For other reasons there
were the meetings, because we were working on land rights and all the conicts { but
this was a dierent kind of conict and we did know how to handle it. [...] Today
the team says we have to learn how to deal with it in a better way. [...] That we have
to ask, you know we have to ask that community to become morally responsible. So
we have to ask for an apology, a kind of a public apology, and that is the process. I
mean that is the stand which women are taking and [...] which [NGO] has taken.
Earlier, this NGO merely extended their established interventions to Muslim communities
(a prevalent approach; cp. chapter 2). But after their oce was attacked, they realized that
classic interventions only were not enough and started to make communalism an explicit issue.
This change in approach necessitated of many NGOs an often painful and complex processes of
organizational change. In this process, doubting professionals developed considerable leadership.
Even though many of them hold high positions in their organizations, they had to regain agency
in a dynamic which resembles the one described of emancipating women (cp. section 5.3). They
gain it not so much from own victimization, though, but from the shock of having been caught
unaware. The following account is exemplary of this process (my emphases):
Snippet 61 | So all this was happening and then of course this 2002. What
happened in 2002 it was really, really [pause] I mean it shook us all, because the
immediate realization was that all the groups that we had in our eld area, how
insensitive they were to what had happened, to a particular community. Some of
them were naive but some of them were almost feeling that: OK, whatever happened
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has happened for good. This is what they deserve. [...] Oh it did not make sense.
Because at dierent level there were very senior people who had some kind of political
orientation and social orientation. [...] And then one really started thinking: is this
what [NGO] should be all about? [. . . ] So as a result of all this, what we felt: it is,
it is absolutely important to work on this issue, and this is the rst time that I felt,
I am saying: I am going to take a stand and a position.
Here, the regaining of agency can even be traced on a grammatic level: rst something "was
happening" (a serendipic formulation) and "immediately" caused a "realization" (as an exigent,
uncontrollable consequence). Only a few sentences later, subjectivity is attributed: initially to
an anonymous actor ("one started thinking"), then in the rst person plural ("we felt") and
nally as individual agency ("I felt, I am saying: I am going to"). Even though doubting
professionals have been caught unaware, the own ability to act returns { and it does so when
interviewees actively choose an own viewpoint and develop own understanding.
This conrms the statistical importance of knowledge-related events in the narratives on a
grammatical level: a context-sensitive analysis of religion in conict really is crucial for doubting
professionals' political behaviour. To what extent dimensions of religious identity and their
interaction with peace activism also changed shall now be discussed in the next two subsections.
Religious beliefsets
Most doubting professionals have a liberal middle-class family background, which typically
brought them (if at all) only cursorily in closer contact with religion. But even if they were
not religiously raised, their professional interest frequently inspired a reection on their own
personal position towards religion. A typical story is told by the following doubting profes-
sional, who grew up a-religious, but discovered Islamic beliefs after 2002:
Snippet 62 | I saw women, and livelihoods lost, and for example: there were
people, and this is a big area, 3 lakh [30.000] population Muslim, and people had no
food, and they were not regularly eating one meal and all this was aecting me really
badly and then I moved around. Because before that I have never been to that, you
know: what is Juhapura [one of the biggest Muslim ghettos in Ahmedabad; RS]. I
just had a house, and as a typical donor and development worker, I did get out of
my house and I travelled all over the world, but I didn't know what Juhapura is
all about. And I was getting much and much { I was lost. So I was psychologically
aected. [...] And I realized that I did not know anything about my faith. That
thought came repeated again and again. And then I started reading, I started reading
Quran, the english version of Quran, and then I started reading books [...]
This snippet shows how the discovery of religion is not only part of developing a professional
understanding { it is also a process of acquiring a deeper self-understanding. In this process,
doubting professionals (unlike secular leaders; cp. section 5.2) abandon their prior assumptions.
But unlike faith based actors (cp. section 5.1) or emancipating women in an intermediary
78
stage (cp. section 5.3), they do not pick out theological details but develop instead a holistic-
aesthetical spirituality. To them, religion is neither about details of the good (a detailed ethic
or moral) nor about details of the truth (theological metaphysics). They are concerned with the
beauty of the good and the truth (aesthetics) and would typically equate religion with calm,
comfort, and a feeling of coherence. One young activist, for example, who has an orthodox
background but began his own quest for religion after 2002, related the following Su anecdote:
Snippet 63 | *  rAn m\ 700 pn h{\.
[...] uskA aA[vFrF pn m\ aA[vFrF fNd
bs h{. to p rA pxn kF bAt Cowo. y do
fNd smJ lo to EdmAg m\ aA jAegA.
Ek y b aOr a aOr s ?yA h  aA ? bs.
bs yAnF Ek bs. aOr usko alVA do
to sb ho jAegA. usm\ sb k  C aA
gyA.
There are 700 pages in Quran. [...] The
rst word on the rst page is "bas".
Then you should stop reading. If you
understand the following two words, it
will come to your mind. "B", "a" and
"s" are what? "bas". "Bas" means
"enough". If you turn it around, it will
become "sab" ["everything"]. Every-
thing goes in this word.
This interviewee is not interested in the details of 700 pages Quran. To him the experience
of coherence, of the beauty of everything, of a spiritual look on the world is sucient. "To
nd oneself in the irritating in-between, to become certain of oneself in sweeping presence, [...]
to stimulate and move beyond the known and expectable: this is religion, lived religion. It is
more than mere assuredness in the vulnerabilities of life. It becomes life-experience as surprising
self-experience. And this exactly happens when [religion] foregoes to clad itself in metaphysics
or morality, when it rejects to legitimize through holy texts and exposes itself to questions"
(Korsch, 2007, p. 257f., my translation; this must not be confused with more specic Euro-
pean discussions about "aesthetical religiosity", though, despite the fact that both emphasize
interiority; cp. Müller, 1999, p. 123. Doubting professionals frequently claim that Islam would
be truly progressive if only seen as such a holistic spiritual way of life, not as a set of xed
moral rules or demanding metaphysical beliefs. Unlike secular leaders, who denounce religion,
doubting professionals prefer reinterpretation, incorporating modern science and psychological
insights into a religion which fosters self-reexion. Two examples:
Snippet 64 | dKo m{\ s  bh pxn ko
koEff krtA h ?yo\Ek aOrto\ kF dAdAEÿ
grF rhtF h{. [...] nmA) &yE?tgt k
Ele h{. s  bh pA c bj uW k , kAm
EnpVA k pxo. nmA) ek yog h{. [...]
to nmA) kA bhAnA h{ aOr yogA hmAr
frFr k Ele bh  t )zrF h{. y p rA ek
Ev>nAn h{. aOr nmA) kA trFkA isÿ
lAm m\ ktAi h{. Ek BI iskF vjh s
t  m t  MhArF body ko shF rK skt ho.
Look, I [only] try to pray in the morn-
ing, because my wife insists. [...] Na-
maz is for personal wellbeing. After you
rise at ve in the morning and after the
work settled, you should pray. Namaz is
Yoga. [...] So the pretext of Namaz and
of Yoga is very important for our body.
It is all science. And like Namaz is the
whole Islam. That "look, you should
keep your body well".
Snippet 65 | I think that the most important thing about Islam is this whole
thing of equality. Which is something, which I nd is so important, you know, and
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the place of women [...] those were the things which were very very close to me, in
terms of humanity, and loving others and all that. And the most challenging thing
is about this whole jihad. How jihad is being interpreted by others and also Islam
by the Muslims { but this is such a wonderful concept of ghting your own egos.
Surprisingly, the word "jihad", which dominates academic and public discourse on Islam and
conict, occurs only this one time in all 19 interviews: as part of an advice to work on own
self-improvement (which is, by the way, not a good sign for the academic obsession with this
concept). Similarly, if doubting professionals use the term "Islamic behaviour" at all, then to
designate an overall ethical orientation, which is functional for societal integration, but not a
detailed moral (resembling the famous argument of Böckenförde, 1976, p. 60). Their personal
religiosity is neither the rigid framework that faith based actors promote nor the patriarchy
from which emancipating women try to escape with the help of secular leaders { but something
for which all three types of activists have comparatively little intuition: a spirituality "not
attempting assurance about any transcendental a-priori, but more in the romantic sense of a
reexive and thus ironical relation to oneself" (Luhmann, 2000, p. 110; my translation). This
is conrmed in the following snippets:
Snippet 66 | That whole thing about Fatwa and do this and there Fatwa and I
do that, this is kind of a [pause]. Basically Fatwa is advice, it is not like making a
[cross speech] rule, an ethical law and things like that. [...] So much we are saying
that Islam is connected to science. And logic, and way of life and love and all that
{ so it is such a beautiful religion, in terms of if you bring those things in life.
Religion is beautiful when connectable to one's own life: doubting professionals do not just
prefer aesthetic over given sets of metaphysical beliefs or authoritative moral commandments {
they do so because religion is only credible when related to experience. To nd an own relation
to religion, which is cleared of anything not coherent with autobiographic integrity, requires
considerable inner freedom, not least of community tradition:
Snippet 67 | I am not a practicing Muslim, because I have not seen religion in
that way. When I was a child I was absolutely like three times Namaz, I would never
miss Namaz, and so many times going though Quran and all those things. [pause]
So, but today I follow my own understanding: I don't have to do this, I don't have
to do Namaz. [...] And now, being a part of that community that I am in, if you go
to a mosque, or a tomb, or a Dargah, than I have to wear a Burqa [whole-body veil].
So I say: no, I don't want to. I am not going to pretend [...] I visit so many temples,
I go to Jain temples, I go to all the beautiful places, you know like to to Su places.
In this snippet, an inner freedom in religious aairs becomes visible, which neither of the
three other types of interviewees possess. This partly stems from certain characteristics of
personality, which will be discussed in the next subsection. But part of it also results from
awareness of the empirical variance within Islam. The only convert in my sample explains:
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Snippet 68 | f  zaAt k! to , mrA
nAm [name] h{. phl mrA nAm y nhF\
TA. phl mrA nAm h  aA Eh\d smAj
s. mrA nAm [name] TA. marriage kF
m  sElm s , aOr [...] jb fAdF h  I to
islAm -vFkAr EkyA. aOr mrA nAm
[name] rKA gyA. [...] education k dOrn
hF love h  aA , phcAn h  I , i\sAn aQCA
lgA. usk yAdA detail m\ nhF\ ge aOr
usk sAT hF -hAdF kr lF court mar-
riage kF [...] yhA p aAI to mr ss  r
m  Js yAdA bAt\ krt T Ek bVF isÿ
lAm m\ esA h{ Ek ek to m  rEt p jA nhF\
hotF. jo EdKtA nhF\ h{ , v EnskArF h{ ,
usko hm p jt h{\. aOr nmA) is trh
pxF jAtF h{ , kA'F bAt\ jo ss  r s jb
sFKF to , drgAho\ p nhF\ jAt. ?yo\Ek
[caste name] h{\ , y log , p r\t Vot h{\ ,
n. [...] [isEly] islAm m\ jo ElKF h  I
bAt\ h{\ , m{\ EjtnF jAntF h . [...] [lEkn]
m{\ [NGO] kF BF aABArF h . ?yo\Ek kA'F
jgh p hmko l ge , kA'F jgh alg
alg logo\ s m  lA*At\ h  e. unk EvcAr
jAnt ko Eml , usk ArA BF hmko
islAm aOr *  rAn m\ ?yA h{ jAnn ko
EmlA.
To begin with, my name is [name]. Ear-
lier this was not my name, though. Ear-
lier my name was a Hindu one. My
name was [name]. I married a Muslim,
and [...] then converted to Islam. And
my name became [name]. [...] During
my education, I fell in love, met him,
we felt that we t. We did not go into
details and quickly went together for a
court marriage. [...] When I came to
their place, my father in law talked a
lot with me, that daughter, in Islam we
do not revere an idol. We do not have
an image, he, whom we revere, is invis-
ible. And Namaz is read in this way, I
learned many things from my father in
law. "Do not go to Dargahs"; because
these people are [caste name], they are
very puristic, right. [...] [Therefore] I
know quite a lot about Islam as it is
written. [...] [But] I am also thank-
ful to [NGO]. Because with them, we
went to many places, and met very dif-
ferent people. We learned about their
respective beliefs, and through this we
[really] understood what Islam is and
what Quran is.
Her last sentence conrms how important and fruitful it is to empirically assess religion
(as argued in section 1), something all doubting professionals did. Parallel to their professional
discovery of religion, they developed a reexive, holistic-aesthetical spirituality. This spirituality
provides them a symbolic language to express their experience and grounds their demanding
work for peace by giving them calm. But it does not include moralistic or metaphysic details,
and it remains open to irritations.
Group identication
As in their assessment of religious belief, all doubting professionals emphasize internal complexity
and plurality when talking about Muslim communities (something few other interviewees did).
And like the professional interest in Islamic teachings personally inuenced many of them,
a confrontation with group identication after 2002 frequently changed the relation to their
community. Not all doubting professionals made both moves, but all did change in at least one
dimension of religious identity. An example for group identication:
Snippet 69 | So I have never thought that we should work for Muslims or that
because I am a Muslim, I should do something for them, it never occured to me. [. . . ]
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[But] my own identity [...] started surfacing. Which was very dominated before. [...]
So I think that identity started surfacing for me and I used to think very strongly
about my own community. [. . . ] It started surfacing and I thought: "ya, I am a
Muslim and I have some responsibility for this community". [. . . ] The rst time I
had this. The thought: I have ignored it, and I am not going to ignore it any more.
[...] I will do something for them, this is something, this is my moral obligation
towards the community. [. . . ] So that is what came to my mind.
This is an example where the new interest in religious beliefsets remained restricted to the
professional level, while the group identication side of religious identity became very personal.
Because not all doubting professionals reacted with rising groupness, most psychological results
remained inconsistent: low and high groupness, optimistic and pessimistic assessment of inter-
group relations and all levels of permeability for and resonance in one's surrounding were present
among them. The ranking of identication options was equally unclear: women activists and
willed non-categorizer were among them as much as those who put religion, caste or language
at the rst priority. The measure of dominance was comparatively low (cp. gure 13 on page
83), probably reecting the diculties doubting professionals experience in the formidable chal-
lenge of organizational development. But even in this dimension, the eect is low and rather
unreliable. Only one nding was really interpretable: doubting professionals' comparatively high
tolerance towards ambiguity in all IMA dimensions, especially towards irritations of role models.
This in particular separates them from emancipating women, who show low tolerance towards
ambiguity. Ambivalence as well as ambiguity was forced upon both, but doubting professionals
endured it better:
Snippet 70 | You know the fear that you have, you know coming from a minority
[voice breaks], that [pause] though I was a leader, I could not [pause]. I am sorry
| Interviewer: not at all | That [pause] even working in that team, where the
majority of the team came from the Hin, the majority community. You know from
the [pause] [...] I felt that I am a strong person and humanity and all that. One
felt that { but we became so vulnerable. Because suddenly I felt that I wanted to
work on this issue [of communal peace], I felt that it was very important, you know,
to involve Muslims, and to work on this whole issue of conict between Hindus and
Muslims and even as one did not know how to go about it, it was very important
to work on this issue. But I became very, kind of vulnerable, because I wasn't sure
how the team was going to respond.
This snippet shows how grammatic constructions break down and how singular, plural and
non-designated subjects are all invariably mixed when it comes to the issue of group identica-
tion. Like for emancipating women, changes in group identication were psychologically not an
easy dynamic for doubting professionals either { but they chose to confront this dynamic be-
cause they feel responsible, as a second example, from a Bohra interviewee (a prominent liminal
community in Gujarat; cp. section 3.4), indicates:
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Snippet 71 | I would like to start by saying that, you know, from where did I get
the inspiration. And that is very much me and my family itself, from my mother
and my aunt. [...] She was, I mean, she was very very pakka [particular] of her
prayers, she never missed any prayer and all that. Even now, she is [age] now. And
her { lot of people used to say [name] you don't look like a Muslim. You know since
childhood I had really heard about that, you know "you don't look like a Muslim".
And my mother just used to laugh and say, that well, we all are human beings, so
nobody looks like a Hindu or a Muslim. But at times she also used to get very
angry and she said: "what do you mean by 'what Muslims have?' Some horns?" [...]
This dialogue [in the family] has been more in terms of what really the Islam is, you
know, what real principles of Islam is and what we as we had known Islam to be
and how this is practiced, and the worry is that how these practicies, by the clergy,
by the women [uncomprehensible word] { how that is taking away away, how this
is forcing people like us to move away from the community. [...] But again, coming
back to why I, as an individual, felt so strongly about working on peace [. . . ] felt
that just because I was Muslim I did shy away from taking position and did not work
for the Muslim community. [. . . ] You know in 2002, you feel that [pause] you feel
responsible [emotional breakdown follows; tape stopped for one minute]
On the one hand, doubting professionals' aesthetic-holistic spirituality and their liberal { and
in this case also: liminal { background create tensions with orthodox Muslims. On the other
hand, and in my opinion even more important, they talk about feeling responsible for their
ingroup. They do not need group processes for their own psychological stability, but actively
chose to work for the benet of Muslims (which does not exclude working with Hindus) { out
of a rather modern, i.e. reexive feeling of responsibility.
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Figure 13: Those dimensions of doubting professionals' psychological test results with a vari-
ance considerably and interpretably dierent from that of other interviewees. Scales are z-
standardized and two measures assess dierences numerically: Hedges' g is a coecient for the
eect size or degree of deviation (values above .2 indicate a medium eect; cp. Hedges, 1981, p.
112.), the p-value stems from a non-parametric Wilcoxon test on variance equality, estimating
the clarity of this deviation (lower values indicate higher clarity; cp. Bortz, 1999, p. 149f.).
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6 Conclusion and implications
To conclude my thesis on religious beliefsets, group identication and political behaviour, I shall
now return to the initial research question and review the process of answering it. Unlike a
mere summary, this review concentrates on presumed and actual weaknesses of my typology
and on its broader conceptual implications. In the introduction chapter, I started out with the
identication of three shortcomings in prevalent academic approaches to religion and peace: a
lack of explorative eld studies, an underutilization of identity's explanatory power combined
with its insucient conceptualization, and a biased selection of cases, which ignores Muslims in
India (cp. chapter 1). These shortcomings led to the formulation of the research question:
Research question: by exploring political behaviour, religious beliefsets and group
identication, I hope to develop a comprehensive understanding of how religious
identity (as an abstract categorization as well as a psychodynamic process linking
oneself to a Muslim community and a set of beliefs about God, religion and the world)
accounts for biographical anchorage of peace activism and how political behaviour
in turn inuences dimensions of religious identity. My aim is to hermeneutically
extract, separate and characterize dierent ways of "being Muslim and working for
peace", systematically disclosing empirical variance.
Informed by sensitizing concepts from academic literature and based on 19 interviews and
socio-psychological tests with Muslim peace activists in Gujarat, I then developed an empiri-
cally grounded typology of the relation between dimensions of religious identity and political
behaviour. This typology distinguishes four major dynamics in ideal-typical condensation:
Faith based actors are stably inuenced by group identication as well as by detailed religious
beliefsets. They interpret their activism by dogmatic foils and experience themselves as
collective subjects. But behind this uniform facade, considerable internal variance in
religio-political orientation, theological thought and ingroup denition shines through.
Secular leaders are to the contrary neither inuenced by religious beliefsets nor by group
identication dynamics; they were religiously unmusical before as well as after 2002.
Emancipating women overcome the passivity of victimhood through peace activism and in-
creasingly struggle against religious patriarchy. They initially resort to Islamic ethic, but
ultimately discard religion { to the psychologically possible extent.
Doubting professionals nally emphasize the complexity and ambivalence of religion in com-
munal conict; they develop second thoughts about pure instrumentalization hypotheses.
Personally, they actively embrace a holistic-aesthetical spirituality and feel responsible for
their ingroup without identifying strongly: an unmistakably modern dynamic.
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Despite critique on one or the other detail, my research might provoke two rather fundamental
objections, which concern the relation between prior design decisions and later outcome as well
as the broader relevance of the ndings. On the one hand, one can argue that the broad variety of
"being Muslim" and "working for peace" circularly results from a lack of substantial denitions
of both terms in the rst place. On the other hand, "the cynic who comments 'Sez you'"
(Silverman, 2005, p. 237) can always question whether explorative case studies are instructive
beyond one specic context. Adding to the a-priori justication of the research design in chapters
1 and 4, empirical ndings suggest some ex-post arguments to counter both objections.
If one questions the Muslimness of religiously unmusical secular leaders or the peacebuilding
qualities of some faith based actors' projects, the typology would shrink by half. Can emancipat-
ing womens' private inuence on their sisters be called political behaviour? And does everything
that faith based actors do lead to peace, including the fundamentalist missionary activity which
one of them pursued? While fundamentalism is indeed problematic, the very structure of my
empirical ndings renders the general objection pointless: the dierent ways of combining di-
mensions of religious identity and political behaviour do not coincide with particular ways of
working for peace (with the exception that all emancipating women report their own biography
as their success story { but even they work in very dierent projects). Results would therefore
probably remain robust even when excluding some interviewees in favour of a narrow denition
of legitimate peacebuilding. Still, the typology might actually describe Muslims being active as
such and not only for peace { an option which should be reconsidered in further studies.
While a substantial denition of "working for peace" would probably not inuence the typol-
ogy, a substantial denition of "being Muslim" would make a dierence, and above all obstruct
the discovery of dynamics in the congurations of dimensions of religious identity and political
behaviour. Empirically, secular leaders (whose Muslimness is most likely to be challenged) can
become doubting professionals and emancipating women tend to become secular leaders. Social
scientists would miss such transitions if they impose their own normative denitions of Muslim-
ness instead of reconstructing the actual use of this category by actors themselves: my a-priori
decision to rely on self-categorization proved well chosen despite inherent sponginess.
The second potentially fundamental objection concerns the broader relevance of the typology.
Indeed, with a small and non-random sample, I have no possibility to assess its potential of
generalization: it might or might not be transferable to other contexts (which is still something
else than non-transferability). But the typology has conceptual meta-level implications which
are important beyond 19 biographies in Gujarat and provides rst empirical suggestions for the
necessary concretization and de-essentialization of the ambivalence of the sacred on the micro-
level of individual agency (cp. section 3.1). In particular the dynamics of emancipating women
and doubting professionals could be instructive to this end, as shall now be discussed in detail.
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Religious identities support as much as obstruct the transformation of emancipating women.
In an intermediary stage, the ambivalence of the sacred unfolds between internalized feminist
ethic and external patriarchial demands. In later stages, religious beliefsets lose inuence, but
self-categorization remains important: ambivalence now concerns the inner conguration of
religious identities (cp. section 5.3). Doubting professionals, on the other hand, actively and
explicitly embrace ambivalence in their modern stance on religious identity: they object moral
xation but long for holistic-aesthetical spirituality, and while they do not strongly identify
with their ingroup, their self-categorization produces a reexive feeling of responsibility (cp.
section 5.4). Both types show that the ambivalence of the sacred can already be found without
even considering violent actors in the sample. While the details of neither type can reliably
be generalized (although my ndings partly overlap with a typology of Christian and Buddhist
social activists developed by Wagner, 2006), the means of identifying them provide some meta-
level academic "lessons learned" for future research.
One lesson again concerns the advantage of non-substantial denitions: with too many preas-
sumptions, unexpected varieties of ambivalence might remain undiscovered. Since identity is for
both emancipating women and doubting professionals reversely inuenced by political behaviour
as much as it frames the latter, my research design had to be sensible to dynamics to analyze
them, and because this reverse inuence is an open-ended process, too many preassumptions
would have been obstructive. More general, "a transformation process is always susceptible to
[...] political, economic and social power relations in both discourse and institutions" (Buckley-
Zistel, 2006, p. 21) { including the power of local as well as academic mainstream which favours
a stable and substantial conceptualization of religious identity (cp. chapter 2 and section 3.1).
Methodically, narrative interviews turned out to be a particularly useful technique to remain
open to unexpected dynamics; in the case of emancipating women they even helped to construct
a hypothetical chronology out of momentary insights.
A second lesson is the importance of dierentiating several subdimensions of religious iden-
tity and integrating them into a comprehensive design. With only group identication in mind,
emancipating women would probably appear as strongly ingroup-bound faith based actors, while
doubting professionals seem to identify with their ingroup as little as secular leaders. When
religious identity would on the other hand only be thought of as a certain set of beliefs, misun-
derstandings run the other way round. The fact that ambivalence partly unfolds between both
subdimensions of identity { as is the case for these two groups of interviewees { becomes only
visible when the usual narrow conceptualizations of identity are discarded.
Finally, the dierent stages of emancipating womens' transformation and the broad diversity
among faith based actors suggest to look beyond the mere fact of dogmatic justications of
agency and in particular to use a concise denition of fundamentalism (cp. section 3.2). Only
then the diversity in how beliefsets might inuence political activism can be adequately analyzed.
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Having so far refuted two fundamental objections against design and relevance of this case
study and having outlined possible implications for future research, I shall conclude the conclu-
sion by acknowledging actual methodical weaknesses. These in particular concern the psycho-
logical indicators, which largely fell short of expectation. The Giessen Test might have been too
general (even though it produced interesting ndings for Kakar, 1996), identication ranking
and intensity scales did not produce enough variety and the Inventory to Measure Ambiguity
is only very indirectly related to religious ambivalence. All three instruments did not deliver
well interpretable data due to statistical restrictions as well as conceptual weakness. Meanwhile,
more explicit models of measurement of religious identity (like those developed by Huber, 2003,
2007) only t Christian contexts. Consequently, much of the information on group identication
actually came from unsystematic hints in the narratives. This topic should have been included
more explicitly in the interviews right from the outset, since socio-psychological scales proba-
bly imply too "broad generalizations about the psychological impact of group membership [...]
[while] a narrative approach to the study of identity and culture restores an earlier commitment
[...] to the study of individual lives in context" (Hammack, 2008, p. 223).
While the insucient operationalization of group identication is the biggest and probably
the only shortcoming of my typology, this does not, on the other hand, imply that the same
is any big advance either: the relation of "Being Muslim" and "working for peace" demands
continued thorough enquiry, in which the reconstruction of faith based actors, secular leaders,
emancipating women and doubting professionals can only be a minor comment. Despite all
arguments brought forth in this conclusion, the biggest strength of explorative research is still
the possibility of thick description, while the scope for theoretical conclusions remains limited.
The resulting slowness of research might be particularly disappointing for practitioners, who have
to deal with religion and conict right now. And even though I still consider broad exploration
to be necessary, I would have hoped that academia could develop its advice quicker and more
reliable (cp. preface). But unfortunately, "hermeneutic [research] is simply a way of seeing and
interpreting the world, not an action-plan to change it. [...] Assessing the in-between is all it
can do. Nevertheless, it can help us understand if and how boundaries and identities change [in]
violent conict, whether there are any obstacles to this process or whether they contribute to a
peaceful future" (Buckley-Zistel, 2006, p. 22). In this sense the actual last word shall be reserved
for an interview voice from Gujarat, recorded at the end of a comprehensive conversation:
I whish you have [developed] a better understanding of Islam and you proceed accord-
ingly. [...] Do not look at Islam as the spectacle, from the viewpoint of the West.
And you may not look at Islam from the viewpoint of a Muslim. [...] Just look at
Islam from a third viewpoint: as what is actually happening. [...] If you are asking
me such questions, I am also trying to [pause] see: these are not questions which are
there in my mind. But this is also making me think! To think is good.
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Appendix: Map of Gujarat with locations of interviews
Source: Wikimedia Foundation
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map GujDist CentralEast.png)
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Appendix: NGOs visited for background talks
Individual observers and NGOs only visited for primary interviews not listed
Action Aid
Ahmedabad
www.actionaid.org
Behavioral Science Center
Ahmedabad
www.bsc-sxnfes.org
Gujarat Sarvajanik Welfare Trust
Ahmedabad
www.gswt.in
Islamic Relief Committee Gujarat
Ahmedabad
Jan Vikas
Ahmedabad
www.janvikascommunity.net
Prashant
Ahmedabad
www.humanrightsindia.in
Safar
Ahmedabad
Sahr Wahru
Ahmedabad
www.sahrwaruindia.org
Samerth Trust
Ahmedabad
www.samerth.org
Sanchetana
Ahmedabad
www.sanchetana.org
Ulema-e-Hind
Ahmedabad
www.jamiatulama.org
Utthan
Ahmedabad
www.utthangujarat.org
Yuv Shakti
Halol
www.yuvshakti.net
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Appendix: Interview guidelines
Pillar 1: Biography of activism
 Structure: your own story, I will mostly listen
 Focus: please tell me the story of your political activities in the last 10 years, with a focus
on your peace activism
 Timeframe: 30 minutes
Please tell me how you became active for
peace.
btiy aApn amn k Ely kAyktA kAm k{s
f  z EkyA.
How did 2002 change your political life? 2002 k sAl n aApkA rAjn{Etk jFvn k{s
bdlA ?
How was your religion or community impor-
tant for becoming a peace activist?
aApkA Dm yA aApkF kOm aApkA amn k
kAm k Ely k{s mh(vp Z h{ ?
Please tell me a story where you were success-
ful in campaigning for peace.
ek khAnF s  nAiy Ejsm\ aAp apn aml k
Ely kAm m\ s'l rh ho\
Pillar 2: Religious beliefsets
Preface
 Structure: your family, you and Islam, your religious life, society and Islam
 Important: everybody has own understanding and experience. I am not interested what
the Islamic scholarship would answer, but in your personal answer.
 Timeframe: 30 minutes { please keep answers concise
A. Your family { aApkA pErvAr
1. Do you speak a lot about religion in your
family?
?yA aAp apn pErvr m\ i-lAm k bAr m\
bh  t bAt krt h{\ ?
2. On which aspects of Islam dier the opin-
ions in your family?
apn pErvAr k log i-lAm k bAr m\ Ekn
bAto\ pr amhmt h{\ ?
B. You and Islam { aAp aOr i-lAm
1. What is the most important idea in Islam
for you?
aAp k Ely i-lAm m\ sb s mh(vp  Z ?yA
h{ ?
2. When and where did you learn about Is-
lam?
aApn i-lAm k bAr m\ kb aOr khA sFKA ?
3. To what community in Islam do you be-
long? (Sunni, Shia?)
i-lAm m\ aAp Eks s\þdAy s h{\? (s  nF,
EfaA ? )
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C. Your beliefs and praxis { aApk Ev[vAs aOr aApk aml
1. Do you doubt whether some behaviour are
Islamic or not? Which are these?
?yA aApko esA lgtA h{ Ek koI &yvhAr
i-lAm k an  sAr h{ aOr koI &yvhAr
i-lAm k an  sAr nhF\ h{ ? es kOn s
&yvhAr h{\?
2. Do you do the prayers? What do you feel
then?
?yA aAp nmA) pxt h{\ ? tb aApko k{sA
l`tA h{ ?
3. When do you visit the mosque? aAp m-jFd kb jAt h{\ ?
4. Do you visit saint tombs? When? ?yA aAp drgAh jAt h{\ ? kb ?
5. Which festivals and Eids do you usually cel-
ebrate?
aAp Id aOr d  sr kOn s (yOhAr mnAt h{\
?
6. Do you visit temples or churches? ?yA aAp mEdr aOr cc jAt h{\?
7. Should Islam be adapted to "modern
times"? How / Why not?
?yA i-lAm ko aAD  Enk smy k Ely bdÿ
SnA cAEhy ? k{s . ?yo\ nhF\ ?
8. What happens after you die? mOt k bAd isAn kA ?yA hot h{ ?
(How will god judge you?) (aSlAh aApko k{s aA\k\g ?)
D. Society and Islam { smAj aOr i-lAm
1. How did your perception of Hindu and Mus-
lim communities change after 2002?
2002 k bAd , aApkF n)EryA Eh\d smAj k
Upr yA m  sElm smAj k Upr k{s bdlA ?
2. What are the duties of Islam and what are
those of the state?
i-lAm k kt&y aOr srkAr k kt&y ?yA
h{\ ?
3. Who should decide about religious issues?
How?
m)hbF m-lo m\ EkskF bAt mAnF jAtF h{
? k{s ?
4. Should sharia be a source of legislation?
The only source?
?yA kAn n fAEraA k an  sAr bnnA cAEhy ?
Es' fAEraA k an  sAr ?
5. Should there be dierent regulations for
Muslims vs. other people { in India, in
countries with majority Muslims?
?yA m  E-lm k Ely aOr d  sr log k Ely
alg alg kAn n hon cAEhy ? BArt m\?
d  sr dfo\ m\ jh m  E-lm log yAdA h{\?
Your questions? Thank you!
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Appendix: Questionnaire (English)
In accordance with the licence requirements of the socio-psychological tests, these instruments can't be
given verbatim. Therefore only the second (middle) part of the questionnaire is reproduced here.
Part two: you and your community
Following, we would like you to rank dierent possibilities to describe yourself. We give you ve possible
ways; please number them with one to ve, with one being what is most important for your self-description
and ve being the least important way to think about yourself.
I am a men / I am a women
I belong to a specic caste or caste-group
I am a Muslim rather than a Hindu
I am an Indian citizen
I speak Gujarati / Hindi / English as my mother tongue
Each of the following questions is phrased as a statement whith which you might agree or disagree.
You have six possible answers { please tick the answer which best describes your attitudes to the given
statement. For example, if the statement is "I think Gujarat is a nice place to live", and if you really like
it, please tick "agree fully". If you are, on the contrary, doubtful, please tick "disagree somewhat".
a
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1 I feel good about being a member of the Muslim community . . . . . . . .      
2 My own fate is strongly connected with my communities well-being      
3 Hindu-Muslim relations will improve in next 10 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
4 Being a member of the Muslim community is important to me      
5 I would welcome an opportunity to work for the Muslim community      
6 Hindus and Muslims often compete for jobs and power . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
7 I sometimes whish I would belong to another community . . . . . . . . . . . .      
8 If the Muslim community suers, I suer as well . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
9 I think I am a good Muslim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
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Appendix: Questionnaire (Hindi)
In accordance with the licence requirements of the socio-psychological tests, these instruments can't be
given verbatim. Therefore only the second (middle) part of the questionnaire is reproduced here.
d srA BAg { aAp aOr aApkA kOm
-vm k bAr m\ btAn k Ely nFc pA c sMBAvnAe h{\. ek s pA c a\k ko kAm m\ lAiy aOr sbs
mh(vp Z s sbs km mh(vp Z bAt pr a\k lgAiy.
m{\ p  zq h / m{\ -/F h 
m{\ EksF EvEfq jAEt kA h 
m{\ m  slmAn h , Ehd nhF\ h 
m{\ BArt kA nAgErk h 
mrF mA/BAqA g  jrAtF / Eh\dF / a\g}\)F h{
nFc k  C vA?y h{\ Ejsk ArA aApko svAl p C gy h{ Ejns aAp shmt yA ashmt ho skt h{\.
C, sMBAEvt jvAb h{\. aApko us jvAb pr EnfAn lgAnA h{ jo aApk EvcAr yA d  E	VkoZ ko EcE/t
krtA h{. msln , yh vA?y lFEje "mrF rAy m\ g  jrAt rhn k Ely aQCF jgh h{." agr aAp p rF
trh s shmt h{\ to "kA'F shmt" pr EnfAn lgAiy. agr aAp aEnEfct h{\ to "k  C ashmt" pr
EnfAn lgAiy.
k
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1 m  E-lm kOm kA sd-y honA m  Jko ps\d h{ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
2 mr BA`y mrF kOm kF K  fhAlF s j  wA h  aA h{ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
3 agl ds sAl m\ m  E-lm { Eh\d s\b\D s  Drg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
4 m  E-lm kOm kA sd-y honA mr Ely mhvp  Z h{ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
5 m  E-lm kOm k Ely kAm krn kA avsr m  Jko ps\d hogA . . . . . . . .      
6 Eh\d aOr m  slmn kAm aOr þBAv k Ely þEt-pDA krt h{\ . . . . . . . .      
7 kBF kBF m{\ cAhtA h Ek m{\ d  srF kOm kA sd-y ho sktA h . . . . . .      
8 agr m  E-lm kOm ko tklF' hotF h{ to m  J BF hotF h{ . . . . . . . . . . .      
9 m  J lgtA h{ Ek m{\ ek aQCA m  E-lm h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      
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Appendix: Form of informed consent (English)
Headline: addresses of both me and School for International Training, Jaipur
Informed Consent
The following information should inform you about this study's purpose, the possible conse-
quences of your participation and your rights as interviewee. With this study, we try to nd out
what role the religion of young Muslim peace activists in Gujarat plays for their activism. Ba-
sically, the question is: how far is your activism inuenced by your relation to your community
or by your religious ideas? We pursue this study to better understand the ways in which reli-
gion and peace can interact and to give better advice how to design interventions in communal
conict to promote peace.
For our study, we will ask you three sets of questions, covering your history as an activist
(how and when did you became active for peace?), your relation to your community (how do
you interact with people and do you see yourself as belonging to certain communities?) and
nally your religious ideas (how do you think about Allah, the world and about how one should
behave). The whole interview should not take more than one hour.
Your participation in this study is absolutely voluntary. You have all rights to decide whether
you want to participate at all and to what extent you want to share personal information. You
can always, even after the interview begins, opt to end your participation or not to answer
certain questions. This will have no disadvantage for you.
Unless you yourself request to be named, all data will be fully anonymized and stored en-
crypted with only the researcher and his academic supervisor having access, the latter only to
the anonymized version. This form itself is kept locked at all times and is only accessible to the
researcher himself and the institutional review board of his university.
The NGO Jan Vikas and its youth movement for peace, Yuv Shakti, help us in facilitating the
research. Nevertheless, they have at no time access to any data or personal contact information.
They will in no way be informed whether you participated in our study or what you said. Because
our knowledge of Hindi and Gujarati is limited, we also have to make use of an interpreter. This
interpreter is obliged by contract and applicable law to maintain anonymity. However, if you
feel uncomfortable with the interpreter but would otherwise want to participate in our study,
we can meet without his assistance.
If you have any questions related to our study or your rights as interviewee, feel free to
contact one of us, at any time. We hope that you are willing to participate and help us to
develop a better understanding of how religion can play a role for peace.
Mr Raphael Susewind Interviewee Mr Azim Khan
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Appendix: Form of informed consent (Hindi)
Headline: addresses of both me and School for International Training, Jaipur
shmEt
hm is s  cnA s aApko btAnA cAht h{\ hmAr an  s\DAn kA l#y ?yA h{ , aApkF Efrkt k
pErZAm ?yA ho\ aOr is an  s\DAn m\ aApk aEDkAr ?yA h{\. is a@yyn dArA hm mAl m krn
kA þy(n kr rh h{\ Ek g  jrAt m\ y  vA m  E-lm jo fA\Et k Ely kAy kr rh h{\ unk kAy m\
unk Dm kA ?yA mhv h{. m l svAl yh h{ Ek aApkA fA\Et kA kAm aApk m)hbF EvcAro\
s v aAp k kOm s s\b\D s Eks trh þBAEvt hotA h{. yh a@yyn hm Dm aOr fA\Et k
aApsF s\b\D ko smJn k Ely kr rh h{\ Ejs kOmF s\Gq k smy k{s kdm uWAy\ Ejs s
fA\Et v amn -TAEpt ho.
hmAr a@yyn k Ely hm aAp s tFn trh k þ[n p C\g jo aApk amn k Ely kAyktA
bnn k bAr m\ h{ (aAp kb aOr k{s amn k Ely kAyktA bnn ? ), aApk aApnF kOm s s\b\D
(aAp d sr logo\ s k{s &yvhAr krt h{\ aOr aAp apn ko KAs kOm s s\b\EDt mAnt h{\? )
aOr aApk Dm k þEt EvcAr (aAp aSlAh k bAr m\ k{s soct h{\ , d  EnyA k bAr m\ k{s soct
h{\ aOr a\t m\ isAn k sAT k{s &yvhAr krnA cAEhy ? ) is p r sA?fA(kAr m\ krFb ek G\V
kA smy lggA.
is a@yyn m\ aApkA BAg lnA p rF trh aApkF m)F pr h{. aApko aEDkAr h{ yh ty
krn kA Ek aAp is m\ BAg lnA cAht h{\ yA nhF\ aOr Eks hd tk aAp apn bAr m\ jAnkArF
dnA cht h{\. aAp kBF BF (sA?fA(kAr k bAd BF) yh ty kr Kkt h{\ Ek aAp aAg ism BAg
nhF\ l\g v aAp k  C þ[no\ k ur nhF\ d\g. iss aApko koI hAEn nhF\ hogF. jb tk aAp n
cAh\ tb tk aApk jvAb gopnFy rK jAe\g jo Es' foDktA v usk slAhkAr ko uplND
ho\g . yhA tk Ek slAhkAr ko EbnA nAm kA zpAtr uplND hogA . jo 'om hm kAm m\
l rh h{ vh tAl m\ s  rE"t rhgA aOr vh Es' a@yynktA aOr Ev[vEvAly kF EnEr"Z
sEmEt ko hF uplND hogA.
is foD m\ hmArF shAytA "jn EvkAs" aOr iskF fA\Et k Ely y  vA mocA "y  v fE?t"
kr rh h{\. hAlA Ek iskA XAVA yA aApkA EnjF EvvrZ unko EksF smy BF uplND nhF\ ho\g.
yhA tk Ek unko yh BF ptA nhF\ lggA Ek is a@yyn m\ sAfly yA aApn ?yA khA.
?yo\Ek Eh\dF aOr g  jrAtF kA hmArA âAn sFmFt h{ , isEly hm\ d  BAEqy kF mdd lnF pwtF
h{. d  BAEqy pr kAn n aOr an  b\D s yh pAb\dF h{ Ek vh aApk nAm ko gopnFy rK. EPr BF
agr d  BAEqy kF mO) dgF s aAp ko aApE ho aOr is a@yyn m\ BAg lnA BF cAht ho\ to
hm uskF shAytA k EbnA BF Eml skt h{\.
agr hmAr a@yyn yA sA?fA(kArF k tOr pr aApk koI þ[n ho\ to EksF BF v?t , EbnA
EksF EhcEkcAhV k hm s Eml skt h{\. hm aAfA krt h{\ Ek aAp a@yyn m\ BAg ln k
iQC  k h{\ aOr usko aQCF trh smJn m\ aAp hmArF mdd krnA cAht h{\.
F r'el s )Evd sA?fA(kArF F a)Fm An
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Appendix: Intermediary analysis of psychological scales
Intercorrelation matrix
Correlations are given as Pearson's r; higher ones (above .5, a contingent
dividing line) are printed in boldface.
R
o
l
e
N
e
w
C
o
n

i
c
t
R
e
l
i
g
i
o
n
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
t
y
L
a
n
g
u
a
g
e
C
a
s
t
e
G
e
n
d
e
r
D
o
m
i
n
a
n
c
e
P
e
r
m
e
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
R
e
s
o
n
a
n
c
e
I
n
g
r
o
u
p
I
n
t
e
r
g
r
o
u
p
N
e
w
0
.
1
8
C
o
n

i
c
t
0
.
5
3
0
.
7
7
R
e
l
i
g
i
o
n
0
.
0
2
0
.
4
6
0
.
3
2
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
t
y
-
0
.
2
4
0
.
5
6
0
.
4
0
0
.
2
9
L
a
n
g
u
a
g
e
-
0
.
0
8
0
.
4
2
0
.
3
4
-
0
.
3
2
0
.
1
5
C
a
s
t
e
-
0
.
3
6
-
0
.
2
7
-
0
.
1
3
-
0
.
3
4
-
0
.
3
6
0
.
5
6
G
e
n
d
e
r
0
.
0
5
-
0
.
5
8
-
0
.
4
8
-
0
.
6
4
-
0
.
1
0
-
0
.
3
1
-
0
.
1
7
D
o
m
i
n
a
n
c
e
-
0
.
3
7
-
0
.
3
7
-
0
.
2
8
-
0
.
1
8
-
0
.
0
7
0
.
0
4
0
.
4
0
0
.
1
5
P
e
r
m
e
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
0
.
0
8
-
0
.
6
6
-
0
.
2
6
0
.
0
3
-
0
.
3
4
-
0
.
4
0
0
.
1
5
0
.
0
4
0
.
4
0
R
e
s
o
n
a
n
c
e
0
.
4
8
0
.
4
4
0
.
5
9
0
.
0
8
0
.
0
8
0
.
1
7
-
0
.
1
7
-
0
.
2
6
-
0
.
6
6
-
0
.
1
2
I
n
g
r
o
u
p
-
0
.
1
5
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
0
-
0
.
1
7
0
.
2
5
-
0
.
0
9
-
0
.
2
8
0
.
2
8
0
.
0
8
-
0
.
3
3
0
.
0
1
I
n
t
e
r
g
r
o
u
p
-
0
.
2
1
0
.
0
6
0
.
0
0
0
.
5
2
-
0
.
0
2
0
.
0
3
0
.
1
4
-
0
.
4
9
0
.
4
2
0
.
2
9
-
0
.
2
2
0
.
0
1
D
e
p
e
r
s
o
n
a
l
-
0
.
3
1
0
.
0
3
-
0
.
0
5
0
.
0
0
0
.
3
4
-
0
.
2
1
-
0
.
3
7
0
.
1
6
0
.
1
1
-
0
.
1
7
-
0
.
1
7
0
.
9
0
0
.
1
8
107
IMA cluster solution
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